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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the existing conflictual tendencies in the Lebanese 
social structure have generated long term and continued cleavages and disharmony 
in Lebanese society and polity. Many interpretations have been offered to explain this 
conflict, but previous research on its genesis and outcome has focused mainly on 
variables whose main focus lie outside the social structure.
This study deliberately avoids an analysis of external factors. It, rather, 
concentrates on the role played by domestic factors in the aetiology, dynamism and 
resolution of the Lebanese conflict. It is assumed that the external factors have 
played a contributory rather than a causal role in the conflict.
The first premise of the theoretical scheme is that the basic causes of the 
conflict in Lebanon are inherent in its social structure, which failed to generate a 
change within itself. The objective is to explore the dynamics, in a historical 
perspective, of this social structure in order to determine the conflictual tendencies 
inherent in it.
The second premise is that the persistence of conflictual tendencies in the 
social structure tends to keep the socio-political order perpetually unstable.
As a corollary to the first premise it is argued that conflictual tendencies are 
inevitable in pluralist societies. Some systems have evolved successful adaptive 
mechanisms and strategies to contain destructive responses, but the Lebanese 
system did not. It is further argued that the endemic nature of conflictual tendencies, 
compounded with the failure or even flaws of the adjustment mechanisms are 
sufficient to initiate and maintain conflict.
The premises suggested here are analyzed in relation to conflict theory as 
envisaged by Marx, Dahrendorf, Coser and Ibn Khaldun. Marx's vision of the 
economic determinacy of the conflict process, and the supremacy of the economic 
factor in the generation of conflict had been contested by Dahrendorf’s vision of 
political determinism and the primacy of the authority structure in the genesis of 
conflict.
The argument developed in this thesis is that Marx's and Dahrendorf's models 
need to be revised in order to capture the empirical situation in Lebanon. The validity 
of the revised model is assumed in terms of its ability to explain the formation and 
behaviour of the conflict groups. For this purpose Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiya is 
offered to supplement Dahrendorf's concept of Authority.
On the basis of a causal analysis of the conflict in Lebanon it was concluded 
that Marx's doctrine of economic determinism must be rejected in favour of 
Dahrendorf's concept of 'authority' and by Ibn Khaldun's vision of asabiya and its role 
in the aetiology, growth and demise of power groups.
In considering the resolution of conflict, this study applies a theoretical strategy 
developed from conflict management to deeply divided societies such as Lebanon. It 
explains the manner in which Lebanon managed its communal conflict in three distinct 
settings: The 1860 civil war, the post independence era (1943-1975), and the 1975 
conflict. Each of the three settings investigated exhibited similar conflict management 
patterns; the first setting established the basis for power sharing, involving authority 
differentiation and marked communal interdependence.
The second setting witnessed a period of relative and apparent stability due to 
the implementation of the power-sharing principle within a consociational context.
The third setting manifested analogous conflict patterns and corresponding 
conflict resolution strategies in spite of the time lapse involved. Power-sharing and 
communal interdependence remain a viable option for the resolution of the existing 
conflict.
The three settings provide the study with an empirical base to suggest that 
pluralist societies are not condemned to continuing conflict as long as they apply 
conflict resolution strategies based on flexible, but solid, consociational principles. On 
the other hand such societies cannot free themselves totally from conflict, basically 
because conflict is a natural phenomenon in human society.
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1INTRODUCTION
To explore the root causes and possible outcome of the conflict in Lebanon, 
one needs to look at an array of interrelated questions, which unmistakably reveal the 
polymorphous nature of the conflict. What are the causes and the contributory factors 
in this conflict? What are the conflict issues and who are the main actors? What role 
does the socio-political structure play in this conflict and vice versa? Why has this 
structure been vulnerable and unaccommodating? Was it bound to collapse under 
pressure? What was the source of pressure? Was it ethnicity, religion, class struggle, 
political ideologies, or was it an external provenance? Is a resolution to this conflict 
possible? In other words, the queries revolve around causes, issues, participants, and 
the relation of the conflict to the social structure.1 The other part of the investigation 
relates to modes of analysis and relevant conflict resolution mechanisms.
This thesis is concerned with the genesis, growth, sequence and resolution of 
the conflict within communal groups and between them. It investigates conflict 
dynamics not only in relation to their structural properties and political motives but also 
as a challenge to public policy and social engineering. In so doing, it does not seek to 
direct the attention away from social processes, particularly the conflictual tendencies 
inherent in that structure. Nevertheless this study is in agreement with conflict 
theorists such as Marx, Coser and Dahrendorf that any analytical study of social 
conflict "...must begin with a consideration of the social structure."2 We shall be 
examining some of the structural failures which seem to be at the root of communal 
group tension.
I Causes
In considering the answers to the above questions I reviewed the conventional 
literature on the subject. Much M this literature is descriptive and has been dominated 
by three over-riding hypotheses. The first is that the basic causes of the conflict in 
Lebanon reside in the malfunctioning of its socio-political and economic structure. 
The second is that the conflict is basically a function of the interplay between the 
country's domestic, regional, and international environment. The third is that the 
conflict is caused and determined solely by the intervention of foreign powers.
It is obvious that the proponents of these hypotheses have had different 
perspectives. They differed from one another in their focus, methodology, and 
judgment, depending on their ideological commitment and individual academic 
training. Yet they all had one theme in common: they viewed, with different degrees
2of emphasis, but with marked empathy, the socio-political and economic structure as a 
fundamental variable to be reckoned with in any meaningful analysis of the conflict.
The above classificatory imagery of the conflict in Lebanon does not in itself 
constitute a valid paradigm to explain analytically the recurrent hostilities among some 
of the sects in the country. The writers failed to delve into the dialectics of the socio­
political structure and the conflict process. Some writers treated the subject as a 
dichotomous relationship characterized by a simplistic outlook. Their main aim was to 
expose the causal relationship between the internal conflict and foreign intervention, 
with the hope of exonerating the Lebanese from their predicament.
This thesis is concerned with the domestic factors rather than the external 
dimensions of the conflict. This is not to underestimate the influence, or lack of it, of 
foreign intervention. There is no doubt that the external factors have played a 
conspicuous role in the conflict, but its domestic bearings are the base. It did not exist 
in vacuum either. It has been nestled in a milieu of social, political and economic 
contradictions which, through a dialectical process, nurtured its restive character and 
hardened it to possible resolutions. The conflict changed in shape, form and direction 
over the years, but the social structure has remained constant. An analysis of the 
social structure and its inherent conflictual tendencies would reveal that they are 
mutually reinforcing. The outcome of such an interplay supports the premise that 
social structure is the spawning ground for conflictual tendencies and that the conflict 
itself contributes to the breeding potential of the social structure.
II Theoretical Perspectives
In order to formulate a relevant theoretical perspective for the analysis and 
resolution of the conflict in Lebanon, it is necessary to review the existing body of 
relevant theories as well as the empirical work on the subject. The topic under 
investigation subsumes these theories in two areas: (1) the nature of the social 
structure; and, (2) the nature of conflict. The first area contributes to the formulation 
of a conceptual scheme relevant to the analysis of the structural causes of the conflict 
and provides guide-lines for mediators’ and conciliators' considerations of the 
outcome. The other area directs to aspects of conflict which provide specific answers 
to questions such as: will the conflict change the existing structural conditions? What 
is the nature of this change? Is the conflict an ideological, communal, ethnic, or a 
class struggle over power, status and economic goals?
The study of conflict and its causes lends itself to several approaches and 
theories. These could be accommodated within two schools of thought: (1) the
3structural-functional school with its emphasis on consensus, order, stability and 
integration; and, (2) the conflict school with its focus on social change, power, 
coercion, and authority.
In this context the insights of some of the more relevant conflict theorists are 
examined. Marx's vision contributes to an explanation of the structural base of the 
conflict. Parsons' social action theory provides some answers to the Hobbesian 
question: How is it possible to achieve social order in a disorderly world? Dahrendorf’s 
notion of authority as the principal motive in conflictual behaviour sheds some light on 
the basic aspects of the causes of the conflict. Coser's concept of constructive and 
destructive functions of conflict points to an optimistic outcome of the conflict process. 
Ibn Khaldun's generic concept of asabiya provides some clues to certain questions on 
the formation and behaviour of the conflict groups as well as on the rise and fall of the 
state.
Ill The Basic Issues
The conflict in Lebanon broke out into a civil war^ following two apparently 
unconnected incidents in 1975. The first was an incident in the southern port city of 
Sidon in which the army clashed in March of that year, with an organized rally 
protesting the setting up of a fishing monopoly in Lebanon. A former parliamentary 
deputy, who was marching at the head of the protesters, was shot dead. Kelidar and 
Burrell claimed that his death triggered a campaign against the army which was to 
degenerate into the civil war.4 The second incident, several weeks later, was the 
massacre in Ain al-Rummani, a suburb in east Beirut, where on April 13, 1975, the 
Christian Phalanges gunmen ambushed a bus and killed 27 of its mainly Palestinian 
passengers. This incident, judged by Khalidi as the "Sarajevo of the Lebanese war"5, 
sparked heavy fighting between the Phalangists and the Palestinian resistance 
movement in Lebanon. The fighting developed, in stages, into inter-communal 
clashes, and spread like shock waves to Beirut, and gradually engulfed the whole 
country.
The conflict evolved in several phases and proceeded in stages, each marked 
by the emergence of new forces, new tactical issues, strategies and a logic of its own. 
The first and the last phases of the conflict were the most violent and costly. During 
the sixteen years of conflict, loss in human lives (estimated at 150,000 persons killed) 
and destruction of property was matched only by the damage incurred by the social 
structure in the areas of community relations and nation-building.
4The basic issues involved in the conflict stems from three main themes: 1) 
political reform, 2) the national identity of Lebanon, and 3) Lebanon's sovereignty, with 
specific reference to the relations with neighbouring Syria. Other issues emerged as 
the conflict progressed and evolved in form and focus but did not endure. All of these 
issues have had bearing on the sectarian and ideological relations in the country. 
Some of them are as old as Lebanon itself, and they were then a source of acute 
sectarian conflict.
In fact, the Lebanese were at war with each other before hostilities broke out in
1975. Communal tension had been simmering under the surface for decades. "...It 
had been a feature of the politics of the modern state of Lebanon since its creation."6 
In post-independent Lebanon, an earlier crisis shook the sectarian peace in the 
country. In 1958, the opposition resorted to arms to preclude the extension or 
renewal of the mandate of the President of the Republic who angered them by tilting 
Lebanon's foreign policy towards the West7 As a result, a three dimensional armed 
struggle erupted. It involved the President of the Republic, Camille Chamoun, the 
Phalanges party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the leftist and 
predominantly Moslem opposition. The army remained neutral. The capital city was 
divided along sectarian lines, the predominantly Moslem section fell under the control 
of the "rebels", as did the other two main cities, Tripoli and Sidon. Clashes continued 
for six months, raising communal tension to a dangerously high level. The crisis was 
defused and political consensus was restored as soon as Chamoun retired by the end 
of his term of office in September 1958.
This crisis was a warning to what might come, and pointed to the cracks in the 
political system and its basic pillar, the National Pact. Although inter-sectarian 
relations were restored soon after a new president was elected, stress and strain 
started to show on these relations. The two main confessional blocs began to drift 
apart in the early 1960s. This was associated with three phenomena: (1) the rise to 
power of an organised Palestinian armed resistance in Lebanon, (2) a soaring Arab 
nationalist feeling in the wider region, and (3) the Shi’a and their demands on the 
system for greater entitlement. The Palestinian resistance movement aligned itself 
with the Moslem-leftist bloc.
The rising Arab nationalist feeling among the Moslem masses in Lebanon 
alarmed the Maronites and their allies. They sensed that such developments might 
shift the inter-communal balance of power in favour of the Moslems in the country. 
Their fears were reinforced by the simultaneous rise of Shi'a power under the 
leadership of Imam Musa al-Sadr.
5IV The Conflict Parties
Meanwhile a new configuration of actors started to appear on the arena. 
Within the two main confessional blocs, several factions organised themselves into 
self-conscious conflict groups. They fell into two main categories: those who vied for 
a change of the power-sharing arrangement, upon which the political system was 
based, with a view to increase their individual share in the power structure of the 
country, and those who struggled to maintain the status quo.
However it must be admitted that, although the conflict had a sectarian 
dimension, it was not a conflict basically between Christians and Moslems over 
religious precepts, or between leftists and rightists over ideological issues, or between 
Arab and Lebanese nationalists over the identity of Lebanon, or between the poor and 
the rich, or between the powerful and the powerless over positions of authority. While 
some of the groups in both camps may have assumed one or more of these 
dimensions and utilised them as a springboard to achieve their conflictual aims, each 
camp developed, out of this mix, core issues which set them apart from each other. 
At certain stages of the conflict the antithesis was greater between its Christian and 
Moslem components and at another stage it was greater between leftist and rightist 
and so on, depending on the ebb and flow of the issue in dispute.
Lebanon’s political culture was guided, until 1975, by the principles of 
consociationalism. They provided a workable frame of reference for the diverse 
ideologies, and sectarian orientations to interact and keep the conflict within a 
legitimate level. Under the pressure of the war, this political spectrum was 
transformed into a polarised and dichotomous culture, manifesting itself in the 
antipodal configuration of the conflict groups.
Lebanon's conflictual environment was dominated before and immediately 
after the 1975 war by two major conflict groups: the Lebanese Front, formed in mid-
1976, and the Lebanese National Movement, which was already in place at the 
outbreak of hostilities in April 1975. There were few other organisations and 
significant political personalities outside these two groupings. The Lebanese Front 
was a coalition of several Christian parties, militias, personalities and organisations. It 
consisted of the Phalanges and National Liberal parties, whose leaders Pierre 
Gemayel and former president of the Republic Camille Chamoun coalesced with 
former president Suleiman Frangie, founder of the Marada militia, Father Charbel 
Kassis, head of the Order of Maronite Monks, and few other leading hard core 
Christian intellectuals, to form the Front. There were a few other organisations and 
parties which remained outside the Front but maintained an alliance relation with it.
6The Front's political objectives aimed at achieving: (1) the confederacy or 
federacy of Lebanon, in case the present system collapsed, (2) the liberation of its 
national territory, and (3) the redistribution of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
throughout the Arab world.8
The Lebanese National Movement consisted of six major parties and ten 
organisations plus few personalities, who shared a three dimensional aim: (1) 
reforming the political system, (2) supporting the Palestinian resistance movement in 
Lebanon, and (3) opposing the right-wing militias.9 The constituent groups of the 
Movement were: The Progressive Socialist Party, the Organisation for Communist 
Action, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Movement of Independent Nasserists (al- 
Murabitun), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Ba'ath Party (both pro-Syria 
and pro-Iraq branches). Other minor groups were: The Arab Socialist Union - Arab 
Brigades, the Arab Socialist Union, the People’s Nasserist Organisation, the Union of 
Working People's Forces, the Kurdish Democratic Party Organisation, the Arab 
Socialist Action Party, the Patriotic Christian Front, and the Lebanese Democratic 
Movement.10 The Amal Movement stood aloof of joining the Lebanese National 
Movement but coordinated its activities with it. The Moslem Establishment included 
the Sunni, the Shi'a and the Druze religious organizations.
Following the outbreak of war, the Lebanese National Movement announced 
its manifesto. This document, known as the transitional program, called for extensive 
political reform to ensure a more equitable distribution of scarce resources, the 
secularisation of the representative system, and the restructuring of the balance of 
power between the three branches of government. It also requested the reorientation 
of the institution of the Army towards sharper nationalistic aims and the aligning of it 
with the other Arab armies in defence of the Palestinian cause.11
What seemed to differentiate the two camps from each other were neither the 
sectarian nor the ideological orientations, for those two trends have been satisfactorily 
accommodated through various conflict regulation mechanisms, including the 1943 
National Pact. The bottom line was their profound divergent interests in changing the 
political system.
Several writers used different criteria to classify the conflict groups whose 
numbers and orientations defy easy classification. The pressure of events leading to 
the 1975 war polarized those groups into two predominant dichotomies which helped 
in drawing an Ideal Type classificatory model. Depending on the objective factors and 
their world views these writers classified the conflict parties and forces into two
7configurations: right and left-wing, Lebanese and Arab nationalist, rich and poor, and 
Christian and Moslem. Barakat's heuristic typology may have captured both, the 
notions of conflict goals and the participants' orientations. He characterised the 
contending parties as Rightists and Progressives, based on their political platforms. 
"The most reliable method of classifying the participants in the Lebanese civil war, 
then, is not by religion or class but by the division between those who seek basic and 
comprehensive change from those who would maintain the existing order."12
Khalidi shares with Barakat his classificatory imagery of the issues in dispute 
but differs in his assessment of the participants. He has conceived the conflict as 
between two forces: the Maronites and the rest of Lebanon, with the former struggling 
to defend and maintain the status quo and the latter challenging the sanctity and 
performance of the existing political system and trying to introduce changes to it.13
Rabinovich draws on Barakat's concept and has recognized three conflict 
groups: the Status Quo defenders, the Revisionists, and the Syrian supporters.14 
Demarcation lines between the first two groups were reinforced by the intensity, 
violence and shape of the conflict. However, as the conflict progressed, the alliances 
between the subgroups shifted and some of the groups swapped their position 
between the two camps. Perhaps a more significant change occurred within these 
groups that left its mark on the progress of the conflict. The Amal movement was split 
and a new splinter group, the Hezbollah, grew into a fierce competitor, whereas the 
Maronite Camp witnessed also the atrophy of the Phalanges Party following the death 
of its founder and president, Pierre Gemayel, and the rise of a new shoot in the form 
of a politico-military organization: the Lebanese Forces, which emerged from a 
conflict environment and assumed the leadership of the Maronite community during 
the spasmodic years of the conflict. The Forces were later dragged into an armed 
power struggle with the predominantly Maronite break-away Army.
This study draws on Barakat's basis for a distinction of the two camps, those 
who adhere to the status quo, defend it and reject any call for change in the formula, 
and those who lost their faith in the veracity and sanctity of the formula and strive to 
change the status quo in the direction of a more equitable distribution of power and 
resources. The first category includes the Lebanese Front and the Christian 
Establishment. The second category is made up of the Lebanese National Movement 
and the Moslem Establishment.
With the progress of the conflict, the participant groups developed their specific 
interest goals, but they synchronised them with the mainstream ideology of their 
respective camps. The religious establishment, on both sides of the conflict, was
8instrumental in defining the ideological parameters within which the conflict was 
enjoined, whereas the affiliated militias pressed their demands on the ground through 
combat and political manoeuvres.
The conflict groups emerged in stages and appeared at different levels of 
political organisation. Whereas the religious establishment and political institutions 
evolved as a result of a historical process which carried in it the seeds of conflict, the 
militias were the product of the conflict environment which led to the outbreak of 
hostilities in Lebanon. Each one of the three institutions played a distinctive role in 
the conflict, at its own level. At certain stages of the conflict the Institutions' role was 
paramount; at other stages, it was the militias' role which had the upper hand. Most of 
the time those roles were complimentary to each other. However, it must be stressed 
that the origin and genesis of the religious and political institutions were determined by 
the historical and political processes whereas the emergence of the militias and the 
radicalisation of some political parties were due mainly to the conflict process itself.
The two main camps were not the only actors in the protracted conflict. There 
were also a number of external participants contributing to the conflict process from a 
different, sometimes complementary aspect. The most important ones were Syria, the 
Palestinians, Israel, Iran, Libya and Iraq.
Syria played a major role at almost every stage of the conflict. Its role 
changed with the variation in the conflict itself, and sometimes it caused this variation. 
At different times, Syria acted as a mediator, a conciliator, a patron, a provider, and 
above all a balancer.
The Palestinians in Lebanon, both as a community and as an independent 
armed resistance movement, were perceived by the Status Quo Coalition, particularly 
by the Maronites, as a threat to the sectarian balance and the sovereignty of the state. 
The Palestinians' support of the Lebanese National Movement and their increased 
raids into Israel, which invited Israeli indiscriminate retaliations on Lebanon, strained 
the overstretched inter-communal relations. Moreover, Israel's persistent incursions 
and air raids on the Palestinian bases in South Lebanon, compounded with its support 
of the Status Quo Coalition, exacerbated the inter-communal tension and contributed 
to an escalation in the conflict.
Inter-Arab discord and rivalries were another contributory factor. They 
increased the intensity and violence of the conflict whereas inter-Arab concurrence 
enabled Lebanon to carry on the peace initiative to a terminal point, after which the 
conflict subsided and was brought down to a legitimate level. This stage was
9accomplished later in 1989 through the Taif Accord concluded between the Lebanese 
parliamentarians and mediated by an Arab League tripartite committee.
V Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution
This study makes a distinction, on the empirical level, between conflict 
management and conflict resolution. The existing conflictual tendencies and previous 
eruptions were managed by means of a power-sharing arrangement which offered 
each community an opportunity to contribute to the political process in the country. In 
retrospect, this system lacked the adequate adjustment mechanism and hence was 
unable to exhibit sufficient flexibility and potential accommodation in the face of 
mounting pressure stemming from the modernization process and domestic as well as 
regional variations.
The basic issues in dispute between the two conflict groups were resolved at 
the Taif meeting. This process evolved from several earlier unsuccessful attempts 
over a period of fifteen years. Several methods of conflict resolution were attempted 
in the past but failed. Conciliation and mediation by a high profile and credible 
tripartite Arab League committee was finally able to put forward viable proposals that 
were negotiated and approved by the Lebanese parliamentarians in October 1989. 
An Accord was signed between them under the auspices of the tripartite mediating 
committee, which brought that episode of conflict to an end, and set the peace 
process in motion. The Taif accord constituted a conflict resolution model in which 
communal pluralism maintained its legitimacy in the face of federalist desires, 
cantonization, and irredentist pan-Arab ideologies. It restored to the political system 
its structural options and provided the policy makers with a conceptual foundation in 
their search for the relevant process to end the conflict.
Esman equates conflict management with governance. In managing 
communal conflicts he recommends a shift in emphasis from the aetiology and 
progress of the conflict to the public policy that brings the conflict to a manageable 
level. This, in his view, entails the utilisation of "...all regulatory processes, institutions, 
and practices."1 ^ In other words, conflict management is a preventive measure 
applied to forestall any probable or expected eruption of conflict. Morton Deutsch 
believes that any regulatory measures applied to a conflict should determine the basic 
power relations between the disputants.16 Himes observes that conflict management 
involves the utilisation of societal measures "...to prevent non-legitimate conflict from 
developing, and once developed to return it to the level of legitimacy."17
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Conflict resolution, on the other hand, implies termination of non legitimate 
conflict and returning the relations to a legitimate level.18 To achieve this it is 
necessary for the conflict parties to agree to join the conflict resolution process and for 
the results to be agreeable to all of them. The parties involved are to accept all or 
parts of the resolutions, and the follow-up procedure established by the resolution 
outcome.19 In this regard, the Taif agreement is not only a settlement but an Accord, 
for it establishes a framework for continuing and formalizing the resolution process.
Chapter One of this thesis provides a theoretical framework with a focus on the 
identification of the basic causes of the conflict and its resolution. The conceptual 
scheme is drawn from the visions of five social theorists: Marx, Parsons, Dahrendorf, 
Coser and Ibn Khaldun. Their views on the basic determinants of conflict have 
contributed to the direction and analysis of this study.
Chapter Two presents a more specific analysis of the conflict determinants in 
terms of Dahrendorf's concept of authority and Ibn Khaldun’s notion of asabiya. 
These two concepts were utilised to analyze the causes of the conflict and explain the 
rise and fall of conflict groups and their behavioural structure.
Chapter Three describes the Lebanese social structure in a historical 
perspective, highlighting the inherent structural contradictions and their bearing on the 
existence of conflictual tendencies.
Chapter Four discusses the historical background of the power differentials of 
the two main conflict groups and the genesis of the conflict process, in the sense that 
the gain in power of one party was the loss for the other. This shift in the locus of 
power created the necessary societal conditions for the generation of conflict.
Chapter Five elaborates the theory of power-sharing in deeply divided 
societies, discusses its applicability to the Lebanese political system and provides an 
overall assessment of its performance. First introduced by Arend Lijphart as 
"consociational democracy”, the theory has been widely used in fragmented societies 
as a mechanism to ensure social justice.
Chapter Six describes the various attempts at resolving the Lebanese conflict. 
It also provides information and a description on how the intervention by the League 
of Arab States successfully achieved the Taif Accord as a satisfactory means to 
resolve the conflict. The Taif Accord was the fruit of painstaking third party mediation 
and possibly the gateway to long lasting peace in Lebanon.
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Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with significant deductions on the origin 
and nature of communal conflict, conflict group formation, conflict regulation and 
resolution, and the future direction of Lebanon. It reveals that communal conflictual 
tendencies originated in the social structure, and that the conflict itself was over 
positions of authority and access to power. Although the conflict was resolved, there 
is still a possibility that it would recur unless some changes are introduced to the 
social structure itself.
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CHAPTER ONE 
COMMUNAL CONFLICT 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
I Introduction
Scholars have searched for the causes of conflict in many fields by looking at 
different essential aspects of social reality. Early theories, in particular those of Georg 
Simmel,1 focussed on the "instinct" and "biological basis” of conflict as a key for an 
explanation. They assumed that survival is attained through a struggle and this 
struggle involved competition and aggressive behaviour. Other theories stressed the 
phenomenon of "tension"2 as a causal force to be investigated. This perspective is 
based on an individual’s interests. It is assumed under this orientation that the 
interests and needs of individuals are not always harmonious but most of the time are 
incompatible.
A third group of scholars has based their explanation primarily upon the social 
structure of society and the interests of the component groups3, assuming that 
different groups struggle for positions of power and authority within the social structure 
of society. Marxists contend that this "...interactive process itself is the locale of the 
causal sources of conflict."4
More recent theories have focused on the area of frustration as a basic causal 
factor in social conflict. Attention to this area was first drawn by Sigmund Freud. 
Since then several scholars have built on Freud’s conception and applied this concept 
in a variety of formulations.5
The main concern of those who take the "instinct" and "tension" perspectives is 
a formulation related to the individual's behaviour. Their contribution to the study of 
social conflict among collectivities seems to be limited. Group conflict is conceived by 
these two perspectives to be a single or "...weighted additive function of individual 
behaviour."6 Moreover, the analysis of these perspectives is at a different level 
because of the psychological nature which is difficult to integrate into either a 
structural-functional or conflict model. The other perspectives (structural, inter­
actional and frustration) are not mutually exclusive, although each one of them is 
committed to a fundamental explanation of social conflict. In spite of these differences 
they all tend to agree that the genesis of social conflict is in the social structure itself.
This does not mean that they are all equally relevant for all purposes. The 
problem at hand focuses mainly on conflict and change within the socio-political order.
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An approximation to an adequate model in this case requires at least two essential 
qualifications: a set of explicit substantive and procedural concepts that could 
adequately capture the notion of conflict and change, and a distinct conceptualization 
of conflict to help delineate the methodological approach, scope, and nature of the 
problem and its theoretical orientation.
II Methodological Approach
An adequate methodological approach for the study of conflict in Lebanon has 
to address itself to the study of conflict in power groups rather than among individuals, 
in which case a socio-psychological approach could not suffice. The problem at hand 
is conceived of in terms of group relations, communities, political parties and 
movements, status groups and social classes. A conceptual scheme is required to 
explain, in a rational, systematic and deliberate way, purposeful action, such as wars, 
revolutions, sects and cleavages, rather than non-rational, interpersonal, face-to-face, 
dyad type of behaviour.
The theoretical orientation upon which such a conceptual scheme is based has 
to explain conflict as a process of a normal social organism rather than as a 
pathological lapse of a harmonious and integrated social system, with permanent 
devastating effects and disruption to the social and political order. Assuming that 
conflict is embedded in the social structure, a theoretical orientation has to explain 
social conflict as a structurally based phenomenon, the genesis of which is grounded 
in social structure7 and its mechanisms.8
In order to construct a relevant model for the study of conflict in Lebanon, an 
adequate conceptual scheme, utilising well defined concepts and methodologies, and 
a wide range of theoretical perspectives were examined. The difficult task of selecting 
the relevant perspective from among many orientations is compounded by the fact 
that some of them blend into each other, rendering it difficult to utilise them 
separately. The most feasible solution is to select those perspectives that would 
provide a cogent matrix capable of capturing the empirical realities of the subject 
under study. Two theoretical orientations seem to fulfil this requirement, namely 
structural-functional theory and conflict theory.
III Structural-Functional or Conflict Theory?
To add to the theoretical debate, which contrasts functional theory with conflict 
theory, calls for a justification. A consequence of such a renewed debate is to push 
both perspectives further towards ideological and artificially polarized positions. Each
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one of these two theories contributes to the imagery of society which is seen by 
Dahrendorf as having two faces: "...one of stability, harmony and consensus, and one 
of change, conflict and constraint."9 The criteria for selecting one rather than the 
other is related to each theory's conceptual potency to grasp the basic features of the 
empirical situation under study. How far can a functionalist model explain a 
structurally generated conflict? To what extent is a conflict model more appropriate 
and an indisputable scheme for the analysis of the conflict at hand? Could a conflict 
model claim exclusive and comprehensive applicability or even primacy for the study 
of conflict in society? Does the conflict model supplant or complement the structural- 
functional model?
A conflict model could solve the many problems that would have escaped a 
structural-functional approach in the study of the Lebanese experience, bearing in 
mind that neither approach is to be utilised exclusively. Neither model can provide all 
answers to full cognizance of social reality, since society is assumed to be "Janus 
headed". Nevertheless, there are situations in society that could be analyzed by a 
functionalist theory and others that require conflict theory. Each theory focuses on 
specific themes.
Functional analysis dominated most of sociological thought up to the 1960s. 
Since then it has receded and lost much of its lustre. Its adequacy as a valid 
paradigm to explain change and development in society has been increasingly 
questioned. Disenchantment with it stimulated attempts to develop and expand 
alternative perspectives. Critics of functionalism10 found in conflict theory, with its 
array of dynamic concepts of change, power, authority, coercion and restraints, that 
alternative.
IV Lebanese Social Structure and Conflict Theory
The conflict in Lebanon is obviously an area whose focus appears to require a 
conflict model to analyse. Nevertheless it is legitimate to contend that a claim of 
generality of this model is not directed against a claim of competence of the structural- 
functional approach with respect to the question of stability, equilibrium, and 
consensus. Yet the functional approach does not grasp the "ugly face" of the 
situation because of the limitations of its basic assumptions and terminologies. A 
structural-functional approach would require us to refer to the Lebanese experience 
as a "social system", meaning that such a system exists within the geopolitical 
boundaries of Lebanon, and this system consists of sub-systems each of which has a 
function in terms of other sub-systems and in relation to the system as a whole.
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These assumptions have certain basic limitations as revealed in the following socio- 
historical fact.
Before 1920, there was no geopolitical unit called Lebanon. The Lebanon of 
today, with its name and present borders, was created on 1 September 1920, by 
expanding the area of semi-autonomous Mount Lebanon whose main inhabitants 
were the Maronites and the Druzes. The new incorporated areas were mostly urban 
communities, inhabited predominantly by Moslems, with an Orthodox Christian 
minority. By virtue of their urbanism they differed in their outlook from the inhabitants 
of rural Mount Lebanon, who had a self image of an independent republic of villages. 
By annexing the coastal cities and the interior areas, Lebanon became a city-state, a 
concept which did not have much meaning to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. 
Their contradictory interests and their different conception of what the new Lebanon 
was and what it ought to be were almost irreconcilable.11
The interaction between the various component communities was strongest in 
the areas of economic and commercial exchanges rather than in social life. This 
interaction was not strong enough to integrate the various communities into one 
social system. Each community developed as a social system by itself, with its own 
belief and value system, communal consciousness, specific interests and stratification 
system. Moreover each community is now self contained geographically and spatially; 
the Druzes and the Maronites live in their enclosure in Mount Lebanon, The Shi'a in 
South Lebanon and the Beq’a valley, the Sunnis in the coastal cities and towns, and 
the Orthodox Christian in parts of North Lebanon and the city of Beirut. This trend has 
intensified as a result of the present conflict.
Perhaps a more relevant portrayal of Lebanese society is to underline its 
pluralistic character. It consists of several social systems that exist side by side, 
spatially adjacent with apparent harmony but void of a basic central value system and 
minimum acculturation. Their exposures to a common life style, urban or rural, have 
brought the communities closer to each other but not enough to create from them an 
integrated social system. Western values permeated Christian society and influenced 
its life style but have failed to penetrate Moslem society sufficiently to cause a similar 
transformation.
Lebanese society has preserved, over the centuries, its pluralistic 
characteristics.12 Cobban observes that "...for about a millennium now, the major 
present-day sects have been living in the Lebanese mountain, each with its own quite
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rich and varied inner life..."13 Even present-day Lebanon is seen by Norton as no 
more than a grouping of sectarian communities.14 Petran explains this further:
Each of these communities has its own power structure, its own laws 
governing marriage, inheritance and other matters of personal status, 
its own (religious) courts and judicial procedures ... its own schools and 
distinct educational orientations, often hostile to that of other 
communities, its own hospitals, health, and social agencies.15
In other words, it is a system of multiple social units hierarchically structured16 in which 
conflictual tendencies are embedded and generated.
No doubt such a system experienced intermittent periods of stability, but 
behind that apparently smooth functioning system reposed divergent simmering 
communal interests which pervasively penetrated the social order, and around which 
a multivarient value system evolved. Between 1864 and 1920 inter-communal 
relations in Lebanon were symptomatically stable. The cycle of violence through 
which the two main communities of Mount Lebanon, the Druzes and Maronites, were 
engulfed for four decades in the nineteenth century, was replaced by an era of 
cooperation that lasted for seven decades. Yet the conflictual tendencies in each 
community persisted and were instrumental in defining and sharpening the communal 
boundaries, interests and goals.
An analysis of the Lebanese conflict and its resolution requires a thorough 
investigation of the social structures and processes of conflict and their outcomes. It 
is argued by this study that the genesis of the conflict is the social structure, 
generated by the communal contradictions inherent in this structure, and exacerbated 
by external contingent factors. It is further argued that the conflict process is itself a 
mechanism as well as an outcome of change. The repository of these propositions is 
the assumption that conflict, far from being a "pathological" phenomenon (Parsons), is 
both destructive and constructive (Simmel and Coser). It is also assumed that it is 
ubiquitous (Simmel), and above all a basic law of social life (Marx, Weber, and 
Dahrendorf). As to the social structure itself, it is proposed that conflict exists in all 
aspects of social life. Dahrendorf is very firm on this assumption. He postulates that 
"...wherever there is social life there is conflict....Not the presence but the absence of 
conflict is surprising and abnormal, and we have good reasons to be suspicious if we 
find a society or a social organisation that displays no evidence of conflict."17
However, some envisage society as an outgrowth of consensus. Williams 
believes that every society is the product of both attributes, consensus and conflict,
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and as such is held by both, consensus and coercion.10 Dahrendorf holds similar 
views. For him society is a "Janus head" but he highlights the conflict aspect of 
society as being more central to human habitation.
V Major Trends in Conflict Theory
1 Classical and Contemporary Theorists
a Karl Marx
The notion of conflict is a core concept in Marx's theory of change. He saw in 
it a basic law of life and an all pervasive predisposition of human nature, which exists 
in almost every type of social relationship. Although he was not the first to recognise 
the extent of conflict, he was a pioneer in studying its nature, significance and 
outcome in the dynamics of social relations.
Marx utilised the concept of conflict as a world view through which he analysed 
contemporary society. He saw conflict and change all around him. Conflict for him 
was not only a normal condition of social realities but also a "central process in 
history"19, which essentially is the history of class struggle. Marx’s historical process is 
carried out, basically but not exclusively, by two classes: "...in every historical epoch 
two classes are set against each other."20 In the stage of capitalism he specified 
these two classes as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat which constitute two hostile 
camps facing each other.21 Conflict, as represented by the dialectic process, seemed 
to be the only common bond that these two classes shared.
Of course, this does not mean that Marx reduced society to two classes only. 
Both Marx and Engels were aware of the existence of an "intermediary class"22 whose 
role in a conflict environment could not be underestimated. Nonetheless, Marx 
asserted that the relationship between the two classes reveals the "...innermost 
secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure."23
For Marx, conflict is not a problem to be solved but an ongoing state of 
exploitation, that is, domination and suppression, to be terminated by elimination, 
through transformation of the conditions which nurtured it.24 Marx's analysis of the 
class struggle revolved around the notion of conflict grounded, like the rest of his 
theories, in economic determinism.
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these
relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of
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their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society -the real 
foundation, on which rise the legal and political superstructures and to 
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production in material life determines the general character of the 
social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the 
contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a 
certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in 
society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or - 
what is but a legal expression of the same thing -with the property 
relations within which they had been at work before.25
However, Marx's emphatic insistence on the economically based determinants 
of class struggle does not negate the role of other determinants. "The bourgeoisie 
and proletariat were in conflict not only because they had different economic interests, 
they were in conflict also because Marx saw one of them (the bourgeoisie) as the 
embodiment of Hegel's thesis and the other (the proletariat) as contemporary history's 
antithesis."26 Nevertheless the concept of class is a cornerstone in Marx's political 
thought. He regarded it as "...the most important fact in political economy"27, and the 
basic organisational structure in society. The transfer of power from one phase of 
historical development to the next is a process carried through the class structure of 
each society.
Class affiliation, according to Marxist theory, is an objective basis for class 
interests and eventually for group conflict. Yet ethnic affiliation and assertiveness are 
to be reckoned with in any group conflict situation. Marx's mono-causal class 
approach to the study of conflict does not provide a satisfactory model to the present 
study, for it errs in denying the social relations their basic and intrinsic significance. In 
analysing society in terms of class interests and solidarity, Marx relegated the 
communal affiliation and allegiances, and their role in the genesis and emergence of 
communal conflict, to the lower rungs of the causal ladder.28 Horowitz defended the 
role of this factor by asserting that: "...ethnic affiliations have considerable power to 
generate conflict."29 Lenin acknowledged the importance of communal affiliations in 
conflict but indicated that they should not be allowed to hinder the emergence of class 
solidarity and the eventual transformation of society.30
Marx's perspective of the genesis, dynamism and resolution of conflict is 
governed by a profound economic determinism to the exclusion of other societal 
variables. This perspective leaves out a significant aspect in which history, tradition,
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and the normative system play a salient role in the conflict. Parsons' vision of these 
factors provides a different assessment of the social system, which nevertheless is 
responsible for the generation, or suppression of conflict.
b Talcott Parsons
Parsons' consensus model of society is based on the assumption that human 
nature is conflictual while society is consensual,31 that is void of overt conflict. 
Underlying this assumption is the quest for a solution to the question of social order, 
specifically the Hobbesian problem of order. The question that could be posed is: in 
the light of the existing contradictions between human nature and society, how is it 
possible to achieve "social order in a disorderly world?" Hobbe's solution to this 
problem aims at the manipulation of political arrangements in order to give the 
dominant group absolute power. He assumed that the world exists in a state of 
disorder (war of all against all) which needs to be set in order. Parsons, on the other 
hand, presumed that social order is the normal state of society and the problem is 
how to explain it.
Parsons’ answer to this question is revealed in his theory of social action in 
which he postulates that for social systems32 to survive they have to perform four 
functions.33 The first is pattern maintenance, that is, maintaining the stability of 
institutionalised values, beliefs and ideas. The second is goal attainment, that is, the 
process of selecting, ordering and attaining collective goals. The third is adaptation. 
The fourth is integration, which refers to mutual adjustments of sub-systems to each 
other and to the system as a whole.
For a social system to be able to perform these functions it needs a structure 
consisting of the following: a) a value system which would effectively establish the 
legitimacy of the normative order, b) a differentiated collectivities structure, that is a 
plurality of actors occupying statuses and enacting prescribed roles, c) a structure of 
roles, that is a class of individuals who through reciprocal expectations are involved in 
a particular collectivity, and, d) a normative structure.
It must be clearly stated that integration is a basic survival need for a social 
system.34 However, for the integration process to take hold, a social system must 
avoid "...commitment to cultural patterns which either fail to define a minimum of order 
or which place impossible demands on people and thereby generate deviance and 
conflict."35
Of particular significance to the analysis of Lebanese conflict is the role of the 
institutionalized value system. The Parsonian version of consensus theory maintains
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that the inherent stability of the social system is due to the presence of a built-in 
universal consensus of values. Once it is institutionalised, the value system is able to 
play a predominant role in legitimatizing the normative order. "Legitimating of a 
society's normative order...operates in the first instance through the institutionalization 
of a value system... then its sub-values, which are specifications of the general value 
pattern, become parts of every concrete norm that is integrated into the legitimate 
order."36
The epicentre of the integrative functions in Parsons' consensus model is the 
"integrative subsystem" which is the consensual base upon which political integration 
is built. It refers to that aspect of society in which members are considered "full 
citizens" and where the normative system is taken as the system of legitimate order37. 
Membership of the societal community presumes a degree of consensus in the value 
system.38
Parsons rejects Hobbes' suggestion that social order can be maintained only 
by means of force. He believes that the stability of the political system rests on the 
normative order of the social system, which prevents "...human relations from 
degenerating into a 'war of all against all"'.39
In a social system where a consensus of values is absent, the use of power 
"...can be assumed to be intrinsically the most effective in the context of deterrence."40 
This does not rule out the probability of the use of force, for social order rests on two 
complementary pillars; "the institutionalized value system and the overt and potential 
use of force."41 How does Parsons justify the resort to force in order to maintain social 
order in a repressive dictatorship? In such cases he maintains that a substantial 
proportion of the population is either completely or partially integrated into the 
"societal community".
A "societal community" in a repressive dictatorship consists of members of the 
ruling group whose consensus of values is the institutionalized values of the social 
system. The rationale behind it is that the whole process becomes a vehicle of 
legitimization of the rule of the minority.
From a Parsonian perspective, Lebanese society is organised into two distinct 
systems42 whose "societal communities" consist of two substantially different sub­
systems, the Christians and the Moslems. The "core of more fully integrated" 
members of one community is different from the "core" of the other. Members of each 
community possess and manifest a consensus on their own communal values. Those 
values are perceived to be normatively institutionalized for the whole social system.
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Legitimacy of the system is derived from the process of institutionalization. For the 
Christians "Lebanism" ranks highest among their institutionalized political values. For 
the Moslems it is "Arabism". Both concepts were reconciled by the National Pact of 
1943.
To Parsons' credit the war and the ensuing conflict confirmed this pattern. It 
hardened the boundaries of the sub-systems, sharpened their goals, demarcated their 
institutionalized values, and created a well-defined integrated "societal community". 
The elites were able to carry their masses to adopt their institutionalized value system, 
and establish a normative order accordingly.
In his explanation of how socio-economic and political structures create order, 
Parsons emphasized the role of the normative system in this process. According to 
his perspective, social order is considered a function of the value system and as such 
falls short of explaining social change.43 Consensus, however, describes all forms of 
social relations up to but excluding the overt use of force. This means that violent 
conflicts are left out of his conceptual scheme, a case Parsons refers to as a residual 
problem outside his theory.
Parsons' conceptualization of the role of the social system in generating 
conflict and his theory of social change fail to capture the basic concept of conflict and 
change in Lebanese society. Ralf Dahrendorf, with his emphasis on the role of 
authority structure in the generation of conflict, offers an alternative scheme to both 
Marx’s economic determinism and Parsons' normative order for the analysis of the 
conflict in Lebanon.
c Ralf Dahrendorf
Dahrendorf's early contribution to the consensus-conflict debate redirected the 
interest towards the theme of conflict and its concepts of power, domination, force, 
coercion, constraint and social change.
Dahrendorf's conflict scheme was developed in the following areas: a) his 
refutation of the consensus theory as a basic survival requisite for the social system; 
b) his critique and expansion of Marx's postulate of class struggle,44 shifting the 
emphasis of the sources of conflict from the differential distribution of property to the 
differential distribution of power and authority45; and, c) his development of a conflict 
model postulating the ubiquity of social conflict and social change.46 "...It appears that 
not only in social life, but wherever there is life, there is conflict."47 Although denying 
that his model is a substitute to the one-sided consensus model, he yet proceeded to 
show that it is the only way out of Parsons' "Utopia". In his analysis there is a
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persistent hint that his conflict model constitutes a "...more comprehensive theory of 
society."48 As the consensus model is equipped to tackle only the problem of stability 
and order in society, Dahrendorf believes that it failed to explain the phenomenon of 
change and conflict.49
In his assault on the consensus model, Dahrendorf claims that individuals 
within groups are consensual, yet relations between groups are conflictual. Above 
and beyond that, the consensus within a group may have been produced by the 
process of conflict between the groups themselves. In a broader perspective, he 
rejects the consensus theory on the following grounds50:
First, he claims that it is a "utopian" model portraying social change as an 
organic growth which is seen as an abnormal phenomenon.51 Social change and 
social conflict are viewed by Dahrendorf as a normal state of society.52
Second, he believes that a consensus model professes that stability in the 
social system is assumed by the presence of a consensus on values among the 
dominant group (societal community). These values are institutionalised in the social 
system and provide it with order and stability by a legitimating of the normative order.
Third, he holds that in such a model non-conformists to the value system are 
deviants and their behaviour is pathological and leads to the disturbance of 
equilibrium in the social system.
Moreover the consensus model justifies and serves the status quo in society. 
All functions and processes of society move in a recurrent and predetermined pattern 
for the purpose of upholding the existing state of affairs.
In contradistinction to the consensus model, Dahrendorf proposes a conflict 
model that rests on the following basic assumptions 53: a) every society is subjected at 
every moment to change; social change is ubiquitous, b) every society experiences at 
every moment social conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous, c) every element in society 
contributes to its change, and d) every society rests on constraint of some of its 
members by others.
Dahrendorf qualifies the universality of his model by accepting the argument 
that "...stability and change, integration and conflict...consensus and constraint 
are...two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society."54 Some problems could 
be analysed through a consensus approach, others require a conflict model. Both 
perspectives emphasize different aspects. Van den Berghe lends his support to this 
perspective by stating that consensus "...is a major dimension of social reality, but so
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are dissension and conflict.”55 It is a reconciliatory attempt between the two theories 
at the assumptive level. The main question of which theory is most typical of the 
social system remains an empirical one.56 At such a level the question becomes: 
under what conditions do conflict groups form, enter into conflict, and affect a change 
in the social structure?
In Dahrendorf's conflict model, Parsons' social system and Marx's class 
concept are supplanted by the Weberian term of "imperatively coordinated 
association". Dahrendorf writes:
"Social system" is a very general concept applicable to all types of 
organizations; and we shall want to employ an equally general concept 
which differs from that of social system by emphasising a different 
aspect of the same organisations....It appears justifiable to use the term 
association in such a way as to imply the coordination of organized 
aggregate of roles by domination and subjection. The state, a church, 
an enterprise, but also a political party, a trade union and a chess club 
are associations in this sense. In all of them authority relations exist, 
for all of them conflict analysis is therefore applicable....In looking at 
social organizations not in terms of their integration and coherence but 
from the point of view of their structure of coercion and constraint, we 
regard them as (imperatively coordinated) associations rather than as 
social systems. Because ... they generate conflict of interests and 
become the birthplace of conflict groups.57
The "imperatively coordinated association" is an organization of roles 
differentiated by power relations. Some roles have enough power to extract 
obedience from others. These power manifestations tend to become legitimated and 
are viewed as authority relations in which certain positions become normatively right 
to be dominant and other positions to be subordinate. Authority is a legitimate relation 
of supra and subordination and is based on an expectation associated with social 
position. Failure to obey the command is sanctioned.
Underlying the notion of roles displaying power differentials is the assumption 
that people have different interests which come in conflict with each other. Some 
people gain more power and use it in pursuing their interests. Dahrendorf observes 
that:
In all human societies, there are positions that enable their bearers to 
exercise power. These positions are endowed with sovereignty- the men
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who hold them lay down the law for their subjects. Obedience is 
enforced, for the most important single aspect of power is the control of 
sanctions....It follows from this notion of power, and sanctions that there 
is always resistance to the exercise of power and that both the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of power- if there is any difference between 
these two concepts- are precarious. Normally those in power manage to 
stay in power. Theirs is the stronger group, and society is held together 
by the exercise of their strength, that is, by constraint.58
In his attempt to opt out of Parsons' utopia, Dahrendorf turned to some of 
Marx's key assumptions on the notion of conflict and class organization. He 
reformulated them with a slant towards the dialectics. Nevertheless, he rejected 
Marx's formulation of class as being determined by the relations of the means of 
productions. Instead he stipulated that it is the unequal distribution of authority that 
determines the nature and organization of class.59 Based on this assumption, 
Dahrendorf postulated a bifurcated model of class conflict which he, unlike Marx, 
applied to the "imperatively coordinated associations" rather than to the whole society.
In each "imperatively coordinated association" two aggregates can be 
discerned: those who have general basic rights (the ruled), and, those who have 
authority rights over the former (the rulers). It is a dichotomous relationship; there is 
no gradation between them. "Every position in an imperatively co-ordinated group 
can be recognized as belonging to one who dominates or one who is dominated."60 
Different positions involve conflicting interests. The rulers have interest in preserving 
the status quo, and the ruled have equal interest in redistributing power and authority. 
Under certain empirically variable conditions awareness of these interests in both 
groups increases and develops into a conflict over positions of authority.61
Parsons conceded that interests do conflict with each other but he argued that 
the community-held values could override those conflicting interests and establish 
social order. Marx gives more weight to interests over values. He affirms that 
interests determine values62 and are systematically generated through the productive 
process. Dahrendorf's notion of authority is central to his conflict theory. He 
considered Marx’s postulates of economic determinism as derivatives from the 
unequal distribution of authority, but he agrees with Marx that conflict has a 
dichotomous nature.
Dahrendorf's analytical scheme explains the communal struggle in Lebanon 
over political reform. The Status Quo Coalition, which occupied a dominant position in 
the Lebanese power structure, rejected demands for a change in this structure lest it
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lost its position of authority to the contending party, in a zero-sum formula. The 
struggle between the rival communities is, in essence, over positions of authority and 
as such is prompted by different perceptions of communal entitlement in the 
government's reward system. It is assumed here that those who are in power have 
better access to this system.
Dahrendorf’s analysis of the nature of conflict did not extend into the area of 
the functions of conflict. This aspect was elaborated by Lewis Coser who revealed 
that conflict, contrary to Parsons’ imagery in this respect, has a constructive dimension 
and an integrative effect. To what extent do Coser*s perspectives of social conflict 
help explain the Lebanese experience?
d Lewis Coser
Coser developed an image of society whose locus is at a mid-point between 
Parsons' de-emphasis on conflict and Dahrendorf's neglect of the functional aspect of 
it.63 Using Simmel's conflict ideas as a starting point he advanced the integrative 
characteristic of conflict, arguing that the visions of both Parsons and Dahrendorf 
represent the same realities. Coser attempted to bridge the gap between the 
consensus and conflict schools. He rejected the dichotomous interpretation of both 
approaches in favour of a "middle of the road" scheme. "The social scene is neither a 
war of all against all...nor is it a frictionless Utopian vacuum where strife is banned for 
ever and men adjust to one another in blissful harmony."64 He avoided entanglement 
in some of the thorny issues, such as the social system's needs and functional 
prerequisites. He disagreed with Parsons' view that conflict is disruptive and 
dissociative and primarily a disease. By the same token he argued against Marx's 
and Dahrendorf's emphasis on the consequences of violent conflict. To him conflict is 
a normal phenomenon that could result in either integration or disintegration.65
Coser's efforts to specify, systematize, extend and reformulate Simmel's 
propositions on the subject of conflict are his major contribution to conflict theory. 
Simmel, like Marx, regarded conflict as ubiquitous and inevitable but he did not share 
Marx's recognition of the social structure as being composed of domination and 
subjugation, but of associative and dissociative processes.66 These processes are, in 
his view, essential for the maintenance of the structure. "Groups require disharmony 
as well as harmony, dissociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are 
by no means altogether disruptive factors."67
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SimmePs analysis of conflict is oriented in the direction of the role of conflict in 
promoting solidarity, integration and the orderly change of the system. He formulated 
a number of propositions on the functions of social conflict.
Coser expanded and developed these propositions into a comprehensive 
scheme that postulated an explanation of the causes, intensity, duration and functions 
of conflict.60 To him conflict could be either constructive or destructive depending on 
the issues in dispute, and the social structure within which it occurs. Some social 
structures are less tolerant than others in their reaction to rival communal entitlements 
and claims to scarce resources. Such structures are rigid and lack safety-valve 
mechanisms for allowing antagonistic expression.
Another condition which contributes to the nature of conflict is the value 
systems, goals and interests of the conflict parties. Coser holds that if the social 
conflict is over goals, values or interests that are compatible with the basic relationship 
of the conflict groups then it is "...positively functional for the social structure." On the 
other hand if the conflict is between groups who do not share the same values, then 
the conflict is disruptive to this system.69
Coser reformulated Simmel's proposition in such a way as to analyse not only 
the functions of conflict but also the causes underlying its integrative potency70. This 
imagery addresses eight major structural themes in the functions of conflict. These 
themes revolve around cohesion, harmony, identity and boundary of the conflict 
groups.71
Some of Coser's propositions subsumed under those themes are relevant to 
the Lebanese conflict. Let us look at them now one by one.
Proposition N° 1: Conflict establishes a group identity, preserves its distinctiveness 
and maintains its boundary, solidarity and cohesion.
Historical evidence shows that, since its inception in the fifth century, the 
Maronite community was involved, first as a sect and later as a community, in 
constant conflict with other groups; with the Jacobites in Syria, with the Shi’a in 
northern Lebanon following their settlement there and more recently with the Druzes 
in Mount Lebanon as a result of their expansion into that area. Its "communal 
consciousness" and "in-group" feeling was established through these episodes of 
conflict. Conflict seemed also to preserve the cohesion of the Druze community. Its 
ego identity was well established around its esoteric religion and closed social 
structure.
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Recent conflict in Lebanon helped to establish the autonomy of participating 
groups, an "in-group" identity and an "out-group" reference. The Maronites, and to a 
lesser degree the Sunnis, their partners in the 1943 power-sharing agreement, 
constituted an out-group source for the Shi'a, and other sects to emulate and resent 
at the same time. As a less privileged group, the Shi'a, having developed an 
awareness of their status, looked to the Maronites as a community with a higher 
educational and economic standard and strove hard to raise its standards to match 
those of the Maronites. Other communities, such as the Sunnis and Druzes, looked 
upon the Maronites as their higher partners. Yet the three communities, and probably 
other non-Maronite groups, once they became more aware of their entitlements, 
resented the Maronites' privileged status within the state structure. These attitudes 
preserved and hardened the boundaries between the various conflict groups and they 
served to establish group identity and behaviour.
Proposition N° 2: Conflict may serve a positive function for the relationship of groups. 
It is therefore vital for the maintenance of this relationship.
The existence of alternative objects of conflict constitutes a safety-valve 
mechanism to help preserve the social structure. Communal tension had been 
building in Lebanon for three decades following independence. The 1975 conflict 
permitted the rival communities to puff the steam, to release tension and maintain the 
relationship between the communities, though at a price. Conflict in this sense served 
as a safety-valve to release the pressure from the social structure. However, other 
outlets to divert hostile and antagonistic attitudes from the original object to a 
"substitute object" existed.
When the Christian-Moslem communal relations came under pressure 
following the Reformist Camp's demand for political reform, the Phalanges party and 
its supporters shifted their hostility from the Moslems towards their Palestinian backers 
in Lebanon in order to avoid any damage to the principle of coexistence between the 
two main communal blocs. As the conflict escalated the object of their hostility was 
expanded to include the Syrians, Iranians and Libyans who were involved on the side 
of the Reformist Camp. It was always stated by the Phalangist propaganda machine 
that they had no quarrel with the Lebanese rival camp and if it were left to the 
domestic parties there would be instant peace. On the other hand, the Reformist 
Camp displaced their hostilities towards the Status Quo Coalition onto Israel, which 
was a major ally and provider for the Coalition. The communal relations were 
maintained and the principle of coexistence was formally saved.
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Proposition N° 3: A conflict is more intense if it occurs in a close relationship. Within 
such a relationship, disloyalty, apostasy and renegadism are not tolerated, because 
they have disruptive effects on the group's unity. Hostile feeling is suppressed for fear 
of its danger to the principle of coexistence. Such a suppression of hostile feeling 
results in greater intensity of conflict once it is acted out.
Lebanon's limited space, coupled with its high population density (300 persons 
per square kilometre) makes its social structure look like a bee-hive; vigorous and very 
close. The frequency of interaction between the populations both as individuals and 
as groups is very high due, among other things, to the system of centralized services 
in the country. The relationship between the groups is characterized by intimacy and 
total involvement of their members. This type of relationship generates, in Coser's 
view, hostile feeling "...since it furnishes frequent occasions for conflict."72
Hostile feelings between the Lebanese communities were suppressed on more 
than one occasion during Lebanon's independent history. Political crises such as the 
1958 civil disturbances and several other inter-sectarian incidences were instantly 
suppressed for fear of widening the abyss between the various component sects 
which might have led to intense conflict. This allowed the suppressed hostile feelings 
to accumulate and fester over the years. When they were acted out in 1975 they 
were more intense than expected.
Proposition N° 4: Conflict could be a unifying factor if it occurs within the same 
confessional framework but does not involve the basis of consensus.
Throughout the war years, both conflict groups entered the conflict process on 
the basis of preserving the fundamental principles of the political and economic 
system in Lebanon. Both parties shared a common vision of the needs to preserve 
the consensus over which the basic relationship between them was founded. What 
helped the various communal groups to uphold, for a while, this end is, in Coser's 
opinion, their interdependence and crisscrossing goals and interests73 and a social 
structure equipped with a safety-valve mechanism to direct the hostile feeling away 
from the consensual values. This led to mutual accommodation between the conflict 
groups. The 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Taif Accord represented that 
mechanism.
Proposition N° 5: outside threat strengthens the in-group cohesion. It increases their 
group consciousness, mobilizes their defences and intensifies their involvement.74 
Exposure to an outside conflict has an integrative effect on the group. However, such 
an effect is predicated by the consensual situation before the outbreak of conflict. If
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basic consensus is lacking then outside threat will lead not to integration but to 
apathy, antagonism and disintegration. The contrasting effect of the Israeli and 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon on the conflict parties illustrates this.
The Status Quo Coalition perceived in the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese 
conflict a threat to their power status and to the country as a whole. On the other 
hand, the Reformist Camp perceived a similar threat emanating not from the Syrians 
but from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Israel's support of the rival group. Lack 
of consensus on this issue widened the gulf between the two conflict groups and 
increased their hostilities towards each other which in turn led to a breakdown of 
consensus on other issues in dispute.
This leads to the conclusion that the outside threat factor emanating either 
from across the border or from the domestic rival groups, increased the solidarity of 
those in-groups who share common values, interests and goals. For instance, the 
threat to the Maronite power status strengthened their resolve and communal ethos in 
defence of their entitlement, but a threat to the country's sovereignty did not 
strengthen the solidarity between component communities. It rather deepened the 
cleavages and divisions among them.
Coser's conflict theory concentrates on the functions of conflict and its 
resolution. The conflict groups, their structure and place in the conflict process, 
attracted little attention in his perspective. This aspect is of considerable importance 
in any analytical scheme of a communal conflict. The actors are part of the conflict 
process itself; therefore their formation, structure and behaviour become vital for a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature and functions of conflict. A remedy to this 
shortcoming may be found in Ibn Khaldun’s concept of asabiya, a fourteenth century 
notion of group cohesion in the context of a social network based principally but not 
solely on blood bonds.
In his analysis of the rise and fall of the state, Ibn Khaldun emphasised the role 
of asabiya as a determining factor in this process. Equally significant is the role 
played by this concept in conflict group formation and communal behaviour. This 
aspect has not been touched upon by the preceding theorists. It is therefore 
important now to turn to a discussion of Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiya and its 
relevance to the Lebanese situation.
2 Ibn Khaldun
Ibn Khaldun's conception of the rise and decline of states and civilizations 
revolves around basic factors inherent in the social and economic structure of
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society.75 High among those factors is the concept of asabiya, whose significance in 
the evolution of civilization and in the transformation of the state from a primitive 
(badawi) to a civilized (hadari) state is, to Ibn Khaldun, an incontestable fact. Al- 
Azmeh observes that Ibn Khaldun made this concept central to his analysis of the 
emergence and demise of the state (dawla). "Without dawla, the concept of asabiya 
would be superfluous regardless of its 'real existence'. As a concept it is subject to 
the exigencies of the concept of the state and cannot exist conceptually without it."76
Ibn Khaldun treats asabiya as the most central concept in his socio- 
philosophical system. He considers it a social force underlying the whole of the 
historical process.77 For Ibn Khaldun, "...asabiya is the sum total of all the vital 
energies which hold a community together. It is the actual basis for all human 
aggregation and the very factor that sets history into action."78 It is the fundamental 
bond of human beings to "...assert themselves, to struggle for primacy, to establish 
hegemonies, dynasties and empires."79
Toynbee's understanding of asabiya goes beyond the institution of the state to 
that of society at large. "It is the psychic protoplasm out of which all bodies politic and 
bodies social are built up."00 Al-Azmeh bestows on the concept a universalistic 
character. He asserts its incontestable endurance, constancy and recurrence in 
highly complex and sophisticated societies. He goes as far as to consider it a vehicle 
of transformation of the society from its primitive (badawi) to a civilized (hadari) stage 
and maintains that it can be "...employed as the basis for the classification of human 
societies."81 "It is a notion active under different aspects of social formation."82 For 
Lacoste, "...asabiya is the motor of the development of the state.H83Yet asabiya's 
existence, according to Lacoste, is limited to the structure of the tribe and to the 
culture of North Africa. He challenges Al-Azmeh's contention that asabiya is a 
universal concept.
What is asabiya, its nature and the role it plays in a conflict theory?
Asabiya is a complex socio-political concept that requires careful examination. 
The term asabiya is a pre-lslamic term, which was used to describe a strong bond 
between members of the same group. This bond would commit its adherents to 
support one another blindly "...without regard to the justice of the cause."84 However 
Islam condemned asabiya. Prophet Muhammad himself denounced it as "...contrary 
to the spirit of Islam."85 Helping one's people in unjust action is repugnant to Islam. 
Ibn Khaldun was well aware of Islam's rejection of the concept. He used it in such a 
way as to explain the conflict in Moslem thought without impairing the orthodox view 
on the position and role of the successors of the prophet - the Caliphs.
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Most Khaldunian writers seem to have failed in reaching a consensus on the 
precise meaning of the term. This is due, mainly, to the untranslatability of asabiya. 
Writers of different orientations used different conceptualizations in their translation. 
Some defined it in a purely sociological context accentuating a causal nexus between 
asabiya and different cultural contexts. Others focused on its political framework with 
special reference to its organizational attributes in the rise of power groups, the 
formation and decline of state. Even Ibn Khaldun did not give a clear-cut and precise 
definition of it, "...because he was describing a combination of elements and not a 
single phenomenon."86 The way he used the term (around five hundred times in his 
Muqaddimah) was interpreted in different senses to convey different shades of 
meaning.87 However, most of the divergent renditions of asabiya point to a widely 
acknowledged interpretation: solidarity. This interpretation seems to be an acceptable 
translation, although it is used over a wide range of connotations such as "social 
solidarity",88 "group solidarity", "group cohesion", "common will", "esprit de corps", 
"group feeling", "group instinct", "fanatical solidarity", the "corporate will of the group", 
"party spirit", "community ethos", "socio-agnatic solidarity"89, “fellow feeling", "zeal and 
ardour", patriotism", tribal spirit", "national spirit", "national feelings”, "party strength", 
"power", "support90, 'communal ethos"91, and the "vitality of the state."92
This wide range of interpretations implies an equally divergent and discursive 
meaning of asabiya. Though such connotations are reflected in many shades, yet 
two basic conceptually articulated aspects of it are unambiguously identifiable and are 
amenable to cooptation within two empirically defined avenues; a socio-cultural 
avenue and a political avenue. Ibn Khaldun himself treats asabiya as a 
"...phenomenon in nature and a power in society."93
a Asabiya As a Sociological Concept
The lexicographic meaning of the term asabiya is derived from the Arabic root 
asaba, meaning to bind. The noun is asab, literally meaning nerve. It denotes an 
intense, vital and indissoluble nexus among members of the group. Ibn Khaldun built 
the concept of asabiya on consanguinity (silat-al-rahm). He stated that:
Blood tie is something natural among men. It leads to affection for 
one's relations and blood relatives. It makes for mutual support and 
increases the fear felt by the enemy. This strengthens their stamina 
and makes them feared, since everybody's affection for his family and 
his asabiya is more important.94
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Yet he did not ignore the asabiya that comes through social interaction. He specified 
and distinguished among three types of asabiyas, which, in a tribal structure, 
emanated from three kinds of relationships: the asabiya based on relationship of 
sanguinity (silat-al-rahm), or on alliance (hilfj, or on loyalty (wa/a). Members of these 
three types of asabiyas constitute an in-group, but not all of them are equidistant from 
the nucleus tribe, that is, the centre of power.
Relationships based on blood ties (silat-al-rahm) represent a focal ideal-type of 
the group's organizational characteristic, which overshadows and holds down the 
other two types of asabiyas, alliance and loyalty, on lower rungs in the power 
hierarchy. Nevertheless members of the three asabiyas have the same entitlements 
and enjoy equal rights.
Asabiya by alliance is formed either through intermarriage or as a result of one 
weak asabiya seeking protection from a bigger and stronger one. Asabiya by loyalty 
is the result of the attachment of one person or a whole tribe to a more powerful 
asabiya through defeat in war or by voluntary act.
Ibn Khaldun was convinced that any asabiya based on blood ties was the most 
powerful, reliable and intensive in group solidarity. Socio-agnatic solidarity "...has 
precedence over all other ties that result from relationship other than these ties."95 He 
added religion to consanguinity as a cementing factor in the strength and uniformity of 
asabiya: "religion and religious loyalty could provide a more powerful feeling of 
solidarity". Religion plays a greater unifying role than asabiya because it abolishes 
mutual jealousies and rivalries, and provides a dynasty, at its outset, with another 
power in addition to that of asabiya.96
Religion and asabiya, in Ibn Khaldun's view, are two essential pillars of a 
strong leadership. Religion plays a supportive role in the establishment of a strong 
leadership structure." A common religious faith would be capable of strengthening the 
asabiya".97 Religion's contribution to the cultivation, preservation and achievement of 
solidarity has been channelled not only through religious values but also through the 
regular practice of religious rites. Those rites which symbolize adherence to the 
community are the ones that last longer.98
How is asabiya fostered? It is promoted through biological or social milieus. 
Ibn Khaldun points to blood relations as a primary, but not exclusive, factor.99 Ritter 
confirms that the bond between blood relations is strongest among the Semitic 
nations and particularly the Arabs,"... who even after settling down, kept up the 
organization of the tribes."100
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Asabiya emerges also from a relationship of alliance and loyalty. Although he 
gives more weight to blood ties, Ibn Khaldun confesses that asabiya comes about 
through social interaction, common occupation and between men who share the same 
life style.101
The notion of class is implied in the concept of asabiya. Its agnatic aspect is 
viewed as a classificatory base upon which the group is structured and the power 
hierarchy is built.102 The role it plays in the process of change is similar to the Marxist 
notion of class function in the process of historical development. Asabiya is a socio­
political structure through which the transformation from a primitive stage of culture 
(umran badawi) to a civilized stage (umran hadari) is carried out, just as the transfer of 
power from one phase of the historical development is carried out to the next phase 
through the class structure of society.
In contradistinction to the Marxist notion of development, asabiya affects a 
transition from a classless society, where equality of status prevails and the leader is 
the "first among equals", to a society based on class and distinctions.103 As the power 
of the rulers grows it turns its holders into a class, holding contradictory interests to 
those held by the ruled. These contradictions break out into an open-ended conflict, 
causing the break up of the group's structure. This break up is progressive and leads 
to the collapse of the ruling class and the state. The rulers are overthrown by another 
group who posses a stronger asabiya, free from internal contradictions.
b Asabiya /As a Political Concept
As we have seen earlier, al-Azmeh contended that the concept of asabiya has 
no existence outside the concept of state. Asabiya, being a function, does not survive 
by itself. It is a notion active only in the context of state formation.104 Irrespective of 
its polymorphous composition, asabiya's vitalizing properties are oriented towards an 
order whose focus is the state. Therefore its role in the emergence of the state is 
vital. Baali considered asabiya as one of the two foundations necessary to build a 
state. The other one is money. 105
For Ibn Khaldun a state is established by primitive people whose main asset is 
the strength of their asabiya. It has a life span of about 120 years. The state's life 
trajectory, from inception to growth, maturity and decline, follows a "generational path" 
that passes in five stages and needs three generations to complete, unless a force 
majeure interferes with this cycle. Each stage has its distinctive characteristic. The 
initial stage is that of the establishment of the state, followed by the consolidation of
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the powers of the ruler, the organization and entrenchment of that power, then 
contentment and finally decline and demise.106
During the first stage of the establishment of the state, the asabiya is strong 
enough to generate sufficient powers that would enable the rulers to make the ruled 
obey them. Religion plays, at this stage, a strong supportive role in persuading the 
ruled that by obeying the ruler they are obeying God.
Consent and obedience are two prerequisites for the consolidation of the 
ruler's power. He can remain in his position as long as he enjoys the consent and 
obedience of his asabiya. However, they would deny him support if their belief in his 
righteousness is atrophized, due to an unacceptable behaviour on his part. They then 
would "...transfer political leadership from him and his direct lineage to some other 
related branch (of his tribe), in obedience to their group feeling”.107
At this initial stage the ruler is totally dependent upon his asabiya. He is seen 
to be not their master and king but as "first among equals". He shares the power with 
them. As soon as the state evolves towards the end of this stage, the ruler starts to 
monopolize the power and debar those who propelled him into the position of 
authority, that is his asabiya, from its fruits. Conflict between them becomes an 
inevitable outcome. The ruler may start to marginalize his asabiya and resort to that 
type of needed consent which he derives from his position of authority rather than 
from his asabiya.
The second stage in the development of the state is marked by a 
consummation of the process of power consolidation. The ruler who began in the first 
stage as "first among equals" becomes in this stage an absolute monarch. He 
replaces his asabiya with mercenaries in a bid to hold on to power. His asabiya starts 
its long journey towards marginalism and alienation. It loses its role in the 
preservation of the state, to a paid army of mercenaries.
In the third stage of the development of the state, the ruler, having 
consolidated his authority, resorts to coercive measures to earn revenues in order to 
satisfy his lust for luxury and other mundane desires. He succeeds in securing 
enough revenues to spend lavishly on his followers and on improvements in the 
state’s structure. At this point of the trajectory, the state reaches the zenith of its 
power, prosperity, luxury and leisure.108
Having settled down as a prosperous and powerful state, it enters its fourth 
stage with a blanket of contentment and luxury. By then the rulers and the ruled 
would have traversed a long distance from the time their predecessors toiled to
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establish their state. Their generation loses any connection with their progenitors. 
Their life style contrasts sharply with that of the founders of the state. They indulge in 
prodigality, self-gratifying activities and a leisurely way of life. The state progressively 
grows weaker, powerless and becomes less warlike. Thus the vigour and the strength 
of asabiya are broken.109
The fifth and the last stage of the development of the state witness its 
senescence, demise and disintegration. A new strong, vigorous, and powerful 
asabiya takes over, establishes a new state and follows the same trajectory.
The concept of asabiya is at the core of Ibn Khaldun’s conflict and change 
theory. In modern times tribal affiliations and loyalties are in decline. Solidarities of 
class, party, ethnicity, religion, and even neighbourhoods are on the rise, yet those 
solidarities have not supplanted the ones of descent and consanguinity.
VI Convergence of the Frameworks
The five analytical frameworks (Marx, Parsons, Dahrendorf, Coser and Ibn 
Khaldun) utilised in this study concur in providing the conceptual scheme with the 
following major propositions for the analysis of the conflict in Lebanon; a) The conflict 
in Lebanon is structurally based, b) In the long term the conflict is as natural and 
normal a phenomenon as the absence of it, c) Conflict is functional to the social 
system in the sense that it prevents its ossification and revitalizes its energies, and d) 
The asabiya factor is a basic component in the formation and rise to power of the 
conflict groups.
Marx and Dahrendorf envisage society as a stratified structure which enfolds 
class oriented conflict of interest. Coherence in such a society is maintained through 
coercion. In contrast to Marx, Dahrendorf contends that authority rather than property 
is the source of social conflict.
The consensus and order school, Parsons in particular, views conflict as an 
abnormality in the social system. Its proponents believe that society coheres around 
normative values. Social order is attained not by coercion but by a belief in the 
legitimacy of the social system. If conflict occurs it is due to an incidental factor 
reflecting a pathological strain in the system.
Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser envisage conflict as neither a pathological nor 
a disruptive phenomenon. It could also serve positive purposes and achieve 
constructive results; it could strengthen society and reduce its pathological social 
manifestations.
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It was argued in this chapter that communal conflict originates in the social 
structure and that conflict is a natural phenomenon in life. It was further argued that 
positions of authority and asabiya rather than differential distribution of property are 
the major sources of conflict. Authority with its attributes of coercion and constraint 
and asabiya with its attributes of obedience and consent can lead the analysis 
towards an explanation of the relations of communal dominance which prevail in the 
Lebanese social structure. For a demonstration of the analytical potency of the two 
concepts in identifying the source of conflict, we must now turn to the next chapter.
VII Conclusion
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CHAPTER TWO
AUTHORITY AND ASABIYA: TWO FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE LEBANESE CONFLICT 
I Introduction
The concepts of "authority" and asabiya are utilized by this study to identify 
and explain the causes of conflict. This chapter attempts to analyse the implication of 
both concepts for the emergence of the conflict groups and the differential distribution 
of power and its concomitant attribute of domination; and for the role of asabiya in the 
structure of the conflict groups and the conflict process in general. It will do so under 
the assumption that authority is a central issue in the structural causality of conflict, 
and asabiya in relation to the case of Lebanon is a fundamental factor in the rise, 
growth and demise of the conflict groups.
Three basic interrelated assumptions underlie the main theme of this chapter. 
The first is that positions of authority in the Lebanese power structure constitute a 
source of tension which, under certain empirical conditions, can set in motion a 
process of change in the existing institutional arrangements, that is, in the National 
Pact, Constitution and conventions of Lebanon's political culture. The second is that 
as a result of the shift in the balance of power between the various component 
communities occupying different positions of authority in the Lebanese power 
hierarchy, and due to the emergence of propitious contingencies, new forces emerged 
out of the societal structure whose fundamental organisational characteristic revolves 
around the concept of asabiya. The third is that the notion of asabiya is a structurally 
anchored phenomenon in the power structure of the conflict groups, and it constitutes 
a quintessential power source for the leadership as well as for the militias' cohesion 
and performance.
II Concept of Authority and the Rise of Conflict Groups
Power and authority have been associated with exploitation, tension and 
conflict in a social system. It is instructive to examine Dahrendorf's, Marx's and 
Weber’s ideas in relation to these concepts.
Dahrendorf agrees with Marx that conflict is structurally based, but in their 
analysis of the causes of conflict they part company. For Marx, it is the differential 
distribution of property and power and exploitation that leads to class conflict. For 
Dahrendorf it is the "institutionalised authority relations."1. Furthermore, Marx argues 
that differential distribution of property and power lay in the substructure, whereas
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authority relations are a superstructure phenomenon established by the dominant 
classes. Dahrendorf acknowledges and asserts that in every society "...there is a 
differential distribution of power and authority....This differential distribution of authority 
invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflict."2 Such a 
conflict is structurally based in a cluster of social roles characterized by domination 
and subjugation. Dahrendorf believes that this is a "...common feature of all possible 
types of ...associations and organizations."3
In his analysis of authority Dahrendorf draws on Weber's definition: "The 
probability that a certain specific command will ( or all commands) be obeyed by a 
given group of persons."4 Dahrendorf breaks down this definition into the following 
elements:5
1 Authority denotes a relation of supra - and subordination.
2 The Supra-ordinated side prescribes to the subordinated one 
certain behaviour in the form of a command or a prohibition.
3 The supra-ordinated side has the right to make such 
prescriptions; authority is a legitimate relation of supra- and 
subordination; authority is not based on personal or situational 
chance effects but rather on an expectation associated with 
social position.
4 The right of authority is limited to certain contents and to specific 
persons.
5 Failure to obey the prescription is sanctioned; a legal system (or 
a system of quasi-legal customs) guards the effectiveness of 
authority.
Authority as such could be viewed as a scarce resource over which groups 
fight. This is emphasized by Dahrendorf's contention that "...the distribution of 
authority in associations is the ultimate 'cause' of the formation of conflict groups, and, 
...being dichotomous, it is, in any given association, the cause of the formation of two, 
and only two conflict groups."6
Dahrendorf chose not to specify the nature of legitimated authority and 
relations of domination and subjugation. He simply maintained that authority implies 
domination and subjugation and as such it is a basic source of conflict. This 
dichotomous nature of authority resides in parallel dichotomous social roles. Weingart
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suggestsd that this type of authority could be defined as "...legitimate institutionalised 
role-expectation of super-ordination and subordination"7 or as rulers and ruled, with 
the rulers' main interests being to preserve the status quo, and the ruled is to change 
it.8
The question is: How do opposed groups emerge? How do they arise in the 
social structure and under what conditions do the legitimated authority relations 
generate relations of domination and subjugation? Jonathan Turner contends that 
Dahrendorf’s conceptual scheme does not tackle such questions beyond an 
assumptive level simply because it does not explain how authority emerged. The 
causal link between the emergence of conflict and authority is absent. It is only 
assumed.9 Therefore there is a need for it to be expanded through empirical 
observation.
Dahrendorf’s conceptualisation of quasi-groups and conflict groups is an 
attempt at a structural explanation of social conflict. A Quasi-group is similar to 
Marx’s class-in-itself and a conflict-group is akin to class-for-itself. Both notions rest 
on the principle of awareness of true self interest. Dahrendorf's concept implies an 
element of dominance in its definition. The dominant group strives to preserve the 
status quo whereas the subordinate group struggles to change it. Dahrendorf notes:
In every imperatively co-ordinated group, the carriers of positive and 
negative dominance roles determine two quasi-groups with opposite 
latent interests....The opposition of interests has here a quite formal 
meaning, namely, the expectation that an interest in the preservation of 
the status quo is associated with the positive dominance roles and an 
interest in the change of status quo is associated with the negative 
dominance roles.
Interest groups which originated in this manner are in constant conflict 
concerned with the preservation or change in the status quo. The form 
and the intensity of the conflict are determined by empirically variable 
conditions (the conditions of conflict).10
This explanation falls short of answering the question of how do quasi-groups 
arise and under what conditions the legitimate authority relations which generate 
relations of domination and subjugation are created.
Authority is present in any type of association and is a "...universal element of 
social structure."11 Unlike Parsons, Dahrendorf attributed to it conflictual rather than 
integrative functions, on the grounds that "...authority is always coercion; the rule of
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some over others."12 On the other hand, authority, in Parsons' consensus model, 
appears to be a necessary supplement to the normative system which, under certain 
conditions, fails to guide all action in a prescribed way. By introducing the concept of 
coercion into the definition of authority Dahrendorf permits the conclusion that 
authority does not only enforce norms but it can set new norms. It follows that norms 
are set by the ruling groups who use their authority to create new norms through 
legislation. Furthermore, one can conclude also that authority has an instrumental 
capacity for social control and for imposing a value system (defined as interests which 
have been institutionalised as norms) representing the goals of the ruling minority.
It could be deduced from the above that authority is an abstract concept 
whose main attributes are roles and interests and which does not exist outside the 
social structure. Through roles, conflicting interests are manifested and are polarized; 
thus a society is split into two role aggregates: those who possess authority and those 
who are excluded from it.
It is further deduced that interests are also correlated with positions of authority 
and as such they are designated as role-interests. "...Differentially equipped authority 
positions in associations involve, for their incumbents, conflicting interests."13 Those 
who are in power have an interest in preserving the structure and those who are 
excluded have an interest in changing it.
Weber delved deep into the concept of power which he defined as: "the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability 
rests."14 He noted that the two main sources of power are: "a) constellation of 
interests; and, b) established authority that allocates the right to command and the 
duty to obey."15 He defined domination (authority) as "...the probability that a 
command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."16 
Weber maintained that men in society interact on the basis of their material and ideal 
interests and they relate to each other in a relation of authority and obedience which 
rests on shared beliefs. It may be suggested that Weber considered the conditions of 
solidarity which is based on interests and the moral order of authority which is based 
on belief in legitimacy as "...the two perspectives through which a comprehensive view 
of society could be obtained."17 The significance of these postulates to the Lebanese 
conflict can be examined in terms of two questions: Why and how the various 
communities acted in concert and manifested a highly conspicuous degree of 
solidarity on both sides of the conflict? Why and how these communities believed in 
the existence of a legitimate order that imposed obligations upon them? Dahrendorf’s 
concept of authority with its basic tenets of coercion and constraint, and conflict theory
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in general, can provide the answer to the second question. As to the first question we 
may find an appropriate answer in the concept of asabiya as manifested in the 
emergence of the militia organisations and the various conflict groups in Lebanon.
Ill The Concept of Asabiya and its Implications for the Emergence of 
Conflict Groups
We discussed in Chapter One the nature of asabiya and its contribution to 
conflict theory. We turn now to its role in the organization and emergence of conflict 
groups and its relevance in the analysis of the Lebanese conflict. Asabiya is best 
revealed in a warlike situation. "Group feeling produces the ability to defend oneself, 
to protect oneself and to press one's claim. Whoever loses his group feeling is too 
weak to do any one of these things."18 The telos of asabiya is Mu Ik (kingship or 
rulership). This implies the existence of the notion of domination. A group with strong 
asabiya manifests unity and dynamism which helps it gain domination over other 
groups. "Only tribes which have developed asabiya constitute a political force 
capable of making their chieftains heads of states."19 By the same token, for a leader, 
or a chieftain, to achieve superiority he has to have a strong asabiya behind him to 
propel him into that position, which obviously implies authority and power.
Once a group attains the superior position of authority it extends its 
domination, by virtue of its stronger asabiya, over other groups who become 
subservient to the dominant group and obliged to seek coalescence with it. The 
dominant group starts to atrophy when its asabiya wanes. It does not take long for 
another group with a stronger asabiya to overthrow the dominant group and replace it 
in the authority structure.
This imagery of conflict resembles, in its major part, that of Dahrendorf's and 
his classification of conflict groups into two categories. Those who possess authority 
and the power that goes with it versus those who are denied authority and are 
subservient to the first group. It is a relation of domination and subjugation. 
Dahrendorf asserts that this differential distribution of authority is the determining 
factor in social conflict.
However, asabiya is a normative concept which guides all actions in a 
prescribed way. Its functions within the asabiya group are integrative and involve 
consent and obedience toward the rulers. On the other hand, Dahrendorf’s concept 
of authority is conflictual by nature, and rests on the notion of coercion instead of 
consent and obedience. By resorting to coercion in order to maintain law and order 
instead of the precepts of asabiya, Dahrendorf is assuming that authority could also
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set new norms and create new values, which eventually would reflect those of the 
rulers.
At a certain stage of the development of the state’s structure Ibn Khaldun's 
leader, who by virtue of his asabiya has reached the position of superiority, tries to 
introduce changes to the normative structure (usually at the third and fourth 
generational stage). He would impose these changes on his people by resorting to 
coercion, with the help of mercenaries if necessary. This leads to a situation of 
conflict involving his own asabiya who would deny him their consent and obedience 
due to what transpires to them as deviation from the prescribed communal normative 
value system. This deviation is seen by his asabiya as degeneration into prodigality, 
resulting in the eventual dethronement of the leader in favour of a new one with 
stronger asabiya.
Parsons' notion of order also has an admittedly coercive component. He 
postulates that the normative system is functionally integrative but if, under certain 
specific conditions, it fails to deliver on law and order, then authority, with its inherent 
aspect of coercion, could supplement the normative system in order to restore order 
and balance to the system. This is in fact an asabiya approach to the Hobbesian 
question: How is order and consensus possible? Asabiya with its fundamental 
attributes of consent and obedience accomplishes the same cohesion and integration 
of the group that authority and its fundamental attributes of coercion could achieve 
toward the same end. Asabiya is a function not only of lineage affiliation but also of 
the feeling of solidarity which in turn is itself a function of the cohesion of the group; 
"...such coherence cannot be maintained without the presence of a dominant element 
with a mandate to coerce."20
Ibn Khaldun treats asabiya not as a substance, a unit of analysis or a trait, but 
as an abstraction which points to, rather than explains, a phenomenon. Asabiya is 
not reified as a substantive cause but is conceived as a vitalizing characteristic of the 
group.
It is a common understanding among most Khaldunian writers that asabiya is a 
concept interlocked with tribal structure and is particularly associated with 
segmentation and clanship. Toynbee and other writers21 gave the concept a meaning 
synonymous with a notion of universality, whereas Lacoste and others have 
interpreted it in a more specific context.22
Lacoste rejected the interpretation which turns asabiya into a general 
sociological concept. He argued that it is a notion associated with a tribal structure
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and designed to explain that structure. He furthermore claimed that its applicability 
was limited to North African society only, citing Ibn Khaldun himself who "...places 
considerable limitations on its spatial extension."23 It must be pointed out at this 
juncture that Ibn Khaldun, indeed, used the concept of asabiya with certain specificity 
to the historical context of Medieval North African society, but Lacoste's rejection of 
the universality of the concept is inconsistent with Ibn Khaldun's use of this concept, 
as a general theoretical formulation theory, to explain the establishment of the Mongol 
Empire in central Asia, and its conquests in the Middle East. In his biographical 
account of the Jaghatai dynasty and their descendants, Ibn Khaldun saw in their 
victories in central Asia and their conquest of Damascus in the early 15th century, a 
"...confirmation of his own theory of asabiya, of group loyalty, or solidarity, on which, 
according to him, the continuity of a dynasty depended."24 This is an indisputable 
indication that Ibn Khaldun did not attach any spatial restrictions to the concept of 
asabiya.
Asabiya's specificity to a historical context and its association with the 
attributes of tribal structure particularly that of segmentation and clan does not 
proscribe its intrinsic characteristics from claiming universality. Apart from its 
universality, it is apparent from the analysis of the Lebanese conflict, that asabiya 
consists of five variables: agnatic, classificatory, organisational power and ecological 
variables.
1 Asabiya as an Agnatic Concept
As noted in the previous chapter, this is a natural variable based on 
relationship by blood or birth. Ibn Khaldun maintains that asabiya is a function of 
lineage affiliation or something that fulfils the role of such an affiliation. However, in 
his Muqaddimah he does not refer to asabiya as a concept reflecting pristine blood 
ties among individuals, but he treats it in terms of stratifacatory action leading to 
centralization of authority. As a genealogical concept it fixes a position, for example, 
the Arabian Qureish Asabiya ranks highest in the larger Mudar tribe and the Umayyad 
Asabiya is the strongest in the Qureish tribe.
The Lebanese social structure is composed of numerous groups whose 
consanguine relations are manifested through the expression of asabiya. These 
relations are in fact a precondition for the mobilisation of the group. Militias and 
conflict groups are structured around basic attributes of asabiya. For some of them 
this is expressed more conspicuously than for the others.
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Most of the Druze families, and particularly all of the Jumblatt asabiya, 
contributed in men and money to the formation of the Progressive Socialist Party 
militias. Because they belong to the same asabiya as that of the leader of the militia, 
their loyalty is first to him. The closer the consanguinity the more loyal they are 
expected to be.
The same is true of the Amal and Hezbollah militias. Members of these militias 
are linked by blood ties as well as by ideology and geographical affiliations. Loyalty of 
the militia members to their kin comrades is the strongest kind of loyalty in the group. 
It is followed and supplemented, in concentric circles, by loyalty to those who come 
from the same birth place and region.
The Lebanese Forces militias lean on family ties as well as on group feeling 
generated by the common experience of its dislocated members and sympathisers. 
The backbone of the rank and file of the Lebanese Forces Militias consist of followers 
of its leader, Samir Geagea, who were forced out, with him, from his region - North 
Lebanon. One thing the three militias have in common is that their members are 
predominantly recruited from rural Lebanon.
2 Asabiya as a Classif icatory Concept
In its agnatic aspect, asabiya is associated with a certain level of social and 
political structure within the group. Kinship is not enough to describe the conflict 
groups. However asabiya as a classificatory concept has not become clearly 
structured in the Lebanese conflict groups. It remains embryonic, yet there are 
definite indications that asabiya is moving the classless Druze sect as well as the 
Shi'a and Maronite confessions into a class society whose main attributes are wealth, 
power and prestige. Those with stronger asabiya have moved upward in the social 
ladder and those with weaker asabiya may remain immobilised.
3 Asabiya as an Organizational Concept
Genealogy is also an organizational principle. It fixes a position which is a 
precondition for the leader in his mobilization efforts. The Jumblatt asabiya was the 
most capable to unite the Druze factions under its power and consolidate their cause.
The agnatic aspect provided an ideological frame of reference within which 
order and other activities are maintained. It is also a criterion for the generation of 
feelings of solidarity. However blood relations are not the only criterion upon which 
the organisation of a group rest. Leadership is a necessary criterion too. Leadership
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without asabiya is what Ibn Khaldun calls Mulk Naqis (part sovereign power) as 
opposed to Mulk Haqiqi (full sovereign power). Leadership is genealogically 
conceptualised. In fact this case is illustrated by the politico-historical evolution of 
Lebanon, for between 1920 and 1980 only 172 families ruled Lebanon.25
4 Asabiya as a Power Concept
Ibn Khaldun states that no religious or political cause could be successfully 
fostered or defended unless backed by asabiya. Asabiya is needed to establish 
political power within the group and over the whole community. It helps consolidate 
the influence of religion. Asabiya is to be viewed in this respect as a power group 
engaged in political and para political- military- combat for power.
A group with strong asabiya manifests unity and dynamism which helps it gain 
domination over other groups and extend it by force over other groups. The other 
individual groups which possess weaker asabiya coalesce with the strongest one to 
form one single great asabiya. For example, the Lebanese Forces combated the 
Chamoun group and absorbed it. The Forces coalesced with the Guardians of the 
Cedars and with the Tanzim. Jumblatt won over the Arsalan factions of his sect and 
encompassed them.
Once the asabiya achieves its aims by reaching the full sovereign power, it 
shares the fruits of power among its members. As soon as they reach the Mulk stage 
and settle in the position of authority the leaders promote their own men who were 
either their kin (asabiya by blood relations) or their allies (asabiya by alliance) or their 
clients (asabiya by loyalty) to positions which entail power and allow them to enjoy the 
fruits of their victory. Ibn Khaldun maintains that once a ruler is firmly settled in his 
position he embarks on destroying his asabiya who had propelled him to power. This 
was illustrated in the struggle for power inside the Lebanese Forces militia. As soon 
as Bashir Gemayel settled in his position as the uncontested leader of the Lebanese 
Forces, he carried out a campaign of annihilation against the groups which helped him 
achieve this position. He tried to destroy the Marada militia by having its leader, Tony 
Frangie, and his family assassinated, after which he turned on the Tigers militia of 
Camille Chamoun and destroyed it completely.
5 Asabiya as an Ecological Concept
How does asabiya come about?
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Ibn Khaldun mentions a few factors. He stated that beyond blood relationship 
and loyalty, other factors also contribute to the rise of solidarity feeling among the 
groups. High among these factors is social intercourse, (sharing of the ups and 
downs of life, common occupation and location).
Blood relations and geographical location may be strongest among all conflict 
groups. But some groups differ when it comes to alliance and loyalty. With the Druze 
militias, expression of loyalty takes precedence over alliance, whereas this picture is, 
to a certain extent, reversed with the Lebanese Forces Militias.
The geographical space factor is a natural condition for breeding solidarity. 
Common birth place and native towns engender strong solidarity feeling and arouse 
defence instincts. The Lebanese Forces, Amal, and Progressive Socialist Party 
memberships are drawn mainly on the basis of village or neighbourhood formation. If 
we interpolate these variables on the Lebanese social structure we may end up with 
the following imagery.
IV Asabiya and the Lebanese Social Structure
In order to determine the relevance of the concept of asabiya for the analysis 
of the conflict groups it is necessary to analyse first the social structure in which these 
groups existed or from which they emerged. Ibn Khaldun himself used the term as an 
indicative phenomenon of the relationship between group members, but did not 
elaborate on the structure of the groups. The role of leadership, ideology and outside 
threat in enhancing group solidarity was revealed by the Lebanese conflict to be of 
considerable significance, yet it was marginalized by Ibn Khaldun. Nevertheless the 
concept of asabiya, though cradled in a fourteenth century culture, is still relevant to 
explain ethnic, sectarian and communal conflicts today as it was to the tribal wars in 
medieval times. One of the main reasons for this relevance is the fact that this 
concept is interlocked with the notion of segmentation and manifests itself best in a 
war-like situation.
Lebanese society is segmented along a whole range of social and political 
lines. This qualifies it to an asabiya assessment. We can now turn to the study of the 
social structure having in mind its effect on the emergence of conflict groups and their 
asabiya characteristics.
Lebanon's population of three million is distributed into a variety of segments 
along a panoply of lines: sectarian, genealogical, geographical, and political. Its more 
pronounced segmentation which left an indelible mark on the whole system is the
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sectarian line. Lebanon is a great sectarian kaleidoscope in the Middle East. 
Sectarian distinctions are officially recognised but hardly accepted. Conflict over 
resources has tended to polarize much more easily along sectarian lines. 
Nevertheless the conflict in Lebanon could not be attributed solely to sectarianism. 
Other factors - some of which are a by-product of the sectarian distinctiveness - have 
interplayed with sectarianism to bring about conflict.
1 Segmentation Along Sectarian Lines
Segmentation of Lebanese society is a function of the origin, nature and basic 
features of its component sects. In tracing the roots of the various sectarian 
communities, Salibi reckons that the seventeen officially recognized sects in Lebanon 
are nothing but "tribes in disguise.”26 According to this contention, they are tribes not 
only in their social behaviour but also in their historical origins. Salibi goes even 
further to observe that these sects are in fact solidarity groups possessed by a sense 
of group feeling which reflects the will of the community for self-assertion, defence and 
attack. This is a lucid pointer to the existence of asabiya within a group.
Salibi's view of the nature of sects and his observation that their inherent 
feeling of solidarity reflects the community’s will to self defence and attack reflects Ibn 
Khaldun's assertion that asabiya is the force which impels groups to assert 
themselves, and struggle for primacy.27
Salibi tried to ameliorate the influence of religion on the sects' distinctiveness. 
He held that group solidarity rather than religion binds the sect together. Religion, in 
his view, was grafted on to tribes to transform and perpetuate them as sects.28 Ibn 
Khaldun held the view that religion is a motivating force superior to that of asabiya, yet 
his concern with religion does not reflect his status as a devoted Moslem and a 
dedicated jurist and theologian. He regarded religion as part of the social 
environment, determining political action and operating in conjunction with the 
interests of the group.29 Religion in this sense can be viewed as a factor to explain 
certain political dispositions like the emergence of self-contained conflict groups or 
even their militias. In his study of the sectarian system in Lebanon, Crow found that 
religious conceptualisation provided guidance of far reaching consequences for the 
organisation of political life in the country.30 Sectarian distinctiveness in Lebanon is 
not based solely on religion. Socio-economic factors have played a significant role in 
sectarian contrasts and in the creation of conflict.
Marxist writers, like Odeh and Farsoun31, can take comfort in the existence of 
economically based sectarian contrasts in the Lebanese society, which they
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interpreted as class disparities within the social structure. Figures indicated that four 
percent of the population of the country earned thirty-two percent of the national 
revenue, whereas fifty percent earned only eighteen percent of its wealth.32 In 1971, 
the per capita income was $803 in the capital, whereas in the South it was $151.33 
This discrepancy is expressed along sectarian lines. In a study conducted in 1975 on 
the national Income and literacy rate in Lebanon it was discovered that the average 
income earned by the Christians was sixteen percent higher than the income earned 
by the Druzes, and fifty-eight percent higher than that earned by the Shiites. The 
Literacy rate among the Moslems ranged between one third to one half that of the 
Christians.34 In research done by the Institute of Social Sciences of the Leoanese 
University in Beirut in 1981-82 on the differential distribution of professions in 
Lebanon, it was revealed that 67.6 percent of the industrialists were Christians 
compared to 32.4 percent Moslems. Seventy-one percent of the Bankers were 
Christians, twenty-nine percent Moslems. Among the proprietors of commercial 
enterprises 75.5 percent were Christians and 24.5 percent Moslems. The same 
pattern is true also of the proprietors of transport companies, where 72.6 percent of 
them are Christian and 27.4 percent Moslems. In the field of insurance, seventy-six 
percent of insurance agents were Christians compared to twenty-four percent 
Moslems. The law profession is not an exception; seventy-one percent of lawyers 
were Christians and twenty-nine percent Moslems. In the field of medicine the ratio 
was 68.15 percent of the physicians Christians against 31.85 percent Moslems.35
These structural flaws have indeed contributed to the emergence of cleavages 
in the social system and have provided the deprived with the needed material for 
building up a resistance and dissident movement to challenge the existing system. 
Yet something beyond economic deprivation must be invoked to explain why people 
took up arms against each other. The challenge to their sectarian aspiration and 
entitlements and to their communal consciousness did not evolve from economic 
disparities only but from a complexity of factors whose main locus lies in the power, 
authority and asabiya structure. The force that motivated these groups to act and 
transformed them into a power machine seeking authority and domination, was 
grounded in their asabiya consciousness. Asabiya loomed large as a factor not only 
in shaping communal consciousness but in determining whether or not a community 
would achieve hegemony. The mechanism of its operation was similar to the Marxist 
mechanism that turns the class from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself, and 
Dahrendorf's quasi groups into conflict groups.
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2 Segmentation Along Genealogical Lines
Lebanon's genealogical segmentation is based on a system of patrilineal 
descent from a common male ancestor. The family name refers to a common agnatic 
ancestor. Few family names refer to a place or to a point of origin, some are 
indicative of religious affiliation.
Each family is segmented into a certain number of branches and each branch 
is sub-segmented into a certain number of lineages which are sub-segmented further 
down to the nuclear family level. Loyalty in such a system is expressed in an 
expanding series of concentric circles. The individual's loyalty is first to his family, 
then to his lineage, then to the branch, then to the clan, and then to the sect. The 
descendants of two brothers may fight against each other but they join together if they 
are attacked by the brother of their cousin. An Arab proverb says, ”1 against my 
brothers, my brothers and I against my cousin, my cousin and brothers and I against 
the world."
Lebanese society is characterized also by horizontal segmentation. The 
Maronites among the Christians conceive of themselves as descendants from the 
Phoenicians. The Orthodox Christians share with the Moslems a claim of an Arab 
ancestry.
3 Segmentation Along Geographical Lines
Segmentation is also observed in the geographical distribution of the various 
sects. Those who live in the mountains of North, central Lebanon, and east Beirut are 
predominantly Maronites. Those who inhabit the South, eastern Lebanon, and the 
southern part of Beirut are predominantly Shi'a and those who live in Mount Lebanon 
to the east and south of Beirut are Druzes. The Sunnis and Orthodox and other 
minority sects share the coastal regions and the cities. West Beirut together with 
Tripoli, the second largest city, and Sidon, are a predominantly Sunni stronghold. The 
patterns of this geographical distribution are indicated by Table 2-1.
58
Table 2-1: Lebanese Population by Sect and District (1956)
Sects Beirut
Mount
Leb.
North
Leb.
South
Leb. Beq'a Total
Sunnis 76,116 24,423 118,203 29,889 37,067 286,238
Shiites 17,062 22,716 1,337 148,446 61,044 250,655
Druze 2,457 71,569 19 6,893 7,193 88,131
Maronites 18,101 224,921 111,917 39,509 29,260 423,708
Greek Catholics 3,617 21,520 3,864 23,147 35,630 90,788
Greek Orthodox 25,276 32,239 62,767 10,784 17,861 148,927
Protestants 5,482 3,945 1,357 2,493 1,088 14,365
Latin 2,771 963 330 265 117 4,446
Armenian Catholics 8,809 3,722 345 298 1,448 14,631
Armenian Orthodox 42,762 15,600 1,579 1,833 1,905 63,679
Chaldeans 1,178 62 29 8 189 1,466
Syrian Catholics 4,757 40 194 3 705 5,699
Syrian Orthodox 2,745 257 150 5 1,641 4,798
Jews 5,382 95 40 1,108 67 6,692
Others 215 447 6,064 206 261 7,193
Total 220,849 422.193 307,695 264,716 101,063 1,411,416
Source: An-Nahar (Beirut), 26 April 1956
4 Segmentation Along Political Lines
Lebanon’s political culture is equally fragmented along party lines. Almost 
every Lebanese belongs to, and is affiliated with, or sympathises with, one party or 
another. The major political parties of Lebanon reflect the political segmentation of 
the country. The Phalanges party is predominantly Maronite, the Najjadi Sunni 
Moslem, the Progressive Socialist Party, Druzes, and the Amal Movement Shi’a 
Moslems. Quite a few smaller parties have also the same sectarian composition, for 
example, National Liberal Party, Guardians of the Cedars and the Tanzim have 
Maronite followers. Followers of the Party of God (Hezbollah) are exclusively Shi'ite, 
and the Moslem Brethren are predominantly Sunni Moslems.
Among the non Arab ethnic groupings in Lebanon the Armenians are the most 
politically active. The Armenian population belong to either one of their three parties: 
the Dashnak (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), the Hunchak (Social Democratic 
Hunchakian), and the Ramgavar Azadagan Party (Constitutional Democrat).
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There are other influential parties who disclaim any sectarian or ethnic 
composition and orientation, and enjoy considerable influence in the political life of 
Lebanon, such as the Communists, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the 
Ba'athists. Since Lebanon's independence in 1943 these parties have been trying to 
send elected representatives to the parliament without success. When vacancies 
became available, seats were filled in 1991 by appointment rather than by elections. 
It was only then that the Ba’ath and Syrian Social Nationalist parties were able to be 
represented in the legislature. Their representatives were not the only appointed 
deputies though. Almost one third of the number of deputies were appointed by the 
government pending new elections. However, the 1992 elections brought to 
Parliament more party members.
It is generally recognised that political parties in Lebanon are used as 
platforms to air grievances and as means of communication more than a mechanism 
to achieve power. In this sense they reflect the segmented structure and contribute at 
the same time to its fragmentation.
V Limitations to the Concept of Asabiya
Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiya remains a valid scheme to analyse the 
Lebanese conflict, and particularly conflict among groups and conflict group formation. 
However, the conflict manifested certain relevant asabiya attributes, which were not 
elaborated by the theory of Ibn Khaldun. Among these are the following which merit 
attention.
1 Leadership
Strong leadership bestows on asabiya power and determination. Ibn Khaldun 
left this concept in the background. Lebanon's conflict projected and pushed it to the 
foreground. Under the impact of the war the various warring communities came to 
see in their leaders the concentration and personification of their solidarity (Lebanese 
Forces and Druze militias and Amal to a lesser extent). The various communities 
expect their leaders to reflect their collective feelings and make them prevail. The 
leader is also expected to show devotion to the community. He becomes a symbol 
and a subject of idealized fantasies (this is particularly true of Bashir Gemayel, the 
leader of the Lebanese Forces who was assassinated in 1982). The community 
reciprocates his devotion. He becomes an object of veneration. This enhances the 
solidarity between the subjects and rulers.
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2 Ideology
Asabiya gains in clearness of purpose and strength when the conflict groups 
adopt an ideological direction. Ibn Khaldun treats ideology as a form of religion. A 
common religious faith would strengthen the asabiya.
The significance of religion in the asabiya has waned over the centuries, yet 
we clearly observe in the Lebanese conflict that quite a few of the conflict groups 
(particularly among the Shi'a and Maronites) do retain formulas of religious tenets as 
symbols of their communities. At one stage of the conflict, the Lebanese Forces 
adopted the slogan: "Christian community’s security is above everything else". Other 
groups do not have an expressed ideology but rather a prescribed line of conduct 
which is silently understood. In the case of Druze militias, it is publicized if it is 
infringed upon, but rarely broken.
3 External Threat
The threat from an outside factor is a salient solidarity factor in the Lebanese 
conflict. It is a motive which acted with extraordinary force with at least two militias. 
The instincts of defence were immediately activated when the Lebanese Forces 
threatened the Druze stronghold in the Chouf Mountain in the summer of 1983. The 
outside threat generated a kind of energy that made not only defence possible but 
also attack an inevitable course. The Lebanese Forces were able to galvanize 
Maronite public opinion and secure their support by over playing the Syrian threat to 
their existence.
VI Application of Ibn Khaldun's Concept of Asabiya to the Lebanese 
Conflict Groups
The domestic conflict parties who were at the end of 1988 engaged wholly or 
in part in the conflict in Lebanon are shown in Table 2-2 as follows.
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Table 2-2: Current Major Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups
Islamic Groups
N Group Name Control Sect
1 1 i t  Moslems
Amal Shi'a
Amal Al-lslamiya Pro-Iran splinter of Amal
Hezbollah Shi'a fundamentalists
AI Majlis AI Islami
al Shi'i al-A'Ia Shi'a
AI Jama'ah al-lslamiyah Sunni fundamentalist
Islamic Grouping Sunni
Harakat AI Tahrir Al Islami Sunni fundamentalist
National Alovements
Progressive Socialist Party Druze
Lebanese National Movement Non-sectarian claims
Murabitoun Sunni
Communist Action Organisation Shi'a radicals
Communist Party of Lebanon Pro-USSR Greek Orthodox
Ba'ath Party- Iraqi Wing Sunni
Ba'ath Party-Syrian Wing Alawi
Nasserite Corrective Movement Sunni extremist
Nasserite Forces Council Splinter of the Murabitoun
Syrian Sodal Nationalist Party Non-sectarian claims
al-Majlis al A'la (Division within SSNP)
al-Tawari (Division within SSNP)
Popular Nasserist Organisation
(United with the Arab Socialist Union) Sunni
Union of Working Peoples Forces Sunni
I National Confrontation Front Alawite
Christian Groups
Group Name Control Sect
Independer t Christians
Maronite League Maronite
National Block Maronite Uberals
Free Lebanon Movement/South Lebanon Army Pro-Israel Maronite
Marada Militia Maronite
Lobane se Front
The Phalanges Party Christians
Lebanese Forces Lebanese Front militia
National Liberal Party Maronite
Guardians of the Cedars Maronite extremists
1 Al-Tanzim • Maronite extremists II
Many of these groups have been relevant long enough to carve for themselves 
a position of authority in the socio-political structure, but quite a few have declined in 
power or ceased to exist. The surviving groups were able to persist through either 
merger or transformation into politico-military bodies. At present the most influential of 
these surviving groups are: the Lebanese Forces, the Progressive Socialist Party, the 
Amal Movement, and the Party of God (Hezbollah).
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The survival and relevance of these groups could be attributed to their asabiya 
characteristics. Each one of them manifested at least one or more attributes of 
asabiya (consanguinity, kinship, group passion or power). The first three groups 
were, until they were joined by the emerging Hezbollah in 1985, the major actors that 
survived the turbulence and changes in the course of the conflict since its inception in 
1975. Their roots go back to a decade or two before the onset of the conflict. The 
political consciousness of these groups developed, initially, within the existing 
structure of their respective religious institutions, but as soon as they became strong 
enough they, with the exception of Hezbollah, broke away from the authority of the 
church, mosque and Majlis (the Druze religious institution) and reduced the power of 
these institutions to a symbolic level. However, the religious factor remains an 
important component upon which the leadership structure falls back, and solicits to 
keep the cohesion and vitality of the group intact in case asabiya wanes.
Hezbollah's role in the domestic conflict and its overall contribution to the 
conflict process was less central than the role played by the other conflict groups. 
This may be explained by the fact that its preoccupation with fighting Israeli and 
American interests in Lebanon shifted the locus of its concern away from the main 
conflict issues. However, at a post-Taif stage it re-entered the conflict process by way 
of politics. As soon as conflict was brought down to a manageable and legitimate 
level through the Taif Accord, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon in 
September and October, 1992. Having shed its earlier reservations about the political 
system, Hezbollah joined the political process, submitted the candidacy of several of 
its members and won twelve seats out of one hundred twenty eight in the new 
parliament. One of the most strident issues upon which it fought and won the 
elections was the termination of Israeli occupation of parts of southern Lebanon and 
the driving out of Western influence from the country.
While Hezbollah refrained from entering directly the conflict process, except in 
the case of its violent clashes with its co-religionist Amal movement, the other conflict 
parties perpetuated the conflict in an attempt to achieve their conflictual aims. The 
role of authority and asabiya as power agencies in ancient and modern conflicts in 
Lebanon is illustrated below.
VII Differential Distribution of Power and Authority Among the Main 
Sectarian Communities
The struggle for power and authority in Lebanon's political culture bears some 
resemblance to the children's game of "King of the Royal Mountain". One player 
dominates a high place and claims authority over the territory. Other players attempt
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to remove him and take over the command. The strongest among them may 
succeed, the rest will resort to every possible means, including banding together, 
design or even siding with the king to achieve their aim. Some others may seek 
outside help.
This "high place" in the power structure of Mount Lebanon alternated between 
its two main communities, the Druzes and Maronites. In the restructured post-1920 
Lebanon, the power was shared by almost all component communities. The Sunni, 
Shi'a, and some other Christian communities emerged as active participants in 
Lebanon's modern political culture. The shift in the power foci is a result of long 
historical sequences of communal conflict and reconciliation. We are going to 
examine in the following section the process through which the major communities 
came to occupy the "high places" in the power and authority structure.
A The Maronites' Power
The Maronites' ascendancy to power and to a dominant position in the 
authority structure in Lebanon was achieved gradually over a period of thirteen 
centuries. This historical process marked the emergence and maturation of their 
religious ethos and communal consciousness, which developed along nationalistic 
lines.36 Their ascendancy and dominance evolved in three stages, each marked by 
major turning points leading to new developments.
The first stage that ended in 1861, was marked by intensive spells of inter­
sectarian conflict between the Maronites and the Jacobites in Syria, and toward the 
end of this stage, between them and the Druzes in Mount Lebanon. The Maronite 
church played a predominant role in the emancipation of the community's 
consciousness and in forging its social coherence and imbibing in them a nationalistic 
feeling.37
The second stage extended from 1861 to 1920 and was distinguished by a 
consolidation of the Maronites' power and authority status in the state structure. Their 
connections with the European powers, especially France, enhanced their domestic 
political and social status during this period.
The third stage lasted from 1920 to 1975 and was marked by the 
entrenchment of the Maronites' authority status in the constitutional as well as 
institutional structures. They reached the apex of their communal power with the 
attainment of statehood in 1943. A decade later they had to struggle in order to 
preserve their dominant authority status. They could not maintain the status quo for 
long in the face of mounting counter-claims to the same rewards. Soon they found
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themselves in a conflictual situation with the rival communities and their rising 
expectations. Toward the end of this era conflict broke out into inter and intra 
communal armed clashes which ended with the transfer of part of their power to the 
contending communities and the subsequent reduction in their authority status.
Under the Druze dynasty of al-Ma'ni and particularly their Emir Fakhr al-Din II 
al-Ma'ni (1590-1634), the Maronites had their first opportunity to entrench themselves 
in the power and economic structure of the princedom. They were invited into the 
Chouf area and the Beq'a Valley where they worked the land and established 
industry. Some of them were enlisted in the Emir's army and his advisory councils. 
Soon they outnumbered the Druze inhabitants in these areas. Moosa observes that 
"...the period of Fakhr al-Din II al-Ma'ni, marks the rise of the Maronite community to 
an unprecedented eminence."38 This trend continued under Fakhr al-Din's successor. 
The Maronite community continued to grow, under the tolerant rulership of non- 
Maronite Emirs, in numbers, power and prestige. In the early eighteenth century two 
of the most influential Maronite families, al-Khazen and Hubeish, were elevated up the 
social ladder to the rank of feudal lords and were treated on equal footing with the 
Druze feudal families.
1 The Chehabi Period
In the mid-eighteenth century, the Sunni Chehab Dynasty, successors of the 
al-Ma'nis, was converted to Christianity and joined the Maronite Church. The 
Maronites, who already were enjoying the protection of the French, started to look 
ahead for a prominent position in the power structure of the princedom. The Chehabi 
Emirs chose a Maronite as their Mudabber (administrator and chief counsellor whose 
position entailed immense influence and power in running the affairs of the 
princedom).
The Maronites found the Chehab dynasty a personification of their ambition for 
turning Mount Lebanon into a homeland. Bishop Nicholas Murad went further to claim 
that the Chehabi princedom was a Christian dynasty and Druze were rebels against 
the "...legitimate Maronite authority."39
Conflict between the two communities escalated. The political system itself 
was embroiled in the conflict process and became a part of the issue in dispute. The 
Druzes rebelled against the authority of the Chehab dynasty and the Maronites 
embraced it. Within a period of two decades ending in 1860, the whole political order 
collapsed and with it the feudal system (Iqt'a), which was the backbone of the 
authority structure in Mount Lebanon.
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In trying to resolve the conflict, the Ottoman power, under whose suzerainty 
Mount Lebanon was placed, divided Lebanon into two districts (Qayem Maqamiyyah) 
- a northern district under a Maronite ruler (Qayem Maqam) and a southern district 
under a Druze ruler. This was a form of cantonization which did not last for more 
than two decades (1842-1860), during which conflictual tendencies proliferated and 
were intensified by the refusal of the Maronites of the South to accept the authority of 
a Druze governor.40 At the same time, the Maronites of the North were afflicted by an 
intra-communal conflict between the peasants and the landlords. The clergy played a 
significant role in instigating the peasants in both districts to revolt against their feudal 
landlord. The spiralling tension finally broke out on 29 April 1860 into a civil war 
involving the Maronites and the Druzes. The ordeal was resolved by the intervention 
of the then major world powers (England, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria), which 
established a new political order whereby the two districts were reunited under a non- 
Lebanese Christian governor appointed by the Ottoman authorities and approved by 
the intervening foreign powers. The governor was to be assisted by an elected 
administrative council representing the sects of the country. This arrangement 
remained in force until the First World War. The Maronites were granted a significant 
political role, which brought them closer to the centre of power and guaranteed them 
an influential position in the new power structure. "It seems that the Maronites got the 
best of the deal. Under the new regime the Maronites began to mature 
politically...they came to regard Lebanon as their exclusive homeland."41 The 
Administrative Council itself played a central role in the stability of the country.
2 The Administrative Council Period
The establishment of the Administrative Council marked the beginning of the 
second stage in the Maronites’ ascent to power. This Council was established in 1861 
and revised in 1864 as a part of constitutional measures taken by the intervening 
foreign powers in concurrence with the Ottoman Empire. It was meant to serve two 
objectives: to resolve the communal conflict, and to establish an alternative political 
system to the defunct feudal system.
This constitutional arrangement disposed of the two Qayem Maqamiyyah 
regimes in Mount Lebanon and established a single administration for both districts, 
headed by a non-Lebanese Christian Mutasarref (Governor) appointed by the 
Ottoman Sultan.42 The Council was constituted on the basis of a sectarian and 
geographic distribution of the population. It consisted originally of twelve members: 
four Maronites, two Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Shi’a 
Moslem and one Sunni Moslem.43
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The constitutional arrangement of 1861 introduced the principle of 
confessional representation to the political culture of Mount Lebanon. An earlier 
attempt by Bashir III in 1841 to distribute political power among the confessional 
communities had failed. At the request of Salim Pasha, the Governor of Beirut, Bashir 
III formed an advisory council for himself consisting of ten representatives drawn 
proportionally from the various component sects of Mount Lebanon; three Maronites, 
three Druzes, while the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics, the Shi'a Moslems and 
the Sunni Moslems each had one.44 The Druzes refused to send representatives to 
this Council on the grounds that it "curtails their authority and privileges", whereas the 
Maronite representatives were selected by the church who at the same time lobbied to 
increase their numbers from three to six.45
In 1864, the constitutional structure was revised to give the Maronites more 
power in the form of an additional seat on the Council. Linder the revised 
arrangement, the Council’s membership became as follows: four for the Maronites, 
three for the Druzes, two for the Greek Orthodox, and one for each of the Greek 
Catholic, Shi'a and Sunni communities.46 This arrangement continued from 1864 to 
1918. It collapsed with the demise of the Ottoman Empire, but many of the concepts 
embodied in it were passed on to the political system of the newly formed Republic of 
Greater Lebanon and were enshrined in its 1926 Constitution.
The Council as an overall institutional framework and an electoral system 
constituted a venue for the political leadership of the various communities to rise to 
power. The Maronite community found in it an opportune vehicle for their ascendancy 
that was achieved, in a zero -sum formula, at the expense of the Druzes.
The Maronite claim to position of authority did not end there. The first 
Mutasarref of Mount Lebanon, Dawud Pasha, who ruled from 1861 to 1868, 
introduced the post of deputy chairman of the Council and apportioned it to a 
Maronite. There was no provision for this post in the Reglement Organique of 1861 
but it was created by Dawud Pasha and became a precedent for his successors. The 
position of a deputy chairman entailed power and authority. In the absence of the 
Governor, he had to chair the meetings and run the affairs of the Council.
With time the powers of the Council were transformed from an advisory nature 
to actual decision-making. Its authority and influence were enhanced by the 
increased assertiveness of the Council and its public stature. Slowly but steadily it 
moved to the centre of politics of Mount Lebanon. Following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the withering away of the Ottoman administration in Lebanon
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and Syria in October 1918, the Council assumed the State functions and ran the 
country on its own until September 1, 1920 - the day Lebanon was proclaimed the 
State of Greater Lebanon under French Mandate. The Council has been credited 
with ushering the country into its early experience in a parliamentary culture.
The end of the second stage in the Maronite ascendancy to power coincided 
with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War and the 
transfer of Mount Lebanon into the hands of France. Two years later, France was 
granted mandatory powers by the League of Nations with instructions to offer 
countries like Lebanon "...administrative advice and assist in their political and 
economic development until such a time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes 
of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the 
Mandatory."47
3 The Mandate Period
The third stage was ushered in with the creation of the Republic of Greater 
Lebanon on September 1, 1920. This stage was associated with the growth in the 
temporal power of the Maronite Church. It was able to fuse the interests of the two 
main stratas of the Maronite community, the Mashaykh (aristocracy) and the 
peasants, into a unified group that was capable of collective action. It acted as an 
agency to build a feeling of deep communal loyalty and to spread communal 
consciousness.48 The Maronite community became aware of its objective communal 
position when it entered, in the mid-nineteenth century, into a conflictual relationship 
with the Druze community in Mount Lebanon with whom they shared a state of 
coexistence. The conflict helped the Maronite community develop from a community- 
in-itself, that is a collectivity of co-religionists sharing common values, to a community- 
for-itself, that is a community whose members became aware of their true interests. 
This awareness, which grew as a result of their conflict with the Druzes, created in the 
Maronites a feeling of common identity and deep interest in Lebanon. This interest 
was due to their conviction that Lebanon could constitute a shield for their minority 
status in the surrounding Islamic countries. Their growing communal consciousness 
prodded the Maronites to conclude that their emancipation required their domination 
of the Lebanese political order.
Communal consciousness propelled the Maronites further inside the power 
circle. Jumblatt attributes their new position of power to two factors: their communal 
awakening, and the assistance they received from the French Mandate.49 Smock and 
Smock agree with Jumblatt. They note that "...the French created Greater Lebanon in 
order to strengthen the position of Lebanon's Maronite community as well as to
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reward the Maronites for their faithful allegiance to France."50 Concurring with this 
observation, Owen states that the French deliberately created Greater Lebanon "...to 
secure refuge for their Christian protégé."51
The French organised the administration of Greater Lebanon on a sectarian 
basis. The first French High Commissioner, General Henry Gouraux, appointed in 
September 1920 an advisory Administrative Council consisting of fifteen members 
who represented the various sects in the country to assist in the governing of 
Lebanon. Three weeks later this number was increased to seventeen by adding two 
Sunni Moslem members, and was composed confessionally as follows: Maronites six, 
Sunni Moslems four, Shi’a Moslems two, Orthodox three, Catholic one and Druze 
one52. This Council was dissolved and replaced in March 1922 by an elected 
representative Council whose seats were also distributed proportionally along 
sectarian lines. The nature of this Council was similar to the earlier Administrative 
Council of 1864, and was purely consultative and void of any legislative powers. Yet it 
had a profound influence on the political culture of Lebanon. The final confessional 
character of the electoral system was established by this Council.
The Council of 1922 consisted of thirty members: ten Maronites, six Sunni 
Moslems, five Moslem Shi'a, four Orthodox, two Druzes, two Catholics and one other. 
The Council elected a Maronite, Habib Pasha al-Sa'd, as its first president. He was 
succeeded in the following two other annual terms also by Maronite candidates: 
Na'um Labakie in 1923 and Emile Eddé in 1924. In January of the following year, the 
council was dissolved and a new council elected in July of the same year on the same 
basis. This council saw the birth of the first Lebanese Constitution, which was 
promulgated on May 24, 1926. It observed the sectarian composition of the country. 
It also provided for the establishment of two chambers.
The various sects were proportionally represented in both chambers. 
However, its first president Charles Debbas (1926-1933) was a member of the Greek 
Orthodox sect. When a Moslem tried to run for the presidency of the Republic in 
1932, the French Governor intervened and "refused to allow the Chamber to select" 
him.53 Instead a Maronite, Habib Pasha al-Sa'd, was elected to the post. All 
subsequent presidents, with the exception of two, were Maronites. These two were: 
Mr Ayoub Tabet, a member of the Protestant sect who ruled from March 18 to July 21, 
1943, and Mr Pedro Trad a member of the Greek Orthodox sect who ruled from 
July 21 to September 21, 1943. On the other hand a Sunni was elected for the first 
time as a Prime Minister in 1937 and a Shi'a as Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, in 1943.
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This position of power that the Maronites achieved in 1920 was in 1943 still 
precarious. They could not persuade the French Mandatory power to enshrine it in 
the 1926 Constitution54. All the Constitution stipulated was that the president of the 
republic should be Lebanese. "The Maronites and their church were determined that 
a Maronite should be president..."55 The Maronites’ campaign to achieve this goal 
was opposed by other communities.
The third stage of the development of Lebanon's political culture and the 
Maronites ascendancy to power was associated with the attainment of Independence 
in 1943 and the formation of the National Pact in October of the same year. The Pact 
institutionalised all power positions of the various communities, including that of the 
Maronites. What the Maronites could not accomplish constitutionally, they obtained 
institutionally. Their failure to have their newly gained position of dominance explicitly 
enshrined in the 1926 Constitution was mitigated by their success in having it 
institutionalised in the 1943 National Pact.
The Constitution provided for an equitable representation of the component 
sects in the Cabinet and bureaucracy and aimed at ensuring the representation of the 
major religious communities, and preventing the dominance of one community to the 
exclusion of others.56 However the constitution organized the power structure in such 
a way that it gave a large measure of authority to the Chief executive who was 
designated by the 1943 National pact to be a Maronite. Article 17 of the Constitution 
concentrated in the hands of the president the bulk of the executive functions. Article 
18 gave him the power to propose legislation, Article 57 enabled him to veto 
legislation, Article 55 empowered him to dissolve the Parliament, Article 76 authorized 
him to propose amendments to the Constitution, Article 53 permitted him to appoint 
and dismiss the Prime Minister and any minister as well. Placing in the hands of the 
Chief Executive such extensive powers involved risks specially if that person was at 
the same time the leader of one group or community. This would make that particular 
community the predominant repository of power.
•
B The Druzes' Power
The power relation between the Druzes and Maronites in Mount Lebanon 
assumed a zero-sum condition. The Maronites' gains were the Druzes' losses. 
Furthermore, the locus of power shifted from the Druze community to the Maronites.
The Druze ascent to power started with the Tanukh dynasty, reached its apex 
with the M’anis, and its nadir under the Chehab Sunni dynasty. During the 
Mutasarrifiyyah, the Mandate and independence periods, their power was routinized
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but remained vigorous. The rise and decline of their power passed through three 
stages: the Imarah period, 1519-1842, the Qayem Maqamiyyah period, 1842-1864, 
and the Mutasarrifiyah, Mandate and independence periods, 1864-1975. During the 
first stage the Druzes' power reached its zenith. It started its long journey downwards 
during the Mutasarrifiyah period, and levelled off after independence.
1 The Imarah Period
The Druzes initial appearance as a major political power in Mount Lebanon 
and the Levant was associated with the Ottoman conquest of the Levant in 1516 57 
and the rise to prominence of the Ma’n dynasty. However, their existence in Mount 
Lebanon is much older than that.
As a result of the Arab conquest of Syria, many Arabian tribes gravitated into 
Mount Lebanon as well as other parts of Syria. Among these tribes were the 
Tannukhs50, the first tribe in Lebanon to convert to Druzism. This tribe was sent in the 
year 763 by the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, Abu Ja'afar al-Mansour, for the purpose 
of repelling the Byzantine invasions of the coastal regions and putting an end to the 
harassment of the Maradites who were the Byzantine's domestic allies.59
The Tanukhs controlled the whole coastal area that extends from Latakia in 
Syria, to Acre in Palestine. They established two princedoms, one in Latakia and the 
other in Beirut, with jurisdiction over the surrounding mountainous area known as the 
Gharb.60 The Tanukh's rule over the Ashwaf (Mount Lebanon)61 persisted for a period 
of eight centuries.62
Salibi stated that the Tanukh tribes in the Ashwaf accepted in the year 1026 
the Druze faith63 whereas Hamze claimed that they were proselytized earlier, when 
they received the call at the hands of the special emissaries who were sent in 1017 by 
the Hakim.64 In any case, the Tanukhs of Mount Lebanon were the first Druze 
Dynasty to rule that part of Lebanon. The Tanukhs' and their descendants, the 
Buhturs, main contribution to the political life of the princedom was limited to their role 
as protectors of the gateways to the interior. In this capacity, they fought the 
Byzantine Armies and later the Crusaders in the twelfth century.
Salibi contested the claim that the Tanukhs and their descendants were 
reigning princes in their own right. He claimed that "...they were simply the most 
prominent family of Druze notables in the region.'65 In his view their loyalty was given 
to whichever Islamic regime was established in Damascus. They kept close relations 
with the Mamlukes of Egypt before and after their conquest of Damascus, and they 
entered into intense conflictual relations with their neighbours to the North, the
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Turkomans of Kisrewan. Abu Izzeddin mentioned that the genealogical register of the 
Arsalan family showed that the title of the Tanukh's Chief was Prince of the Mountain 
and sometimes Prince of the Gharb66, and his sphere of influence included Beirut and 
Sidon as well as their environs.
The Tanukh princedom was ruled by two dynasties: from the middle of the 
eighth century to the mid-twelfth century by the Arsalans, and from the mid-twelfth to 
the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516, by the Buhturis. The Tanukh dynasty was 
credited with the spread of the Druze faith, once the Mamluke's persecution of non- 
Sunni sects was lifted.
Sayed Jamal Uddine Abdullah al-Tanukhi (1417-1479), revered by the Druzes 
as al-Sayed 67 (the master), was recognised as the first to "...institute and head a 
Council of the Initiates which united the Druzes of the Chouf Mountain under its 
leadership and exercised moral power over them."68 This was a source of political 
strength to the Druzes. It was the beginning of their organization as a theo-ethnic 
community and the start of their communal awakening. The Maronite community 
earlier had a similar organization, namely the church. Such an organized existence 
was absent from the Shi'a and Sunni structures. The Shi'a had a long tradition of 
religious scholarship but this was confined to communal politics.
Toward the end of the Tanukhs' rule, internal conflict broke out between the 
two main lines of succession, the Buhturis and the Arsalans. The conflict was 
aggravated by the fact that each one of these two dynasties belonged to a different 
asabiya, the Arsalan line belonged to the Yemeni asabiya, and the Buhturi to the rival 
Qaysi asabiya69 The feud and the pressure coming from the neighbouring Ma'n 
dynasty weakened the Tanukhs' power. The Ma'nis, with the help of the Buhtur line, 
who belonged to the same asabiya, made few inroads into the Tanukh sphere of 
influence. The cooperation between the Ma’ns and Buhturs developed into an 
alliance whose main bond was the inter-marriages between them.70
The Ma'n princedom in the Chouf existed side by side with the Tanukh 
princedom in the Gharb. The Ma'nis were of the Druze faith and claimed 
descendance from the Rabi’a tribe in the Arabian Peninsula, whose members 
migrated to Syria following the Arabian conquest of the region. They fought the 
Crusaders in northern Syria before moving to the Beq'a Valley in eastern Lebanon, 
and from there to southern Lebanon, at the request of the Mamluke governor of 
Damascus, in order to assist the Tanukhs in their defence of the region against the 
Franks.71 They settled in the Chouf area and were welcomed by their neighbours, the 
Tanukhs, with whom they entered into an inter-marriage relationship.
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The Kisrewan region to the north of the Druze areas was originally inhabited 
by the Twelver Shi'a. Their co-religionists inhabited also the Ba'albek region in 
eastern Lebanon as well as southern Lebanon. The Sunni Mamlukes invaded 
Kisrewan and uprooted the Shi'a and brought in the Sunni Turkoman tribes and 
settled them in their place.
The Turkoman’s presence in Kisrewan created a conflictual situation between 
them and the Tanukhs of the Gharb who were at the same time Governors of the 
district of Beirut. The Tanukhs were vying for the control of the Kisrewan region too, 
expecting the Mamlukes to grant it to them as a reward for their military support. War 
broke out between the two dynasties. The Turkomans were victorious due to the 
assistance they received from the Mamlukes but a few years later the Mamlukes 
transferred their support from the Turkoman back to the Tanukhs, due to the fact that 
the Turkoman fell up against the line of the Circassian Mamlukes of Egypt. The client 
tribes in the Beq’a Valley in eastern Lebanon were instructed to give a helping hand to 
the Tanukhs in their military campaign against the Turkomans of Kisrewan. The 
Tanukhs won the war and took control of the Kisrewan region.72 It remained in their 
hands until the coming of the Ottoman Turks in 1516, then the Turkoman re-emerged, 
under the Assaf dynasty, (1517-1593) from neighbouring Mount Lebanon to settle in 
the region and acted as political agents to the Ottomans.73
2 The Ma'n Period
The Tanukh power started to wane with the advent of the Ottoman rule in Syria 
in 1516. The Tanukhs' alliance with the adversaries of the Ottomans, the Mamlukes, 
cost them their princedom. Internal strife between the two asabiyas of the Tanukh 
dynasty, the Buhturi and Arsalan and between the latter and the Ma'ns coupled with 
the external pressure coming from the Ottoman ruler in Damascus, brought the rule of 
the Tanukh dynasty in 1633 to an end, and heralded the rise to power of the Ma'n 
dynasty.
At the time of the Ottoman conquest of Syria the Ma'n dynasty was already 
settled in the Chouf area of Mount Lebanon. The Ma'nis authority over this region 
was soon recognized by the Ottoman Sultan Salim I on the grounds that the Ma'nis 
sided with the Ottomans in their wars against the Mamlukes. By the same token, the 
Tanukhs were persecuted for their support of the Mamlukes. In 1516, Sultan Salim I 
rewarded the Ma'nis by confirming them as Emirs of the region.
The first ruler of the Ma'n dynasty was Fakhr al-Din I. The seat of his 
princedom was the Druze town of Ba'akleen. His son, Qarqamaz, inherited the
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princedom and ruled it for forty years, 1544-1584. Due to a misunderstanding with the 
Ottoman authority, he fled his seat, died in hiding in 1588, and was succeeded by his 
son Fakhr al-Din II, who was only 12 years of age. Fakhr al-Din II and his minor 
brother Younes were taken away to the Khazen family in northern Lebanon, a 
Maronite family which belonged to the same Yemeni asabiya and the two were hidden 
there for six years. At the age of eighteen, Fakhr al-Din II returned to the Chouf area 
and claimed the princedom for himself. The princedom was administered during his 
absence by his uncle who willingly turned over the reigns to him.
Fakhr al-Din II ruled from 1585 to 1635. During this period the power of the 
house of Ma’n and with them the Druzes, reached its zenith. Fakhr-al Din II united all 
ruling families and assumed supremacy over them. With the help of a strong army of 
one hundred thousand soldiers74, he established an independent power over all of 
Lebanon and part of Palestine and Syria. He established strong commercial relations 
with the Grand Duke of Tuscany who helped him in his development projects and sent 
him Italian engineers and agricultural experts to help in building roads and improving 
agriculture, particularly silk production and olive growing. During this period he was 
able to extend his domain from the central parts of Mount Lebanon to Acre in the 
South and Antioch in the North, and as far as Palmyra in Syria. He expelled the 
remaining Shi'a from Kisrewan and invited the Christian peasantry to settle there. His 
control over the Kisrewan region "...directly linked the principal areas of Druze and 
Maronite settlement in the Mountain, paving the way for the emergence of an inter­
sectarian system."75
This step was followed by a few other measures, which improved the status of 
the Christians, that is, Maronites, and strengthened the relations between the two 
communities. Until then the Christians were treated like second class citizens, but he 
elevated two of their notable families to the same rank as that of the Druze notables, 
and the rest of the Maronite populace to the same civil status rank as his dominant 
group, the Druzes. The nineteenth century Maronite historian, Istefan Duwayhi 
remarked that, "...during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II the Christians raised their heads, 
they built churches, rode on saddled horses, and wore white turbans...most of his 
armies were Christians and his advisers and servants were Maronites."76
During his reign foreign missionaries started to descend on his country. In 
1625, the Capuchin order sent its first mission to his princedom. It was headed by 
Friar Joseph Capuche, the adviser to Cardinal Rochellio, the Foreign Minister of 
Louis XIII. It established its first monastery in Sidon followed by three other 
monasteries in Beirut, Aleppo and Cairo. Fakhr al-Din II gave the mission ample
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support.77 In 1631 he authorized the Franciscan Monks to establish a mission and 
allowed them to preach their faith freely.
It is during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II that the Christians from North Lebanon 
started to move to the South and inhabited the Druze settlements. He permitted them 
to practise their religious rites publicly and freely, a right they did not enjoy under the 
Ottomans. Ma'alouf concluded that Fakhr al-Din’s tolerance encouraged the 
"...Christians to colonise Lebanon and to gain privileges."78 The influx continued at a 
faster pace during the reign of the successor dynasty, the Chehabis (1697-1842).
Fakhr al-Din ll's policies of expansion riled the Ottoman Sultans. In every step 
he took he acted as an independent sovereign. He established strong relations 
between his princedom and that of the merchant princes in Tuscany who were the 
chief rivals of the Ottomans in the East Mediterranean. In 1635, the Ottomans 
captured and executed him at Constantinople. The Ma'n reign continued, through his 
nephew and son, until it came to an end in 1697.
Ma'alouf pointed to another reason for the Ottoman displeasure with Fakhr al- 
Din II: his patronage and protection of the Christians.79 As soon as he was deposed 
the Ottomans lost no time in deporting the Franciscan missionaries and caused some 
of the Maronites to flee the country to Italy.80 Upon the extinction of the Ma'n dynasty 
in 1697, the reign passed to their kin, the Chehabi rulers of Wadi al-Taym, who ruled 
Lebanon until 1842.
With the demise of the Ma’n dynasty the Druze power started its long decline. 
The transfer of rulership from the Ma'n line to their agnates, the Chehabis, brought 
with it three phenomena. The first was a continuity in the gradual build up of the 
Maronite authority in the traditional Druze power structure and a corresponding 
decline in the Druze authority within that structure. The second was the growth in the 
conflictual tendencies between the two communities due to the shift in the power 
locus from the Druzes, to the Maronites, which created an imbalanced authority 
relationship. The third was the demographic changes inside the princedom due to 
the internal conflict and to population movement. Such change influenced the 
balance of power between the two communities to the advantage of the Maronites.
3 The Chehabi Period
The Ma’n dynasty was not extinguished with the death of Fakhr al-Din II. Of 
his five sons only the youngest, Husein, was spared. The rest were killed either in 
battle or hanged. Husein was taken by the Ottomans and brought up in their courts. 
He ended up as their ambassador to India.81 Fakhr al-Din II was succeeded by his
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nephew Melhim, followed in 1657 by Melhim's son, Ahmed, who ruled until 1697. 
Following Ahmed’s death the male line of the Ma’n dynasty became extinct and the 
succession passed on, through a process of election carried out by the Druze 
notables of the Ma'n princedom, to Ahmed's nephew, Bashir Chehab of Wadi al- 
Taym. The Ottomans objected. They wanted Ahmed's grandson from his daughter, 
Haydar Chehab, to inherit the princedom, but since Haydar was still a minor it was 
agreed that Bashir would rule on behalf of Haydar until the latter reached maturity.
Toward the end of the Ma'nis rule internal conflict intensified between the two 
main asabiyas of the Druze society, the Qaysi and the Yemeni. This conflict 
continued well into the eighteenth century and broke out into intra-communal clashes 
in 1711. The Qaysi asabiya was victorious. The rival asabiya had to emigrate to 
Hawran, in Syria, where it established a Druze colony known as Jabal al-Druze 
(Mountain of the Druzes). As a result of the expulsion of the Yemeni asabiya from 
Lebanon the size of the Druze community was reduced and the numerical strength of 
the Maronites bolstered. This conflict sealed the fate of the Ma'n dynasty and paved 
the way for the Chehab dynasty in its bid for the succession of the Ma'ns.82
The Sunni Chehab family ruled a princedom that was controlled largely by the 
Druzes. The Maronites of the princedom, and the Christians in general, were 
numerically predominant, but politically weak.83 The Christians, who started coming in 
from different areas to settle in the Ma’n and Chehab dominion, were mostly 
"...peasants, settling on estates of Druze feudal chiefs. It was their Druze feudal 
master ...who stood out as the strongest political force in the land."84
The Druze hegemony over the princedom remained unchallenged until the 
middle of the nineteenth century. The Maronites started their journey upwards on the 
power scale through their bureaucratic influence, but the Druze feudal lords remained 
the backbone of the polity of the princedom. However, the Maronite ascendancy 
toward the centre of authority started with their growing numbers and social and 
economic relevance, whereas the Druze ranks had been weakened by internal 
conflict, which reflected power rivalries between the two main asabiyas and the 
notables. The Chehabis did not waste time in exploiting this situation. It is worth 
mentioning that the Qaysites and their allies supported the Chehabis, whereas the 
Yemenites opposed them.
Emir Bashir Chehab was murdered in 1707 and succeeded by his cousin Emir 
Haydar Chehab. The Yemeni asabiya did not support his selection as he was from 
the rival asabiya. Their opposition to the Qaysi ascendancy continued to fester inside
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the Druze community until 1711 - the year when both asabiyas fought each other in 
the village of Ain-Darah, to the east of Beirut.
Following its victory in Ain-Darah, the Qaysi asabiya monopolized the power in 
the princedom for a long period. However, the Qaysi notables were not the direct 
beneficiaries of this victory; it was the Chehabi rulers who got the biggest share of it. 
The weakening of the Druzes allowed the Chehabis to tighten their grip on the feudal 
lords of the Druzes and were able to enter into a new alliance with the most powerful 
of their lords, Sheikh Bashir Jumblatt. They distributed the Yemeni lands and property 
to these notables and elevated some of them in social status to that of sheikhs and 
Emirs.85 Among those invested by the Chehabs were the Jumblatts who were given 
the title of Sheikhs. Their rival family, the Arsalans, were ranked among the Emirs.
The feuds among the Druzes ended temporarily with the battle of Ain-Darah. 
However, the rift between the two asabiyas reappeared under different designation. 
It took the form of a Yazbaki-Jumblatti divide in modern times. This cleavage is 
associated with the Chehab inter family feuds. Haydar's son, Melhim, succeeded his 
father in 1732 and remained in office until 1754. His brother Mansour succeeded him. 
This angered his other brother Ahmed who was supported by the Jumblatt asabiya, 
which included most of the powerful Druze families and had the Maronite Khazen 
family in the North as their ally. Ahmed enjoyed the support of the discredited 
Yazbaki families, like the Imads, Talhuqs and Abdel Malik, who had on their side the 
Maronite Hubeish and Dahdah families of the North. This Druze Yazbaki-Jumblatti 
division involved all the families in Mount Lebanon. Salibi was not impressed with 
that. He acknowledged this Druze involvement, but observed that"...the fact that the 
Druzes could still impose their party divisions on the rest of the country was poor 
compensation for their steady, and now evident, loss of power. When Emir Melhim 
retired, the Druzes were already a minority in their own districts."86
The Druze's loss of power was the Maronites' gain in authority. Emir Melhim 
Chehab was the last Chehabi Emir to profess the Sunni Moslem faith. His sons and 
successors were converted to Christianity; so were the other succeeding Chehabs 
and Abil-lam Emirs. The Maronites' position was further enhanced by the arrival from 
Syria of Greek Catholic families and the establishment of foreign Christian Catholic 
missionaries (Franciscans, Lazarites, Carmelites and Jesuits). Of significant 
consequence for the Druze-Maronite relationship was the treaty signed in 1535 
between Francis 1 and Suleiman the Magnificent that gave France capitulary 
privileges in the Ottoman Empire. This allowed France to patronize the Maronites in 
Lebanon directly.
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The end of the eighteenth century witnessed a shift in the balance of power 
between the Maronites and the Druzes. As the Maronites grew stronger the Druzes 
grew weaker until, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Maronites came to 
replace the Druzes as the predominant political power. "The conversion of Emir 
Melhim’s sons to Christianity in 1756, and the succession of the Maronite Yusuf 
Chehab in 1770 finally set the seal to the Druze decline."87
Although the Maronites were now recognized as the predominant sect, the 
Druze community continued to play a significant political role which the Chehabis 
could not afford to ignore. The relations between the two communities were peaceful. 
Salibi claimed that the Druzes did not object to the continuous flux of the Maronites, 
Orthodox and Catholics into their region and their settlement in their villages. "For a 
long time they continued to regard the Maronites as allies, and apparently remained 
without suspicion of Christian political ambitions."88
When Bashir Chehab II came to power in 1788 he was able to manipulate the 
internal and external forces in his favour and thus successfully maintained power as 
the uncontested ruler of Mount Lebanon for a record period of fifty-two years, from 
1788 to 1840.
At an early stage of his rule Bashir II curbed the powers of his foes, as well as 
his prospective competitors, the Druze notables. Cobban claims that he robbed the 
Druze notables of their wealth and reduced them to subservience.89 Of all the Druze 
families only the Jumblatts, headed by Sheikh Bashir, were able to retain their 
positions. Chehab's alliance with Sheikh Bashir enabled him to build an unrivalled 
power base in Mount Lebanon. Abu Izzeddin claimed that the Jumblatt chieftain was 
more powerful than Emir Bashir in men and money.90 This was a source of worry to 
the Chehab ruler. He started harassing Sheikh Bashir by his requests for donations, 
contributions and taxes. Finally the estrangement between the two was inevitably 
completed. Emir Bashir was able to eliminate Sheikh Bashir Jumblatt and with his 
demise the destruction of Druze feudalism was achieved. With the disappearance 
from the scene of Sheikh Bashir, Betts maintained, "...the Druzes entered a period of 
serious decline as the Chehabis seized Jumblatt's holdings, instituted large scale 
confiscations of the properties of Druze Shaykhs, forced sales of land and generally 
impoverished many families..."91
Persecution of the Druzes continued until the downfall of Emir Bashir. His ally 
Mohammed Ali of Egypt sent, in 1832, an army under his son Ibrahim Pasha, into 
Syria and Lebanon in an attempt to overthrow the Ottoman Sultan. The Egyptians,
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with the connivance of Emir Bashir, tried to impose forced conscription on the Druze 
youth, but were faced by a strong rejection. The Druzes rebelled against the Egyptian 
army, and a good number of them fled the country to Jabal al-Druze causing further 
decline in the Druze population of Mount Lebanon.92 They were relieved only upon 
the removal of Bashir II and his exile to Malta in 1840. Following that, the Druze 
deportees to Egypt and the refugees in Syria returned to their areas and claimed back 
their lands and properties which Bashir II had confiscated and distributed to the 
Maronites.
In 1842, the Maronites and Druzes entered into a new era of conflictual 
relations. The tension between the two communities accumulated over a period of 
two decades and broke out in 1860 into a civil war that claimed thousands of lives, 
caused enormous destruction to property, and invited the major powers of the time to 
intervene and impose a settlement to the conflict. The resolution of this conflict 
ushered a new political order in which the Maronites* position of dominance was 
recognized and officially instituted in the constitutional arrangement agreed upon 
between the major powers and the Ottoman suzerain.
C Other Sects and Communities
a The Sunnites
The contribution of the rest of the communities to the political life of Mount 
Lebanon was less strident due to their minor numerical strength and to their dispersed 
demographic distribution. Until 1920, the Sunni community considered itself a part of 
the larger Islamic Umma (nation) and the Shi'a were obsessed by a perception of 
marginality. It was only at the turn of the century that the Shi’a began to develop an 
interest in the national life of Lebanon. Their active participation came only after the 
creation of the Republic of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and the enlargement of the area 
of Lebanon to encompass their habitation. However, both communities' contributions 
helped readdress the balance of domestic power and the distribution of authority in 
the Lebanese system.
Although the Sunni Moslem community's active participation in the political 
process came at a later stage, its presence in the region goes as far back as the other 
two communities. Sunnism in Lebanon dates back to the arrival in 635 of the first 
Moslem armies in Ba'albek and what is today eastern Lebanon. They settled, at the 
request of Muaweya, the then governor of Damascus, along the shores, whereas the 
Christians chose the mountains as their habitat.93 Encouragement to settle along the 
coastal region came also from the Abbasides in Baghdad, the successors of the
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Muaweya regime, with the purpose of having an Islamic ally keeping watch over the 
shores and coastal highway against the invasions of the Byzantines94 and later on the 
Crusaders.
The Sunnis' contribution to the political and administrative life of Mount 
Lebanon was not less than that of the other communities. They had one seat out of 
six on the Advisory Council during the Qaem Maqamiyyah period and another seat 
out of twelve in the Central Administrative Council of the Mutasarrifiyyah. However, 
following the creation of the Republic of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the Sunnis' 
numbers increased by virtue of the annexation of additional areas populated mainly by 
Sunnis. Prior to that, the Sunnis perceived themselves as part of the state structure of 
the Ottoman Empire. Khuri argues that this was a quintessential characteristic of the 
Sunni ideology. "The Sunni feel religiously lost once they lose central power."95 
During the Ottoman rule the Sunnis of Lebanon felt they were part of the state 
structure, their authority status was associated with that of the state.
After 1920, as citizens of a newly created Lebanon, the Sunnis found 
themselves outside the authority structure of the Ottoman state and in an inferior 
position to that of the Maronites. Their rigorous contribution to Lebanon's political 
culture became more apparent after 1936. In spite of the fact that the authority 
structure in an independent Lebanon was not as open to them as it was under the 
Sunni Ottoman rule, they attained the second highest position in the power structure 
of independent Lebanon.
b The Shiites
The Shi'a's contribution to Lebanon's political culture before 1920 was 
marginal. Khuri suggests that the reason for that is found in the orientation of their 
religious ideology and organisation. He maintains that it is adapted to the sovereignty 
of the religious community rather than the state.96
Being a marginalized community, measured by its under representation in 
government and administration, the Shi'a did not bother to enter the main body politic 
of Lebanon before independence. The National Pact accorded them the third place in 
the power structure as far as the legislature was concerned, but they were still under­
privileged in the state reward system. In the 1960s, they manifested a marked degree 
of awakening and organisation and started to develop communal consciousness. 
Since then, they have become an active player in Lebanese politics, and their share in 
the power structure has increased.
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The change in the power structure, from bi-polar to multi-polar, and the shift of 
communal power from the Maronite- Druze axis to a Maronite-Sunni axis was brought 
about by the exigencies of the developing political domestic and regional situation and 
epitomized by the 1943 National Pact.
VIII The National Pact: A Power-Sharing Arrangement
The National Pact was a verbal agreement concluded in September-October, 
1943, between the then Maronite President of newly independent Lebanon, Bechara 
al-Khoury, in his capacity as the most influential leader of his community, and his 
Sunni Prime Minister, Riyad al-Solh, the then most authoritative representative of the 
Moslems in Lebanon. They agreed to establish an independent state and distribute 
the power on the basis of the numerical weights of its component communities. 
However, the power-sharing characteristic of the Pact was part of a wider mechanism 
for resolving the simmering issues of Lebanon's national identity and its foreign policy, 
which were a significant source of dispute between the two main communal blocs. 
This aspect of the Pact will be discussed in chapter five, as a conflict resolution 
mechanism.
The Pact as reported by the Lebanese historian, Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbeck, 
stipulates the following: 97
1 Lebanon is a completely independent and sovereign republic, 
unattached to any other state.
2 Lebanon has an Arab face, its language is Arabic, and is a part of the 
Arab world, but has its particular characteristics. Despite its Arabism, it 
will maintain its cultural and spiritual ties with western civilization having 
in mind that those ties helped Lebanon achieve an enviable degree of 
progress.
3 Having secured a recognition of its independent status within its 
present borders, Lebanon is called upon to cooperate with all Arab 
states and become a member of the Arab community. In its relations 
with the Arab countries, Lebanon should not side with one party against 
the other.
4 Government posts are to be distributed equitably among the 
recognized sects. However, in recruitment for technical posts,
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expertise rather than sectarian affiliation will be taken into 
consideration.
The Pact defined formally the political authority in Lebanon as well as its Arab 
and external policies. The 1926 Constitution instituted confessionalism as a basic 
principle but did not specify a modality for proportional representation. "In allocation 
(of) governmental positions, justice will be observed among the sects. For technical 
posts expertise will be taken into consideration."98 Based on this principle, the 
National Pact specified that legislative, administrative, judiciary and army posts were 
distributed among the two main faiths according to a ratio of six Christians to five 
Moslems. This ratio was further subdivided to reflect the share of each sect within the 
two faiths. This formula was based on the 1932 census, which gave the Christian 
population of the country a majority status, and the Maronites a majority among the 
Christians, and the Sunnis a majority status among the Moslems. As a result of this 
census, the top political offices were allocated to the two largest communities: the 
Maronites and the Sunnis. Since 1933 the Presidency was apportioned to the 
Maronite community, and since 1936 the Prime Ministership to the Sunnis. The 1943 
Pact allotted the Speakership of the House of Representatives to the Shi’a, but this 
was not implemented until 1947.
The Maronites' allocation of the position of Chief Executive put them at the 
core of authority and at the centre of the realm of political power. This position did not 
only allow them access to the rewards of the state but also "...symbolized the political 
superiority of the Christians and the deprivation of the Moslems."99 Aulas believes that 
the Pact "...institutionalized Maronite political supremacy at the head of the state."100
Having proposed an analytical framework based on the two concepts of 
authority and asabiya for the analysis of the conflict in Lebanon we now need to 
proceed to an analysis of the social structure. Two issues are central to our analysis 
and need to be addressed before we do that. These are the significance of the 
conflict groups versus the significance of the social structure. The question that 
needs to be answered is whether the conflict could best be understood through the 
notion of active involvement of the conflict groups or through an understanding of the 
contradictions and cleavages in the social structure. In other words, have the events 
been shaped by the values and interests of the conflict groups or as a reaction to the 
cleavages in the Lebanese society?
This thesis has argued that the social structure is important in so far as it is a 
generator of conflictual tendencies, but it is insufficent to take the social structure and 
conflictual tendencies as given, or to assume that conflict groups reacted to them in
82
an unpredictable way. The social structure has to be analysed in terms of its 
authority and asabiya attributes in order to determine the causal link between its basic 
characteristic, the conflict and the conflict groups.
The next chapter analyzes the sectarian composition of Lebanese society in 
order to explain how cleavages and contradictions incapacitated the social structure 
and made it available for exploitation by the conflict groups, that is , how the quest for 
positions of authority and the rising asabiya consciousness became a source of 
conflict.
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CHAPTER THREE 
CLEAVAGES IN THE LEBANESE SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
I Introduction
Authority and asabiya are two concepts that can explain why and how conflict 
in Lebanon was generated. They are valuable concepts for focussing our attention 
on contradictions and cleavages in the social structure, which in turn explain the 
existence of conflictual tendencies and their bearing on the generation of conflict. 
Many of the asabiya attributes contributed to the rise of communal consciousness, 
which in turn was a driving force behind the struggle over positions of authority.
This chapter attempts to analyse, within the two concepts of authority and 
asabiya, the structural properties of the main Lebanese sects in order to identify the 
source of conflict and determine the social process through which it has currently 
been terminated.
Lebanon is a composite of several large and small religious and ethnic 
communities organized in an “...hierarchical manner accommodating their own 
conflicts and interests within the confines of a system that promotes sectarian 
identification..."1 Relationships between them have oscillated between 
accommodation and conflict. None of these communities constitutes a majority. 
Lebanon is one of the few countries that can claim to be composed totally of ethno­
religious minorities, or sects. Seventeen of these sects are officially recognized by 
the state. Apart from a minuscule Jewish sect, the officially recognized sects are 
broadly divided between the Christians and the Moslems.2
II Historical Development of the Communal Structure
The political significance of these sects lies in the role they have played as 
social organizations through which political security can be achieved. They have 
evolved over the years into semi-autonomous socio-political communities with 
distinctive political and administrative functions. This evolutionary process began in 
the early seventeenth century under the Ottoman Turks, Lebanon's overlords from 
the sixteenth to the twentieth century.
The Christians in the Ottoman Empire were recognized as autonomous sects 
governed by the "millet" system. They were granted independent jurisdiction in the
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field of personal status and have maintained it ever since. After the First World War 
the Ottoman rule over Lebanon came to an end. The Arab territories of the Empire 
came under the control of France and Britain. Lebanon and Syria came under the 
French Mandate. The mandatory French Government extended the semi- 
autonomous status of the Christians to every other component religious group in the 
country.
Under the Ottoman rule the non-Sunni (Christians, Jews, Shiite and Druzes) 
communities were held in an inferior but recognized position.3 The Druzes and 
Maronites were permitted some autonomy. "All Ottoman citizens defined themselves 
according to their religions and sects... the religious leadership of these communities 
represented them at the seat of power and were held responsible for the lawful 
behaviour of their community."4 Religion was essentially the frame of reference of 
one's identity and a major reference point in social interaction. This feeling did not 
wither away with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the transformation of 
its spoils into nation-states. Religious organizations are still represented in the legal 
system of Lebanon as well as in its polity.
Communal distinctiveness features prominently in Lebanon's personal status 
law. Contracting and dissolving of marriages, guardianship, legitimation of children, 
religious endowments, inheritance and wills are exclusively the domain of religious 
courts. Each recognized community has the right to make and alter its own 
regulations in these matters. Each religious community has the right to set up its 
own courts and codify its laws. The advantage of such a system is that it allows 
each group to conduct its own affairs, yet it is "...charged that the official sanctions of 
these various ways of life hinder the development of even the minimum common 
basis necessary to hold together a sovereign state."5 Since personal status matters 
lie within the precincts of religion, it is the case with some religious groups (Greek 
Orthodox and Greek Catholics) that the final authority is in the hands of religious 
officials or institutions outside Lebanon and beyond the jurisdiction of the Lebanese 
Government. For example, the seat of the Greek Orthodox patriarch is in Syria and 
the seat of the Greek Catholic is in Syria and Egypt.
Communal attachment in Lebanon remains an overriding factor in the 
present-day conflict. Up to 1975, communal loyalties and national interests were, to 
a certain extent, reconcilable. The war of 1975 created the conditions that where the 
communal and national commitments conflict with each other, the balance was 
tipped in favour of communal loyalties. Basically, Lebanon's political culture draws 
on the sectarian composition of the country. This does not mean that all things
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political in Lebanon are fundamentally religious. Nevertheless the role of religious 
identification and institutions is to be reckoned with in any analysis of Lebanese 
politics. This phenomenon is not unique to Lebanon. It is a characteristic of the 
whole region. In some countries it is latent and well managed by means of a healthy 
regulatory mechanism. In others, like Lebanon, the system has failed to meet the 
challenge. Hourani confirms that "...the primary divisions inside the Near East are, 
as they have been for a thousand years, religious: whether a man is Moslem, 
Christian or Jew and to which branch of Moslem, Christian or Jewish community he 
belongs."6
The social structure is the custodian of these loyalties. Political institutions 
have not only reflected but fostered them. However, a mechanism of balance and 
checks is institutionalized in the political order of Lebanon to help its various 
communities adjust to the pressures of political and social competition arising out of 
the process of change and development. This system was embodied in the National 
Pact of 1943, as explained earlier. Its direct aim was to constrain the rising 
conflicting tendencies among the various communities, but its ultimate aim was to 
accelerate the development of national identity by enabling the numerous 
component communities to reconcile their divisive issues and establish minimum 
consensus as a prelude to full national integration. In retrospect, this mechanism 
proved to be too brittle for the communities to embrace. The reasons lie not in the 
veracity of its principles but rather in the gneissic boundaries of the communities 
themselves and their failure to avail themselves of this opportunity to use it as a 
viable platform for their cross-cutting interests. The strength of communal loyalties 
and identities eclipsed the integrative potential inherent in the National Pact. As a 
result the cleavages among the component communities increased in strength and 
precluded the process of nation-building and the development of a national identity.
How did these ethno-religious communities - sects come to occupy such a 
definitive and decisive position in the social structure and play such a salient role in 
the political process? A thorough analysis of the historical development of these 
sects is necessary to explain their doctrinal differences. It is to be noted that each 
community has taken a specific path in its development. Certain explicit forms of 
ideal interests (especially those that constituted centripetal and centrifugal forces in 
relation to a central value system) have evolved from specific types of historical 
conditions. These interests have established rather than expressed the 
communities' behavioural patterns and course of action.
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All the sects were involved in the Lebanese conflict, but only four played a 
decisive role: the Maronites, the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Druzes. The Orthodox 
and Catholic sects played a marginal but active role. Among the major communal 
actors were also the Palestinians. The role they played before and after the conflict 
is to be reckoned with.
We turn now to a descriptive analysis of the social structure of each one of 
these sects, and we will identify and describe the structural aspects which have 
engendered the conflictual tendencies among them. Identification of these aspects 
warrant a detailed description of the development of the sectarian structure in 
Lebanon.
A The Maronites
The Maronites, named after their patron, the ascetic monk St. Maroun7 (died 
in 410 AD), appeared in the sixth century AD in the northern parts of present day 
Syria, which was already inhabited by some christianized Arab tribes. "By the end of 
the seventh century, a new Christian sect - that of the Maronites - was already 
becoming organized as a separate communion in the valley of the Orontes and the 
adjacent hills.”8 Hitti points out that the reason for their settlement in the Orontes 
Valley was a possible conflict with the Greek Church in Antioch which Maroun's 
disciples may have had shortly after his death.9 As their converts swelled they came 
in direct clash with the Jacobites (an offshoot of the Monophysites) over the 
interpretation of the nature of Jesus Christ. The Jacobites maintained that Christ 
was God become man, suggesting that he had only one divine nature; his human 
nature was merely a form. On the other hand, the Maronites, being Orthodox 
Melkite, believed that Christ had two natures, divine and human, but one energy 
(energia) and one will (thelema). In the seventh century, the Maronite Monks 
"...broke away from the Melkite Church and proceeded to organize themselves 
separately."10 In the twelfth century they abandoned the Monothelite formula and 
returned to the Catholic Church, accepting the Papal supremacy, but like the rest of 
the Uniate churches in the Arab countries, retained their own oriental rites and 
customs and were granted autonomy under their own elected patriarchs.
As early as the sixth century, the Maronites came into conflict with other 
Christian denominations which had adopted Monophysitism. In one of these 
confrontations, which took place in the year 517, three hundred and fifty Maronite 
monks were massacred by the Jacobites.11 Renewed feuds with the Jacobites in the 
second half of the seventh century, and the failure of the Islamic state, which was 
established in 638, to provide them with adequate security, resulted in the migration
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of a considerable number of them to North Lebanon. Christians and some Maronites 
were already in existence in this area. In the early fifth century, two disciples of Saint 
Maroun were sent to North Lebanon to preach the teachings of their Saint.12
Saint Maroun is the father of the Maronite sect but Yuhanna Maroun was the 
founder of their community in northern Lebanon and their first elected patriarch.13 It 
was under Yuhanna Maroun's leadership that the communal organization of the 
Maronites emerged and developed into an independent community. He mobilized 
his people in North Lebanon into a fighting force of twelve thousand strong men. In 
694 he defended his territory against the invading Byzantine armies under Justinian
II who, before invading the Maronite stronghold in northern Lebanon, destroyed their 
monasteries in Syria and killed 500 of their monks. "Since then the Maronites have 
isolated themselves and developed the individualistic traits characteristic of 
mountaineers."14
The communal existence of the Maronites in Lebanon was completed in the 
second half of the seventh century. By the turn of the tenth century the basic tenets 
of their nationhood started to emerge with the completion of the transfer of their 
headquarters from the Orontes valley in northern Syria to Qannubin, a monastery 
carved in the solid rocks of the Qadisha Valley in North Lebanon. Throughout this 
initial period "...there was no sign of social cohesion of a communal type among 
these highland peasants. Only their common religion bonded them together."15 
Father Boutros Dao argues that by this time, the tenth century, the Maronites had 
become a "nation", for they possessed the main elements of nationhood: land, 
population, civilization and separate existence.16
The Maronites found in the invading co-religionist Crusaders of the twelfth 
century a natural ally. They provided the first invading armies with guides and 
"...contributed a contingent of archers."17 Upon landing in Acre (Palestine) King 
Louis IX received a delegation of twenty-five thousand Maronites with provisions 
,and presents. He rewarded them by bringing their community under France's 
protection as indicated in his letter dated 21 May 1250.18 They were accorded a 
privileged position in the established kingdom of Jerusalem and were ranked first 
among the Christian denominations after the Latins. The involvement of the 
Maronites with the Crusaders in such a way had a debilitating effect on the Christian- 
Moslem relationship.
Pressed from all sides (Byzantine persecution, the massacre of their monks 
by the Jacobites, and the tidal wave of Arab conquests resulting in supplantation of 
Christianity by Islam), the Maronites found in the Crusaders a convenient protector of
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their faith and possibly of their nationhood, although Islam was tolerant toward other 
religions. "Indeed, from the point of view of religious orthodoxy, the effect of Arab 
conquest on Syrian Christianity was not unwholesome."19 The Islamic state under 
the Umayyad dynasty (downfall in 750) was "...on the whole unusually tolerant. Its 
liberalism and tolerance transcended the political into the religious and intellectual 
spheres."20 However, Maronite fears were substantiated with a later dynasty, the 
Mamlukes who were credited with the termination of the Crusaders' occupation of the 
Orient in 1291. They harassed all non-Sunni groups but were particularly less 
tolerant toward the Christians and Jews. In 1283, they penetrated the Maronites' 
stronghold in northern Lebanon and destroyed their villages.21 They also uprooted 
the Shi'a population from the neighbouring Kisrewan region and forced them to 
emigrate southward. The few who were left were forced to take refuge in 
proselytization into the Sunni sect.22
In spite of these pressures, the Maronites in North Lebanon were able to 
develop their social structure and their communal identity. In the sixteenth century, 
they started expanding outside their secure habitat. Groups of them ventured into 
the neighbouring Kisrewan region to fill in the vacuum left by the deportation of its 
indigenous inhabitants, the Shi'a, whom they encountered when they tried to expand 
further east to the Beq'a valley. To the South, they penetrated the Druzes' 
stronghold. Actually the Maronites were lured into the Druzes' region because of 
their much needed skills and professions. They lived in peace and harmony with the 
Druzes and under their hegemony until the middle of the nineteenth century. During 
this period the Maronites' power grew in strength and the Druzes became weaker 
due to their internal feuds and the Chehabi persecutions.
Around that period the Maronites strengthened their relations with France and 
established firm relations with the Vatican. Pope Gregory XIII had patronized the 
Maronite church in Lebanon. A Maronite college was set up in Rome in 1584 to 
educate Maronite clerics from Lebanon and send them back as missionaries and 
reformers. As they started to grow in numbers and in power, the Maronites started to 
challenge the Druze supremacy in the Chouf region, the Druzes' only stronghold.
B The Druzes
The Druze faith originated, after a few years of preparation, in the closing 
phase of the reign of al-Hakim, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, (966-1021). The divine 
call was proclaimed in Cairo on 30 May 1017. Tawhid (Unity of God) is the basis of 
this faith. The Druzes like to be known as Muwahidun (Unitarians). "On the first day
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of AH 408 (1017 AD) the Unitarian doctrine was made public with a proclamation in 
which al-Hakim invited the people to choose freely and practise openly their belief."23
The founder of the new faith was Hamza bin Ali, a Persian missionary born in 
the province of Khurasan. He was assisted by five missionaries of whom Nashtakin 
al-Darazi, also of Persian origin, is best known. Nashtakin was a confidant of al- 
Hakim and the first to offer veneration to him, but later was discredited because of 
his libertine tendencies, and was denounced and killed. Two years after his death 
his name became eponymous for the Faith.
The Druzes differ from the Sunnis and Shi'a in their approach to the message 
of Islam. They contend that by the year 1017, the task of the Shi'a Imams was 
almost completed. With al-Hakim, the allegorical interpretation of the religious law 
was terminated. A new era was to start. Prophet Muhammad delivered the religious 
law. The Imams, after him, interpreted it allegorically. Now it was time to convey the 
truth (al-haqiqa) without allegorical interpretation.24 This haqiqa is the knowledge of 
the One, the knowledge of the Unity of God (tawhid). It is the goal of all knowledge. 
Religion is only a means to attain the reality of the divine message.
The Call was met by opposition in Cairo, both from followers of the other 
sects and from the successor of al-Hakim, who persecuted the believers and forced 
them into hiding. However, outside Egypt, mainly in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, 
the Call met a positive response. Five years after the proclamation of the Faith, al- 
Hakim mysteriously disappeared, then shortly afterwards Hamza himself went into 
concealment leaving the Faith in the hands of one of his disciples, al-Muqtana 
Bahauddin. For a time al-Muqtana lived in concealment. "He addressed Epistles to 
his followers or prospective ones all the way from Byzantium to India..."25 The Faith 
was overwhelmed with persecution. All who would not recant were killed. Al- 
Muqtana spent seventeen years as a missionary (da'i) trying to keep his followers 
under control.
Al-Muqtana himself may have "...compiled one hundred and eleven letters, 
many of them his own, some of them by Hamza and by Isma'il Tamimi, and certain 
pieces by al-Hakim, into a cannon which has since served as Druze Scripture, called 
Rasa'H al-Hikmah, the Book of Wisdom."26 Towards the end of his life, al-Muqtana 
decreed that no part of this religion should be divulged, a decision probably dictated 
by security concerns. The Call was closed to new converts in 1043.
The ethical principles of this Faith are probably one of its most significant 
aspects. It prescribes a sevenfold set of commandments for all Druzes to follow: to
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speak the truth, to defend and help one another, to renounce all former religions, to 
recognize the unity of our Lord (God), to be content with whatever he does, and to 
submit to his orders.27
By then Druzism was well established in Lebanon, working its way from the 
southern tip of the country northwards, limiting its expansion to the mountainous 
areas. "Here its adherents acquired those national traits that have characterized 
them throughout their entire career: intense community loyalties, high sense of 
solidarity, vigorous spirit of independence, endurance in the face of adversity."28 
Albert Hourani describes them as "...mainly an agricultural community...socially the 
most solidly organized of all the communities. They have a double organization: the 
religious with its hierarchy, and the feudal with its gradation of ranks."29
Of particular interest to this study are the historical incidents the Druzes have 
experienced. The events contributed, as was the case with the Maronites, to the 
building up of their asabiya consciousness and strong communal and conflictual 
tendencies. Since its establishment the Druze faith has met antagonistic reception, 
and its followers were subjected to various kinds of oppressions and persecution. As 
a result of continuous persecution over the years, the Druze communities in Egypt, 
northern India and some other parts of the world, have disappeared. Only the Druze 
community in Lebanon has remained with a central presence in Wadi al-Taym, at the 
foot of Mount Hermon, as well as in satellite communities in Syria and Palestine.
The Druzes were exposed to three historical incidents that have strengthened 
their group solidarity and sharpened their conflictual propensity. The first was during 
the 13th century when the Mamluke rulers, who belonged to the Sunni sect, 
subjected them to the harshest of discriminatory measures on the grounds that they 
were unorthodox Moslems. The second was in the nineteenth century when they 
were exposed to physical persecution at the hands of the invading Egyptian Army 
commander, Ibrahim Pasha. Six hundred of their notables were massacred because 
they refused conscription in his army. The Druzes of Syria rose against Ibrahim 
Pasha. To crush their uprising he armed 7000 Maronites and sent them to fight the 
Druzes. The third was the three decades old conflict between the two communities 
that culminated in thhe 1860 civil war. The episodes of fighting took a sectarian 
form, but the issues were void of any religious connotation. By then the two 
communities developed a separate mature social structure with distinctive social 
characteristics and distinct political orientation.
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C The Shiites and the Sunnis
The Shi'a30 is a large Moslem sect whose departure from the mainstream 
Sunni Islam was spurred mainly by the question of the prophet's succession. 
Following the death of the prophet Muhammad, the community of Islam was divided 
into sectarian groups with contrasting views on who should succeed the prophet and 
what was the nature of his role. The Sunni Moslems argued that Islam was a 
religious and a political phenomenon, as its Rasul (Messenger) was a prophet and a 
statesman. Therefore the head of the community of Islam should continue after him 
to be a religious personality elected by the community and empowered to implement 
the religious law (Shari'a), to defend the community of the faithful, and to propagate 
the religion of Islam. This implied two themes. The first was that the head of the 
community ought to possess two main qualities, religiosity and statesmanship. The 
second was that it was a religious duty on the part of every Moslem to owe the head 
obedience as long as the observance of religion and the performance of the state 
functions were duly afforded by him. The head of the community of Islam came to 
be known as the Caliph or Imam.31 His elevation to this office ought to be by ikhtiyar 
(selection). The Shi'a on the other hand, claimed that the prophet's successor had to 
preside over the community and to interpret the divine message allegorically. Only 
Imams, designated by the prophet through his successors, were capable of grasping 
the intrinsic and esoteric meaning of the Message. The Imam was not only a leader 
in prayers but he was the epitome of religion, a means for salvation and a model to 
imitate: "whosoever dies without knowing the true imam of his time dies the death of 
an unbeliever".
An Imam in the Shi'a doctrine was a divinely illuminated person who acquired 
his divine insights from the prophet Muhammad by succession. Though the 
message of Islam was sealed with Muhammad, yet allegorical interpretation of its 
inner meaning is a continuous process of divine revelation. "For the contact between 
God and man is not at a point of intersection but in a continuous line, not in a single 
individual but in an uninterrupted series of Imams."32 The Sunnis, on the other hand, 
reject the divine powers of an Imam and the principle of allegorical interpretation of 
the Koran and hold the view that "...salvation is officially and externally sought 
through the observation and application of divine law"33, and that a mujtahid, a 
"legalist-judiciary" intervention, could officiate on divine law in accordance with one of 
the four recognized interpretations in Islam: The Hanbalis, the Shafi's, the Hanafis 
and the Malikis.34 In his interpretation of the Divine Message, the Mujtahid had to 
comply with the following four sources: the Koran, the Hadith (prophet's tradition) al- 
Qyas (analogy with the Koran) and Ijma' (consensus).
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The dogmatic difference between the two sects is reflected as well in their 
organizational structure and their conception of the principle of legitimacy. The 
Sunnis have identified themselves with the state structure and the centrality of 
authority, whereas the Shi’a have over the years associated themselves with the 
sovereignty of the community35, and have attuned themselves to a diffused rather 
than specific type of religiosity. Religious achievement to the Shi'a is positively 
correlated with social achievement, and their religious ranks reflect simultaneously a 
social status position. The gradation in their religious structure starts at the level of 
imam, then ayatollah, mujtahid akbar and hujjat al-islam. These titles carry with them 
an inherent religious value as well as a social status position. Movement along the 
religious and its concomitant social ladder is characterized by a high degree of 
flexibility. This explains how the highest echelon of power became tenable to the 
Shi'a religious leaders in Iran as well as in Lebanon.
On the other hand, mobility in the Sunni structure is circumvented by the 
dictates of the state bureaucratic system. The Moslem officials who are designated 
to officiate on divine law are part of the bureaucratic structure and elite class. The 
grand mufti, the head of the Islamic Shi'a Superior Council, and Sheikh al-Akl are all 
government appointees.
The question of succession to the prophet was the point of departure 
between the Shi’a and Sunni Moslems and a source of friction and conflict. Upon the 
death of the prophet in AD 632, the Sunnis elected one of his companions, Abu 
Bakr, as the Caliph and Imam of the community of Islam, a position that embodied 
both religious and political functions. The Shi'a reluctantly recognized the Imamate 
of Abu Bakr but considered Ali Ibn Abi Taleb to be the true imam, on the grounds 
that he was the prophet’s first cousin and son-in-law, and was senior to all other 
companions in his adherence to Islam. They claim that he deserved the position for 
his piety, learning and bravery and above all for the mere fact that the prophet 
himself had designated him as his successor.36
The institution of the Caliph came into existence with the election of Abu Bakr 
as the first of four pious Caliphs. The other three who succeeded him were Umar, 
Othman and Ali Ibn Abi-Taleb. Their combined rule extended over a period of forty 
years. Under the first two Caliphs, the party of Ali (Shi'ite Ali) remained 
inconspicuously active. It was only under the rule of the third Caliph, Othman bin 
Affan, that they started to show impatience and restive behaviour. Othman was 
accused of nepotism and partiality to the Sunni Umayyads who were the adversary 
of the followers of Ali. This was a major cause of his downfall. He was succeeded
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by Ali in the year AH 35 (AD 656). The desire that the Imamate in Islam should be 
kept for Ali and his descendants was never fulfilled. A conflict broke out between Ali 
and the Umayyad governor of Syria, Mu’awiya bin Abi Sufian. This conflict 
developed into a civil war between the two groups37 but soon was resolved by 
arbitration, much to the chagrin of Ali's followers, in favour of Mu’awiya. Ali lost his 
position as a result of which he was assassinated by one of his dissatisfied 
followers.
The Umayyad House ruled supreme in the Moslem world for a period of 
almost a century. The Shi'a never acquiesced, and denied the Umayyads any 
legitimacy. They contended that the house of Ali was the rightful heir to the 
Caliphate, and that the Umayyads were usurpers of power. Their refractory attitudes 
towards the house of Umayyads and their successors, the Abbasides, brought on 
them further misfortune. Ali’s son and heir, al-Husein, together with his family and 
supporters of two hundred, were massacred in a battle with the Umayyad troops in 
Karbala, Iraq, on Muharram 10, AH 61 (10 October 680 AD J.38 It is claimed by most 
historians that the death of al-Husein marked the birth of the Shi'a. "The blood of al- 
Husein...proved to be the seed of the Shi'ite church. Shi’ism was born on the tenth 
of Muharram.... Yaum (the day of) Karbala gave the Shi'a a battle-cry summed up in 
the formula vengeance for al-Husein, which ultimately proved to be one of the factors 
that undermined the Umayyad dynasty."39 It marked a turning point in their future 
attitude towards any form of legitimacy. It further strengthened the passionate 
motive in their political and religious involvement and commitments.
1 The Shiites
Shi’ism arrived in Lebanon from its chief centre in Iraq in the middle of the 7th 
century AD. It struck its roots in two main regions, the south and eastern part of 
today's Lebanon. Their arrival was broadly contemporaneous with the arrival of the 
Maronites from northern Syria.
The Shi'a and Sunni population of Lebanon have lived outside Mount 
Lebanon, the nucleus of the present day state. The southern and eastern parts of 
the country, as well as a few sporadic places in the north, are predominantly Shi'a of 
the "twelver" denomination.40 Under the Umayyads in Damascus and their inheritors, 
the Abbasides in Baghdad, the Shi’as were subjected to persecution, but their co­
religionists, the Fatimides, who themselves were a victim of Abbaside persecution, 
established their state in Egypt and extended their patronage to the Shi'a of 
Lebanon. This lasted until the thirteenth century. Their previous oppression by the
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Umayyads and Abbasides moulded them into a compact unit which was instrumental 
in the preservation of their distinctive features.41
The protection came to an end with the demise of the Fatimide rulers at the 
hands of the Crusaders in the early 13th century when two new successive dynasties 
of the Sunni Faith, the Ayoubides and the Mamlukes, were able to expel the 
European Crusaders and unite the Islamic world under their Sunni leadership. The 
Shi’a once again were subjected to fresh persecution and were dispersed from their 
native regions in the northern and central part of present day Lebanon to the 
southern and eastern regions of the country. A good number of them converted to 
Sunnism to escape persecution. The Sunni rulers of the 13th, 14th and 15th 
centuries persecuted the Shi'a not only because of their heterodox religious views, 
but because of their disloyalty to the Sunni state at its apogee of jihad42 (war against 
the Christian crusaders).
The Shi'a lived in south and eastern Lebanon with virtually no connection to 
the political system of the country until 1920. They were marginalized by their 
lifestyle and political culture and the neglect of the central government. They were 
basically a peasant society characterized by social immobility and subject to a 
feudalistic social structure tempered by a parallel structure of clerics. "In the rural 
areas, the Shi'ites remained the poorest and most exploited, and politically, the least 
represented and socially the least educated group in Lebanon."43 However, 
urbanization and the destabilization of their normal life due to the Israeli invasions 
and incursions forced a great number of them to emigrate from their regions in East 
Lebanon and the South to the capital city of Beirut. "There the Shi'ite new-comers 
jostled for living space and jobs with the Maronites whom they often found had 
arrived before them. Three particular areas near Beirut quickly became transformed 
into vast Shi’ite dominated suburb-slums."44 These particular areas were the 
spawning grounds for the emergence of the Hezbollah (Party of God) and the Amal 
movement.
As a result of their prolonged persecution, suffering and deprivation, the Shi'a 
grew as an undercurrent of discontent and a movement of protest. In Lebanon, they 
had lived as a marginal community, separated and withdrawn, until the French 
Mandate coaxed them into the new state, created in 1920. They were a reluctant 
contributor to national life and were distant beneficiaries of national rewards. Even 
after the birth of the state of Lebanon and their formal incorporation into it, they kept 
a profile of partial identification and sustained their own culture and cultivated their 
own ethnicity. Memories of persecution and suffering could not be abandoned in
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favour of the new national status, which offered them nothing substantial towards the 
improvement of their lot. Their participation in the newly created entity did not give 
them enough security and comfort to venture out of their cultural enclave and be 
subjected again, not to physical persecution, but to norms that were not their own. 
Furthermore, their Feudalists style of social life isolated them from the main-stream 
of political culture; they remained socio-cultural exiles in their own national state, 
strangers in their own polity. On the other hand, the newly created state did not do 
enough to persuade them to enter the political process and make a contribution to 
national life.45
The persistent feeling of deprivation growing out of their marginality in the 
political structure continued to shape the attitudes of the Shi'a in Lebanon towards 
the state and its legitimacy until the late 1960s, when they began to experience a 
kind of political awakening under the leadership of Imam Mousa al-Sadr. Al-Sadr 
was able to mobilize them, to air their grievances, and to crystallize their demands for 
restructuring the power system in line with their communal aspirations. Al-Sadr, 
together with the clerical hierarchy of the Shi'a of the South, founded in 1975 the 
Amal movement.46 It succeeded an earlier movement, also founded by al-Sadr in 
1974, known as The Movement of the Disinherited. The "Movement's" power grew 
from strength to strength. The traditional authorities as well as other communities 
had to reckon with the rising new power. The movement questioned loudly and 
noisily the Maronite's ascendancy at the expense of what they called the 
disinheritors' rights, and demanded extensive changes to the political system in order 
to restore the balance to the communal structure.47 The Shi’a's political awakening 
and their first contribution to national life are concomitant with the outbreak of the 
civil war in Lebanon.
2 The Sunnites
The term sunnah and sunni Islam became well defined during the rule of the 
tenth Abbaside Caliph, al-Mutawakil (846-61). Various interpretations of the divine 
law appeared prior to the al-Mutawakil period. The controversy was not over the 
source of law, which was the Qur’an and the Tradition (precedents based on the 
prophet's own decisions and utterances), but over its use. On the basis of both the 
Qur'an and the Tradition, the jurist made his legal decision using two methods, the 
analogy (Qiyas) and consensus (Ijm'a). As there was no standard method for 
achieving consensus, several schools emerged, each professing its own version of 
the implementation of the shari'a. The Shi'a sect developed its own Ja'afary school, 
and the Sunnis followed the Sunnah (the Tradition of the prophet), which implies
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compliance with the authority of the state as long as it rules on what is Islamically 
orthodox.48 Against this background of Islamic Sunni ideology, one can trace the 
presence and structural relations of the Sunni to other communities in Lebanon.
The majority of the Sunni Moslem population of Lebanon have lived outside 
the area known as Mount Lebanon49, the sanctuary of Maronite and Druze 
habitation. Mekki claims that their existence is associated with the invasion of the 
region in the 7th century by the Arab-lslamic armies between the years 634 and 
639.50 The increase in the Moslem population of Lebanon continued under the rule 
of the Umayyads and the Abbaside Sunni dynasties. During their reign, 660-750 in 
Damascus and 750-1258 in Baghdad, consequentially, many Arab tribes settled in 
the Beq'a Valley, Wadi al-Taym, the southern part of Lebanon, Beirut and the Chouf 
Mountain.51
With the demise of the Sunni Abbaside dynasty in Iraq, and its replacement 
by the Selucide dynasty and the rise of the Shi’a Fatimide dynasty in Egypt, loyalty to 
Eastern Islam (including Lebanon) split into two divisions. One division declared its 
allegiance to the Fatimide and these were the Shi’a, and the other expressed their 
loyalty to the Sunni Selucides, and these were the Sunnis. Since the middle of the 
11th century, Lebanon fell under the competing influence of both the Fatimides and 
the Selucides. This resulted in the establishment of several autonomous domestic 
suzerain Emirates in Lebanon and the region catering for both influences.
The Shi'a of Lebanon grew stronger and more numerous in number under the 
Fatimide rule, but their superiority came to an end with the demise of the Fatimide 
dynasty and the rise to power of the Sunni Mamluke dynasty in Egypt, which wrested 
the country from the Crusaders and established its rule in the region for three 
centuries (1261-1517). The Sunni power was further enhanced under the Ottomans 
who succeeded the Mamlukes in their rule of Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world 
(1517-1918). Salibi52 attributed the Sunni growth and strength in Lebanon mainly to 
the patronage they received from the Mamluke rulers as well as to the state's 
reprisals against the Christians and other sects. He ascribed this situation to three 
factors.
The first was the high rate of conversion among the Christians and Shi'a into 
the Sunni ideology in order to avoid the state's persecution and oppression. As soon 
as the Mamlukes established themselves firmly in power in the region following their 
defeat and expelling of the Crusaders from it in 1291, they fell on the Christians for 
their support of the Crusaders against the Moslem armies and on the Shi'a for failure 
to contribute to the holy war against the Crusaders. In their attempt to escape the
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wrath and further persecution of the Mamlukes, members of both communities 
adopted Sunnism as their new religious ideology. The Mamlukes also persecuted 
other sects, like the Druzes, the Isma'ilis and the Nusayris. The Mamlukes insisted 
on conformity and could not tolerate schism within their own community.
The second factor for the increase in the number of Sunnis in Lebanon, 
according to Salibi, was the migration of traders and businessmen from the interior of 
Syria, Egypt and Morocco to Lebanon. They settled in the urban centres mainly in 
Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon.
A third factor was the resettlement of the Turkoman and Kurdish tribes along 
the coastal areas and in North Lebanon by the Mamlukes in order to help the state in 
establishing order in the country, and to guard against any turbulence in the 
hinterland.
At the encouragement of the Sunnite Moslem chiefs of the region, many 
Maronite families from northern Mount Lebanon settled in the Kisrewan region. 
However, the new Sunni chiefs helped in establishing and developing a Sunni 
community in Lebanon which was further strengthened by Ottoman patronage.
The Sunni Moslems of Lebanon enjoyed security under Ottoman rule, by 
belonging to the religion of the state, a situation not possible for the Christians and 
the rest of the Islamic sects. Christian citizens of the Ottoman Empire were 
governed by the millet system which gave them autonomy and security in matters of 
personal status law, but locked them into an inferior status position compared to the 
Sunnis, in matters of state authority and power.
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, its Arab territories 
were divided as mandates between the French and the British. Lebanon and Syria 
came under the French mandate, while Iraq, Jordan and Palestine came under the 
British.
In response to pressures from the Maronites,53 the French Mandatory power 
annexed, in 1920, the Ottoman administered provinces of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and 
the Beq'a Valley to the territory of Mount Lebanon and created on 1 September, 
1920 the State of Greater Lebanon within its present frontiers, reconstituted as the 
Republic of Lebanon in 1926. The annexed areas had a majority of Sunni Moslems 
who resented this annexation presumably for fear of losing their majority status and 
becoming a subservient minority in a Christian dominated state.54
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These are the main stages in the emergence of the Sunni community in 
Lebanon. With the creation of the modern state of Lebanon they suffered a transfer 
of political status. Linder both the Mamlukes and the Ottomans they had a sense of 
belonging to the ruling class which enhanced their majoritarian perception. They 
treated other communities from a position of strength and benevolence. This 
perception changed with the creation of Lebanon in 1920. Instead they found 
themselves embroiled in a three dimensional role-diminishing situation. First, they 
lost the majority status that they had enjoyed until then by virtue of being a part of 
the community of Islam. Second, with the loss of this status, they lost their proximity 
to the positions of authority in the state. They had to accept a diminished role in the 
affairs of the state and eventually received less of government rewards. Third, they 
had to accept a new identity which would restrict their parochial loyalties and 
allegiances and constrain their ties with the world of Islam and Arabdom.
Following the establishment of the Republic of Lebanon in 1926, the Sunni 
Moslems found themselves on a collision course with the Maronites over the terms of 
their share of power. The 1943 National Pact managed to resolve this issue, but not 
for long. The issue of power sharing (al-Musharakah) resurfaced in the late 1960s 
and persisted throughout the war years. These conflictual relations, sometimes 
latent and other times explicit, shaped Lebanon's political culture since its creation.
The Sunni community in Lebanon entered the conflict process with minimum 
militaristic preparedness. Their contribution was predominantly of a political nature. 
Their militias were localized and scattered: Qulilat's Murabitoun militia in Beirut, the 
Sha'aban Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli, Sa'ad's Popular Nasirist 
Organization in Sidon, and two other minor Sunni neighbourhood based military 
groups, in Beirut. The "Sixth of February Movement" led by Shakir Birjawi, and the 
"Islamic Military Council", led by Sheikh Abdul-Hafiz Qasim, the head of the Moslem 
Ulama Association, appeared briefly on the scene and disappeared without a 
successor.
The Murabitoun militia played an effective role in repelling the assaults of the 
Phalangist forces at the sea front hotel areas in Beirut in 1976, and was an active 
member of the Lebanese National Movement. It had strong relations with the 
Palestine Resistance Movement. In the enforced departure of the PLO and other 
Palestinian factions from Lebanon in 1982, the Murabitoun lost its life line. Three 
years later it was decimated by Amal and Progressive Socialist Party militias who, 
following the Murabitoun's defeat, established their hegemony over the 
predominantly Sunni West Beirut. The other two minor Sunni militias withered away.
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The Sunni community in Beirut resented the Shi'a control of West Beirut. The Sunni 
Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Sheikh Hasan Khaled, openly criticized the Shi’a for their 
intrusion into the Sunni stronghold. He "...charged that Amal and 'gunmen' were 
waging war against the Sunni community in west Beirut to compensate for their 
defeat in their war against the Palestinians in the camps."55
In Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city with a predominant Sunni population, 
Sheikh Said Sha'aban founded in 1982 the 'Islamic Unification Movement' which 
entered into a conflictual relation with the Shi'a Alawi community and the communists 
in the city, and adopted a fundamentalist platform calling for the establishment of a 
Moslem state in Lebanon.56 The "Movement" did not last long. In 1985, it was 
defeated by its many local foes with Syrian help.57
In the southern port city of Sidon, the Sunni militia of Mustafa Sa'ad joined 
with the Palestinian armed resistance in controlling the city. It is worth mentioning 
that in the early stages of the war in Lebanon, the Sunni community cultivated strong 
relations with the Palestinians in Lebanon, to the extent that, as Norton observes, the 
PLO became the militia of the Sunnis.58 Sa'ad's conflictual partners were mainly the 
Christian Lebanese Forces in areas to the east of Sidon.
The Sunni community's contribution to the political conflict was most 
prominent in the conflict areas of Lebanon's Arab identity and the political reform. 
They played a leadership role in the first and a substantial one in the second.
D Other Communities
The contribution of the above four communities to the Lebanese conflict, its 
intensity and duration, is an essential criterion to distinguish them from the other 
thirteen sects59 that make up Lebanese society. These sects have made little input 
to the conflict. Nevertheless, the mere fact that they were part of the conflict 
environment makes it necessary for this study to acknowledge their role.
Of these thirteen sects, eleven were Christians, one Alawite and one Jewish. 
The Greek Orthodox Sect60 was the largest of the Christian groups, numbering 
around 300,000 and were, like the Sunnis, geographically scattered between the 
urban centres and rural areas. They flourished in the al-Koura district, south of 
Tripoli, and the el-Metn area to the north east of Beirut, with a good number of them 
in Beirut itself. For the most part they lived as minorities in other Christian or Moslem 
areas.
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1 The Greek Orthodox Community
The Greek Orthodox sect is part and parcel of the overall communal structure 
of Lebanon. Its existence in the region pre-dated the advent of Islam and its 
habitation of Lebanon was centuries old. The Greek Orthodox perceive their 
community in Lebanon to be part of a wider community that extends to Syria where 
they have a dense presence as well as elsewhere in the Arab world. This may 
explain their flexibility and absence of inhibition in relating to Arab culture. Their 
national church maintains links with other centres of orthodoxy like Moscow and 
Athens.
Like the other communities the Greek Orthodox contributed to the 
administrative and national life of contemporary Lebanon, but unlike other 
communities it refrained from taking up arms in the 1975 civil war. Its contribution to 
Lebanon's political life goes back as far as the middle of the nineteenth century. It 
was represented in the Administrative Council of 1864 by two members out of a total 
of twelve. It contributed to the national awakening against the Ottoman rule of 
Lebanon and the Arab world.
The First President of the Republic of Lebanon was a Greek Orthodox. 
Nevertheless it is appropriate to indicate that a good number of the Orthodox were 
drawn into Lebanon's national life and politics after 1920 by virtue of being residents 
side by side with the Sunni majority and Shi'a of the annexed territories. Irrespective 
of the size of their overall contribution, their role in the political matrix of Lebanon's 
culture was governed by their historical links to Islam and the Arab world as well as 
by their fear of marginalization in a larger Moslem dominated state.
On the question of Lebanon's sovereignty, Zamir observes that the Orthodox, 
like the Druzes and the Shi'a, "...lacked the passionate emotions and total 
identification of the Maronites towards Lebanon, and they felt less obliged to defend 
its independence and territorial integrity. On the other hand they did not adopt the 
hostile Sunni attitude (towards the creation of the new state) and were willing to 
accept their inclusion in Lebanon as long as their vital interests were safeguarded."61
The Greek Orthodox sect and communities in the Arab world were closely 
associated with Islam by virtue of their symbiotic existence with the Sunnis. Cobban 
contends that their harmonious coexistence was due to the skill of survival the 
Orthodox came to master in an overwhelmingly Sunni society. They identified 
themselves with their Arab environment, but at the same time preserved their own 
identity.62
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In the 1975 conflict, the same direction of the Orthodox community’s 
orientation was maintained. However, Petran reports that the community's 
bourgeoisie stood with the Maronite right, whereas the other levels sided with the 
secular and progressive side.63 It is worth observing that a few community members 
played a significant role in the Status Quo Coalition militias and media, while some 
others joined the Reformist Camp at the elite level.64
The remaining sects, such as the Greek Catholic, the Alawites, the 
Protestants and other Christian minorities, like the Nestorians and Assyrians, as well 
as ethnic groups such as the Armenians and Kurds, have indeed contributed to the 
conflict environment by providing money and sometimes fighters for the three main 
contending militias. Some of these communities made their own brief appearance 
on the scene of conflict, like the Armenians and the Assyrians, but their independent 
intervention was swept by the rise of the main warring factions, and they had to 
merge with them.
The structural analysis of the basic causes of the conflict in Lebanon would 
remain incomplete if the Palestinian factor was excluded. In terms of their 
organization and ideology, the Palestinians came to occupy a position in Lebanon's 
political and social hierarchy similar to that occupied by the militant communities. 
Although they represented an external cause, their existence in Lebanon was 
nestled, briefly but intensively, in the web of Lebanese society to such an extent that 
it became one of the domestic factors in the conflict.
2 The Palestinian Community
As a result of the Arab defeat in the 1948 war in Palestine, and the 
subsequent exodus of 780,000 Palestinians from their land and their dispersal in the 
Arab countries, Lebanon admitted over two hundred thousand of them.65 They were 
settled around Lebanon's major cities in sixteen camps, which were administered by 
a specially created UN agency, the United Nations Relief and Work for Palestinian 
Refugees (UNRWA). The 1967 Arab-lsraeli war and the 1970 Jordanian-Palestinian 
clashes in Amman, capital of Jordan, brought to Lebanon fresh scores of Palestinian 
combatants as well as P L O infrastructural elements.
It was not the first time Lebanon opened its borders to refugees. Thousands 
of Christian Armenians, who fled the 1894-5 Turkish massacres and the 1915-21 
campaign of deportation from Alexendretta, were offered a sanctuary in Lebanon. 
Homeless Kurds (Sunni Moslems) and stateless Assyrians (Christian Orthodox) 
found a home in Lebanon. The Armenians and Assyrians were legally and socially
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integrated but the Palestinians were not. By a tacit understanding, the Arab host 
countries denied the Palestinians the opportunity of political integration or 
assimilation on the grounds that their permanent stay in the receiving states would 
compromise their ultimate aim of return to their homeland. Other factors also 
prevailed. "Many refugees in Lebanon were integrated into the Lebanese economy, 
but political integration proved impossible, because the Moslem element [i.e. Sunni] 
totalled about 95 percent of the Palestinians, and to have given them citizenship en 
masse would have upset the very delicate politico-confessional balance in 
Lebanon."66
It did not take more than a decade and a half for the Palestinians in Lebanon 
"...to develop their own social and cultural institutions, organs of self-government and 
security and a powerful economic presence."67 In the early 1960's they began to 
establish political institutions and military bases inside their camps. "...In the camps 
they did not live in fear of the Israeli occupation army or the Arab regimes' secret 
police as did Palestinians elsewhere; they could speak freely and openly; and they 
were participating in a relatively open political process."68
In 1965, the Palestinians in Lebanon found themselves catapulted into the 
Lebanese political arena. Their organization and military power grew in strength; so 
did their involvement in Lebanon's domestic affairs. This expansion was encouraged 
and facilitated by Arab politicians "who retained deep and abiding support" for the 
"sacred cause" in compensation for their "failure to save their Palestinian brothers 
from exile"69, and by Moslem communities in Lebanon.
The mushrooming growth of Palestinian power in Lebanon and the adverse 
internal developments eroded the credibility of Lebanon's political, economic and 
military institutions. The Moslems pressured the Maronite-dominated legal authority 
for political reform, and power sharing adjustment. This pressure was augmented by 
the Palestinian raison de revolution and their concrete support of the Moslems. The 
Legitimate Authority was finally flouted through a number of clashes between the 
Lebanese Army and the Palestinian resistance movement, whose organized military 
force "...amounted to extra-territorial authority in the country."70
A succession of clashes between the Army and the Palestinians and their 
sympathizers, coupled with pressure coming from some Arab states, Syria, and 
Egypt in particular, nudged the Lebanese government to conclude in 1969 a secret 
agreement (known as the Cairo Agreement after the place where it was negotiated 
and signed) with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Under the provisions of this 
agreement, Lebanon relinquished its sovereignty over parts of the southern region
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and in the refugee camps, in return for some control over the activities of the 
Palestinians through out the country.71 It gave legal cover for the Palestinian growing 
power in the South. "Many Christians believed it damaged Lebanon’s sovereignty.72 
From the Lebanese government point of view, the main aim of the Agreement was to 
regulate and supervise the armed Palestinian presence in the country. This was not 
accomplished. A Protocol to the Agreement was subsequently concluded between 
the two sides setting out strict limits to the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon. 
However, the Agreement and the protocol were notorious for their breach rather than 
their adherence. An understanding was worked out between the Lebanese 
Government, the PLO and the Syrians at Shtaura (a town in eastern Lebanon) in 
July 1977 for the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. The main provision of this 
understanding was the suspension of PLO operations against Israel across the 
Lebanese borders, and the retreat of PLO away from the borders. The 
implementation of this understanding was to be carried out under Syrian 
surveillance.73
The Palestinian pressure in the country, and their rigorous activities, 
increased the tension between the two camps and led to more political polarization of 
Lebanon's official policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Ill Political Institutions
The structural preconditions for the emergence and perpetuation of conflict 
were incessantly manifested also in the political institutions of the country. These 
institutions, in turn, were instrumental in encouraging a conflictual environment 
between some of the main component communities.
The political parties and movements in Lebanon have been numerous but 
ineffective in the legislative life of the country. In contradistinction to the political 
systems of majoritarian societies, Lebanon's political culture has developed a 
marked tolerance towards all sorts of political parties. Nevertheless these parties 
seem to have been less oriented towards capturing seats in the legislature than 
being a communal template reflecting and preserving the sectarian value system.74 
No more than one third of members of the 1991 parliament, which was elected in 
1972, are members of a political party.75
Political parties in Lebanon have been distinguished by their ideology and 
orientation rather than by their organization. Ba'aklini distinguishes between two 
kinds of political parties: The Parliamentary political party and the cadre political
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party. The first kind strives to win an election and campaigns for this aim, whereas 
the second aims to spread its ideology and increase its membership.76
This classificatory scheme does not explain the inherent conflictual 
tendencies embodied in the structure of these parties, nor can it provide any 
analytical insight into the relations of these political institutions to the main conflict 
issues. This scheme is a mere explanation of an electoral mechanism through which 
Lebanon's political institutions operated at a certain point in time.
Zuwiyya77 utilizes a sectarian classificatory system to describe the political 
parties in Lebanon. According to him, these parties are either Christian dominated or 
Moslem dominated. In the first category, parties such as the Phalanges, the National 
Liberal and the National Block are included. The second group includes al-Najjade, 
the Progressive Socialist Party, the National Appeal and the National Organization 
Parties. However, he excludes from his scheme a third group of parties for their 
extra-Lebanese characteristics. This group includes the communists, the Ba'athists, 
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the three Armenian parties. Such a scheme 
falls short of capturing a conflict-prone situation in which these parties play a 
significant role in generating conflict.
A third classificatory scheme proposed by Suleiman70 elaborates parties' 
communal structures, ideologies and platforms from which it tackles some of the 
present day conflict issues, such as the identity of Lebanon, political reform and 
some other issues. He classifies these parties into four categories: transitional 
parties, exclusively Lebanese parties, religious organisations and movements, and 
ethnic parties.
The first category includes the Communist Party of Lebanon, the Communist 
Action Organization, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party whose main aim is to 
recreate Greater Syria, with Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine as integral parts of 
it, the Ba’ath party whose aim is to unify the whole Arab world under the ideology of 
socialism.
The second category consists of Al-Najjade party which started as a Moslem 
boy-scout group and developed into a political organization, working to establish 
Lebanon's Arab character, the Progressive Socialist Party founded, in the late 1940s, 
by Kamal Jumblatt, an influential sophist Druze politician. Its main objective is to 
reform and possibly to create a new society in Lebanon based on the principles of 
socialism. The Phalanges Party (al-Kataeb) which was established in 1936 as a 
youth organization by Pierre Gemayel "to foster and safeguard the Lebanese
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homeland" in the face of the other centrifugal forces represented by some Lebanese 
and non-Lebanese based parties. Constitutional Union Party, which was the party 
that led Lebanon into independence from the French in 1943. Its leader, Bechara al- 
Khoury, became the first President of independent Lebanon. It was an elite party 
with a flexible organization. It supported a democratic republican system with free 
enterprise. Its ties with the Arab world were stronger than the rest of the Christian 
parties.
Among this group of parties is also the National Liberal Party which was 
formed in the early 1960s by a former President of the Republic, Camille Chamoun, 
following his departure from the presidency. It appealed to those Maronites who 
were disillusioned with the Phalanges Party as well as to the wider Maronite 
audience.
The third category includes Hezbollah (party of God); Ibad al-Rahman 
(Worshipers of the Merciful); al-lkhwan al-Muslemin (Moslem Brethrens); Hizb al- 
Tahrir (Liberation Party) and al-Jama'a' al-lslamiyyah (The Islamic group). Their 
membership is drawn strictly from the Shi’a and Sunni Moslems.
The fourth category consists mainly of parties whose followers are ethnic 
migrants79 such as Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians. The Lebanese socio-political 
structure absorbed and offered these groups equal access to the country’s 
resources. Consequently, the Armenian community has been able to consolidate its 
ethnicity into political parties. The Armenians' earliest migration to Lebanon followed 
their 1895-96 massacres by the Turks and the subsequent deportation of them from 
Turkey. In 1915 and 1921 thousands of them settled in Lebanon. In 1924, the 
French Mandatory Power granted them Lebanese citizenship despite the opposition 
from the Moslems "...who accused the French mandatory government of deliberately 
increasing the Christian population of Lebanon."80 In 1937, and as a result of the 
annexation of the Alexandretta region by Turkey, some twenty-seven thousand 
Armenians came to Syria and Lebanon. Similar waves of Armenian immigrants 
came to Lebanon from Palestine in the wake of the Arab Israeli war in 1948. The 
Armenian community in Lebanon numbers today around one hundred and fifty 
thousand, the majority of whom belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. The 
Lebanese government acknowledges, in the context of the existing confessional 
system, two Armenian communities, the Orthodox and the Catholic groups.
The Armenians have been politically active and their influence is significant. 
They belong to three main political parties which were formed outside Lebanon and 
aim at liberating their fatherland from foreign rule. When the Armenians came to
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Lebanon they brought the parties with them, but failed to gain legal recognition by 
the Lebanese authorities. The Armenian Parties resisted assimilation because they 
considered themselves to be parties in exile who one day would return to their 
fatherland. These parties are: the Dashnak, which was established in 1890 in 
Russia as an anti-Marxist party with the aim of maintaining and vitalizing Armenian 
culture; the Hunchak which was formed in 1887 in Geneva, with the aim of liberating 
Turkish Armenia and establishing a socialist regime. Though it has a Marxist 
ideology it operates independently of the Communist Party in Lebanon. Finally, 
there is the Ramgavar Azadagan, which was formed in 1921 with the aim of 
liberating Armenia and restoring its historical boundaries.
Although the ideologies of these parties are distinctively detached from a 
Lebanese context, they have contributed to the political process of the country and 
participated actively in its political activities. Their contribution to the conflict 
environment was not direct but rather of a supportive nature. The Amal Movement 
and few other political groupings appeared on the stage immediately before or during 
the conflict years.
IV Conclusion
The structural base which has been described in this chapter constituted a 
spawning ground for the generation of conflict in Lebanon. It embraced the 
intractable communal conflictual tendencies, which were kept alive over the years by 
asabiya communal consciousness and sectarian thrust towards positions of power 
and authority. The politicization of communalism in Lebanon was a product of the 
correlation between asymmetrical communal entitlement and the socio-economic 
and political power distribution, that is, inter-communal inequalities. Communal 
entitlement and actual power distribution were themselves a by-product of the 
authority structure and asabiya. It is a two-way relationship. Authority and asabiya, 
the latter being an agency of power, propelled their communities into positions of 
power and domination. This differential distribution of power, in turn, created 
inequalities and asymmetry in communal entitlement and deepened asabiya 
consciousness.
However, this situation was exacerbated by exogenous factors that 
contributed to the intensity and violence of the conflict. The Arab-lsraeli conflict, 
Israeli incursions and invasions of Lebanon, inter-Arab discord and the armed 
Palestinian presence in the country have all added more strain to the inter-communal 
relations within Lebanon - issues which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMMUNAL RELATIONS AND THE 
GENERATION OF CONFLICT 
I Introduction
We noted in the previous chapter how the historical development of the main 
Lebanese communities created a segmented social structure. Going into lengthy 
historical details was necessary in order to identify those historical events that were 
responsible for the creation of cleavages in Lebanese society and link them with the 
basic socio-economic and political factors that caused and maintained the 1975 
conflict.
Throughout our historical analysis we have noted that the segmentation of the 
social structure reinforced the asabiya consciousness of the various component 
communities and strengthened their stamina for power and authority. However, it 
must be stressed that asabiya and authority were not passive recipients of conflictual 
reflexes emanating from the social structure. They were active participants in and 
contributors to the conflictual tendencies and their formation. Their role in the transfer 
of these segments into power groups is corroborated by al-Azmeh who maintains that 
asabiya is a "cohesive force" and a medium through which the group gains power and 
domination.1
Having analysed in the previous chapter the segmentation of Lebanese 
society, we shall turn in this chapter to analyse the impact of socio-economic and 
political discrepencies on the concepts of asabiya and authority and try to investigate 
their role in the generation and perpetuation of conflict. External factors, as 
contributory causes to the conflict, will also be investigated.
II Basic Causes of the Conflict
Lebanon’s political culture2 has been shaped by the interplay of historical and 
social processes.The civil war of 1975 was but a historical stage in a continuous and 
ubiquitous process of social conflict in the country. The nature and causes of the war 
have been the subject of numerous works by a variety of writers, ranging from 
scholars to media reporters. Most of the conventional literature on this subject is of a 
descriptive nature and has been dominated by three overriding hypotheses. The first 
stipulates that the basic cause of the conflict in Lebanon resided in the malfunctioning 
of its socio-political and economic structure. The second claims that the conflict was
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basically an outcome of the interplay between the country’s domestic and regional 
environment. The third contends that the intensity and violence of the conflict was 
shaped by the intervention of outside powers.
There is no doubt that foreign intervention, military as well as political, 
intensified and prolonged the conflict; but the basic causes were inherent in the socio­
political structure whose historical evolution produced certain conditions and 
behavioural patterns that engendered conflictual tendencies in the system. These 
tendencies in turn set the process of segmentation of the socio-political structure in 
motion. They created segmental loyalties and hardened communal boundaries.
Conflictual tendencies found in the pluralist composition of Lebanese society a 
spawning ground for their growth and spillover. Those tendencies, in turn, weakened 
the social structure and made it vulnerable to further pressure emanating from the 
outside. The structure grew vulnerable, rigid and impregnable and fell prey to its own 
weakness. It was not able to resist or absorb the pressure coming from within in the 
form of seminal socio-economic change and from outside in the form of regional 
political variations.
The conflict process itself was set into motion by a multiplicity of internal, 
compounded by external, factors. While internal factors manifest social, economic, 
educative and political attributes, the external factors were basically political in nature 
and played a supportive and catalytic role, by determining the balance of forces, 
intensity, and duration of the conflict. Let us now look at the internal and external 
factors separately.
A Internal Factors
An assessment of the internal factors reveals a three dimensional disposition 
of their nature: structural, provocative, and catalytical.
1 Structural disposition
Structural preconditions and value perceptions of the contending parties have 
been evident factors in the Moslem-Christian relations in Lebanon. The Moslems of 
the Republic of Lebanon believed that they were in an inferior position deprived of 
status, power and the rewards system in a Christian dominated state. The Christians 
perceived of the Moslems as peripherals to the core value system of an independent 
state. Equal access to the vestiges of power was seen by the Christians, particularly 
the Maronites, as a threat to their communal political status, and to the independence
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of Lebanon. These value perceptions were governed by three basic factors: 
economic asymmetry, educational imbalance and political disparity.
a Economic Asymmetry
The principal economic institutions that emerged during thirty-two years of 
independence, and those which were inherited from the French mandate and 
Ottoman rule, failed to function as expected. The deregulated privatized economic 
system created many discrepancies and inequalities in Lebanese society. Table 4.1 
summarizes the findings of a study carried out in 1975 of the national income in 
Lebanon distributed by sects. The figures show that sixty-one percent of the 
Christians earned an annual income of less than LL. 6000, compared to eighty-two 
percent of the Shi'ite, seventy-nine percent of the Sunnis and sixty-nine percent of the 
Druzes. The table also indicates that thirty-four percent of the Christians earned an 
annual income of between LL 6001 and LL 25000, compared to twenty-seven percent 
of the Druzes, seventeen percent of the Sunnis and sixteen percent of the Shiites.
Table4-1: Average National Annual Income of Major Sects 
Figures in Lebanese Pounds
SECT NATIONAL INCOME
1500 1501-
3000
3001-
6000
6001-
10,000
10,001-
15,000
15,001-
25,000
25,001-
Christians % % % % % % %
Catholics and Maronites 6 25 30 20 8 6 5
Other Christians 
Moslems
8 24 29 14 14 6 5
Sunnis 15 29 35 8 6 3 4
Shiites 22 30 30 10 3 3 2
Druzes 11 24 34 16 6 5 --------------4j
Source. Les Fiches du Monde Arabe, No. 335, Beirut, July 1985
Quoting figures from a study entitled The Entrepreneurs of Lebanon,3 al-Jisr 
reported that against 105 Christian employers in industry there were twenty-one 
Moslems. For every eleven Christian employers in banking there were two Moslems 
and for every forty Christian employers in the services sector there were five Moslems. 
Still another industrial study reveals that in twenty-five big industries there were 
seventeen Christian owners against seven Moslems. The Christians were also 
represented in twenty-four other big industries against twelve Moslems. Referring to 
the same study Nasr and Nobar concluded that the Moslems were not represented in 
medium industries located in the suburbs of Beirut.4
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At the time of independence the economic structural conditions of Lebanon 
manifested this sectarian disparity. The Islamic component of the society was 
predominantly small businessmen and petit bourgeois peasants, whereas the 
Christians have had a relatively larger middle class, a higher literacy rate and were 
more involved in the public sector activities, companies and banking.5 Prior to that the 
"...bulk of economic, including commercial, activity remained mainly in the hands of 
native Lebanese, mainly Christians."6
b Educational Imbalance
The diverse educational system was also a cause and an outcome of the 
divergent sectarian composition of Lebanese society. Since their establishment in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, foreign universities and schools nurtured the 
conflictual tendencies by instilling in the Lebanese population a diversified value 
system which in some parts catered for foreign influence. The structure of the 
educational system reflected the country's social and ideological division. Lebanon 
has enjoyed the highest educational level among the Afro-Asian countries. The 
present system has a long tradition that extends back over a hundred years. Many 
schools were established by religious institutions, foreign missionaries and religious 
orders as early as the turn of last century.
A wide range of schools and colleges mushroomed in post-independent 
Lebanon. Everyone of these educational institutions belonged to one of four 
categories: government, religious (both Christian and Moslem) non-government non­
religious schools and foreign schools. The first three categories were supposed to 
conform to the government curriculum. The fourth category, foreign schools, catered 
for foreign nationals and their dependents who resided in Lebanon while the head of 
the household worked in the region. These schools followed a distinctive curriculum. 
The diverse natures of these schools, their curricula and their educational philosophy 
precluded them from imparting in their students the feeling of national unity and 
identity. "...They act to perpetuate the sectarian differences."7
In mid-1970s, the illiteracy level among the Moslems remains higher than 
among the Christians. Among the Shi'ite males, the rate of illiteracy is thirty-one 
percent compared to thirteen percent among their Christian counterparts, and it is 
seventy percent among the Shi'ite females as against twenty percent among their 
Christian counterparts. Among the university degree holders, the figures are eight 
percent for the Christians and two percent for the Moslems.8
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This inequality in educational attainment has created a feeling of injustice, 
deprivation and denials on the part of the Moslems of the country. "...The educational 
attainment of the Christians, particularly the Maronites, are much better than those of 
the Moslems....The Moslem population feels out of favour and demands more public 
schools... to provide more educational facilities for their children".9
In the nineteenth century, the Moslems sent their children to schools and 
universities in Constantinople, whereas Maronites and Catholics used to send theirs to 
France and Italy. In the 1830s, French Jesuits and American Protestants established 
schools and printing presses in Lebanon. In 1866 the Americans established the 
Syrian Protestant College, which in 1920 was renamed the American University of 
Beirut, and the French followed suit by establishing in 1875 the University of St 
Joseph. In 1960, a Moslem religious endowment opened a private university, the 
Arab University of Beirut, which was sponsored by the University of Alexandria in 
Egypt. These three establishments have carried with them an apparent sectarian 
overtone. The students of St Joseph University are predominantly Maronites, 
whereas those of the American University of Beirut are Sunnis, Shi’as, Druzes, 
Orthodox and Protestants. Enrolment at the Arab University of Beirut has been 
dominated by Moslem students.
c Political Disparity
Despite the fact that the heterogeneous ethno-religious composition of 
Lebanese society constituted a veritable base for the rise of inter-confessional friction 
and conflict, Lebanon has enjoyed some long periods of communal tranquillity. The 
eighteenth and the last four decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a period of 
quietude and inter-confessional peace. This was mainly due to a strong central 
authority vertically linked to the grass roots by a well-defined feudal system, an 
equitable distribution of political power based on a confessional system that roughly 
approximated the confessional system of modern Lebanon, a class feeling that cut 
across religious lines providing a basis for inter confessional cooperation, and 
opposition to foreign rule, first to that of Egyptian control of Lebanon between 1832 
and 1840 and later, more significantly, to the suzerainty of the Ottomans.
This stability continued throughout the major part of the 18th century despite 
the late appearance of some evidence of sectarian self consciousness. However, this 
stability was shaken in the middle of the nineteenth century as a result of the collapse 
of the feudal system and the ensuing 1860 civil war. Inter-communal tranquility was 
restored through the intervention of foreign powers who imposed a new power 
structure on Mount Lebanon. The Druzes suffered under the new order, a loss in their
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authority status and the Maronites achieved substantial gain. In spite of that, both 
communities lived in peace with each other for a long period. However, following the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the constitutional and demographic changes to 
Mount Lebanon, both communities started to drift apart particularly in relation to the 
newly created Republic of Lebanon and the distribution of power among the 
component communities.
The newly created Republic of Greater Lebanon meant different things to the 
two main communal blocs. The Moslems saw in it a total violation of their aspirations, 
for until 1920, they were a majority in an Islamic environment. They regarded the new 
state as a setback to their desire for a united and independent Arab Moslem world. 
The Druzes, however, were a special case. They exhibited a highly particular 
orientation of their own. On the other hand, the Christians, particularly the Maronites, 
envisioned in the new state a realization of their national aspirations for independence 
and a guarantor of their economic interests. Smock maintained that:
In large measure the French created Greater Lebanon in order to 
strengthen the position of Lebanon’s Maronite community as well as to 
reward the Maronites for their faithful allegiance to France. By 
separating Mount Lebanon from Syria the French assured that the 
Maronites would not be engulfed by Syria's predominantly Sunni 
population. By annexing additional territories to Mount Lebanon to 
create Greater Lebanon, the French saw themselves securing the 
economic viability of the new state.10
Zamir attributed the basic causes of conflict in Lebanon to the expansion of its 
borders in 1920 and the disruption of the existing confessional balance in Mount 
Lebanon to the disadvantage of the Maronites.11-
The creation of the State of Lebanon satisfied the historical aspirations of the 
Maronites for a national home, but fell short of providing them with long term security 
against political and cultural assimilation into the surrounding Moslem world. In 
extending Mount Lebanon's borders, the French Mandate created a problem for the 
Moslem inhabitants by transferring them into a minority, consumed by fear of loss of 
identity, status and cultural links in a predominantly Christian state. These fears were
strengthened by the fact that "...many Christians particularly Maronites..... continue to
believe that Lebanon was primarily a Christian state linked more to the Christian West 
than to the Muslim East."12.
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Such fears and suspicions led both communities to seek allies outside 
Lebanon to enhance their security and status position. The Maronites turned to 
France for protection and the Moslems sought enhancement of their status in getting 
closer to the surrounding Arab world.
This predicament was confounded by the failure of the French Mandate to 
create an appropriate atmosphere for both groups to cooperate and make a 
meaningful contribution to national unity. Zamir asserted that the gap between the 
Christians and Moslems was far more difficult to bridge than had been supposed:
The mutual suspicions, fears, prejudices and centuries - old hostilities 
were so deeply rooted that they could not be overcome by a 
compromise between a limited number of bourgeois political and 
economic elites from the various sects...13
Nevertheless the Mandatory power promulgated, in 1926, a constitution and 
enshrined in it a clear reference to the communities' entitlements in the power 
structure.14 This became a rule which has had an adverse impact on the political 
system of Lebanon. It gradually led to a congealment of these communities within 
well defined boundaries. By recognizing the rights of the different communities and 
their concomitant access to the power hierarchy, the legitimate authority not only 
relinquished part of its functions to those communities but promoted intra-communal 
loyalties and allowed communal identities to grow unabated. An ethno-religious intra­
group feeling was thus unleashed.
By 1943, the diversity of communal interests had become a leviathan threat to 
national accommodation. The 1926 constitutional provision did not specify any 
precise formula for the equitable distribution of political resources. It was insufficient 
to placate contradictory communal interests and diffuse the burgeoning conflictual 
tendencies. However, the issue was addressed by the National Pact.
The atmosphere of mistrust and fears engulfing both communal blocs was 
further enhanced by the change of political regimes in some Arab countries in the late 
1950's and early 1960's. A succession of coups d'etat in Syria and Iraq, and the 1952 
Egyptian revolution brought into the leadership structure of these countries a new 
generation of young leaders, genuinely and seriously committed to Arab nationalism 
and the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, the establishment of Israel in 1948 created a 
Palestinian refugee problem, which had an adverse input into the inter-communal 
relations in Lebanon. The impact of these regional developments left an indelible
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mark on Lebanon's domestic politics by exposing the country's already vulnerable 
socio-political structure to external pressure.
It is therefore appropriate to conclude that the Lebanese structure failed to 
transfer the contradictory tendencies in the Lebanese system as manifested by the 
anti and pro-status quo parties into a dynamic force of change. It also failed to 
activate the accommodative mechanism inherent in the National Pact and 
development policies when the domestic and regional situation became untenable. 
Instead, this mechanism was allowed to be relegated to the status of anodyne 
measures intended to appease the anti-status quo forces. The structure, thus, lost 
one of its effective safety valves that could have served not only to release the stress 
from the system but to be utilized as a vehicle of propitious change.
The subsequent events have also revealed that the failure of the integrative 
mechanisms of the Lebanese system (the National Pact) caused radicalisation of the 
ar\\\-status quo forces and the emergence of such movements as the Amal, the 
Lebanese Forces, and other militant organizations and groups. They also confirmed 
that cultural pluralism strengthened the divergent dissonant value system by 
precluding the normal communication of ideas between the various ethnic groups, 
increased their discriminatory tendencies and accentuated their we-group feelings 
among the various components of Lebanese society.
2 Provocative Disposition
The provocative factors of the conflict process are grounded in the social 
structure also. These factors represented an abstract reflection of the frustration 
mechanism that evolved into a prime mover in the conflict. The Shi'a sect 
experienced frustration under the political system, and developed an increased 
perception of deprivation, for they "...were the bearers of a tradition of lament and 
submission".15
Frustration with the system and deprivation were not the only motivation for the 
rise of the Shi'a communal consciousness and its subsequent involvement in the 
conflict. The Israeli invasion of their hinterland and Palestinian disregard for their 
plight came to be added factors.
Other ethnic groups experienced similar situations of economic disparities16, 
denials, and loss of substantive rewards. The system's failure to address their 
grievances lured these groups into an alliance with the Shi'a.
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3 Catalytic Disposition
Given the fragility of the political structure, it took a minor incident to set the 
conflict process in motion. A few weeks prior to the outbreak of the war, a series of 
incidents occurred that added to the underlying grievances of the anti-status quo 
forces. Some of these incidents were physical, such as demonstrations, protests and 
riots in Beirut and Sidon, while others were political, such as the dismissing of the 
Cabinet and the appointment of an unacceptable Prime Minister. Frustration and 
tension were built up with each successive incident, culminating in the incident of 
13 April 1975.
Of course, on the other hand, there was the role of external factors. The 
impact of these factors, regional and international, merits a separate investigation. 
Their input into the conflict process came by way of their effect on inter-communal 
relations.
Although this study is concentrating on the operative internal causes of the 
conflict, it is necessary to seek a linkage between the external factors and the conflict 
process. This linkage is suggestive of an intrusion of external stimuli, mostly regional, 
on the inter-communal relations that adversely affected the domestic balance.
B External Factors
External pressure and outside influence on Lebanon's domestic politics are not 
new. History continued to produce parallel political templates that often revealed a 
continuity of behavioural patterns. As outlined in Chapter two, the 1860 civil war in 
Mount Lebanon, (between the Druzes and Maronites) invited the intervention of the 
Great Powers of the time which played a decisive role in bringing about a solution that 
provided Lebanon with inter-communal peace for seventy years.
In the present conflict, the regional component of the external factors 
contributed to the intensity of the conflict and influenced its direction and duration. 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can delineate these influences as those exuding from 
the Arab-lsraeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, Israeli incursions into Lebanon, and 
inter-Arab discord.
1 The Arab-lsraeli Conflict
The Arab-lsraeli conflict, with its Palestinian component, had its impact on the 
Lebanese scene through rising Arab expectations of Lebanon's capabilities, and in 
straining the precarious sectarian relations.
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Lebanon’s contribution to the Arab-lsraeli conflict was basically of a non- 
militaristic nature. Its role in the four wars fought with Israel since 1948 was minimal 
compared to that of the frontline Arab states of Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Lebanon's 
diminutive military capabilities were a contributory cause for its reluctance to join 
forces with other Arab armies to fight Israel. Its policy orientations were based on the 
much publicized Phalangist notion that Lebanon’s weakness is its strength. The 1948 
Arab-Jewish war in Palestine caught Lebanon's masses off guard as it came on the 
heels of the attainment of Lebanon's independence, at a time when their social 
energies were directed mainly towards nation-building and the fulfilment of their 
national goals.
However the Lebanese army did contribute a contingent to the Arab military 
efforts to thwart the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, but in the following 
two wars of 1967 and 1973, it refrained from joining the hostilities. This failure incited 
demonstrations and riots from the Moslem masses "...protesting the decision not to 
aid Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic".17 Thus the relation between Sunni 
Moslem political elites and the predominantly Maronite Army command was further 
strained. However, the Christians, mainly the Maronites, embraced the view that 
Lebanon ought to continue to seek security through weakness by taking a "no threat" 
position towards Israel and seek protection from the West and the UN.
The former President of the Republic, Amine Gemayel (1982-88), regretted 
this policy. He stated that:
One of the assumptions we made was that Lebanon’s weakness is its 
strength. The Lebanese believed that the creation of a strong Army 
would be seen as a threat by others. The absence of such an army 
would be an earnest of our dedication to peace, it was believed, 
guaranteeing that we would remain outside regional hostilities. This 
philosophy left us unprepared, unequipped and unable to deal with 
the anomic forces that exploded in Lebanon in the early 1970s.18
The Moslem masses rejected the above policy, considering it callous and 
dishonourable, and proffered instead an active policy of self-defence and reliance on 
the Arab states instead of the West. The Moslem insistence on Lebanon's active 
participation in the Arab-lsraeli wars might have been spurred by two aims: to bring 
the country closer to the Arab fold which would result in a payback in support of their 
status and demands for a more equitable power sharing arrangement; and to preclude 
the socio-political structure, with its Maronite conceptual base, from becoming
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ossified, and eventually relegating the Moslem's status permanently to the lower rungs 
of the political ladder.
2 The Palestinian Problem
The Christian groups publicly expressed their wariness of the emergence of an 
organized Palestinian military presence in Lebanon. Their anxiety was compounded 
by the inability of the government to contain the upsurge of Palestinian power and to 
foreclose its collaboration with the anti-status quo forces.19 The failure of the 
Lebanese government to control this situation prompted the Lebanese National Front 
to claim for itself the responsibility of curtailing the rising Palestinian power, declaring 
publicly that the Palestinians in the country had become a "state within the state" and 
their behaviour had become incompatible with Lebanon's sovereignty.
The latent cause for the Lebanese Front's attack on the Palestinians in 
Lebanon sprang not only from their concern for Lebanon’s sovereignty but from their 
anxiety over the disruption of the communal balance of power. As they became 
conscious of their minority status, the Maronites felt that the presence of about four 
hundred thousand Palestinians, 95 percent of whom were Sunni Moslems, in Lebanon 
would tip the balance of power in favour of the Moslems. Their fears were enhanced 
by the Moslem’s empathetic and sedulous brooding over Palestinian aspirations. 
Khalidi, a Palestinian, acknowledged the Maronites’ fears. He confirmed that "the 
appearance of the Palestinian Resistance on Lebanese soil had many consequences. 
Objectively, it upset the Christian-Moslem balance of power in favour of Moslems. It 
offered not only a model to the radicalized Moslems but also a protective umbrella 
against Maronite high-handedness".20
Furthermore, the Palestinian involvement in Lebanese internal politics 
strengthened the irredentists' claims of pan-Arabism. This gave the Maronites 
legitimate grounds to claim that they were the only community that could guarantee 
Lebanon's sovereignty and deliver it from the comprador.
Three important phenomena have transpired from the Maronites' attack on the 
Palestinians. First, the Christians' conflictual aims were deflected from the Moslems to 
a substitute object, the Palestinians in Lebanon. Second, by redirecting their 
conflictual attitudes towards the Palestinians, the Christians attained a substitute 
satisfaction through more tension release.21 Third, the Maronites had vested interests 
in defending the existing socio-political order.
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3 The Israeli Incursions and Invasions
Israeli violations of Lebanese territory, particularly the border areas of the 
South, had incessantly increased in frequency and intensity after 1968. These 
violations had created havoc in the border area and caused a massive stampede22 of 
the population, who were predominantly Shi’a Moslem. The incursions had a 
centrifugal effect on the inhabitants. They interrupted and curtailed the sources of 
their livelihood and forced thousands of them to desert their homes and lands in the 
South and move northwards to settle in the shanty-towns of Beirut. This displacement 
created slums infested with squalor and misery.
Statistical data kept by the Lebanese Army23 shows that between 1968 and
1974 Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory averaged 1.4 violations per day. This 
increased in 1974-75 to seven violations per day. For the first eight months of 1975, 
the following violations were recorded: air space 1101; territorial waters 215; artillery 
shelling 2150; machine-gun firing 303; air and naval raids 40; temporary installation 
inside Lebanese territory 193; road buildings 3; land incursions 151. This averages 
out to 17 violations per day.
The Shi'a migrants to Beirut's slum areas were largely tenant farmers, share­
croppers and agricultural labourers. They were poorly educated, unskilled and lacking 
in financial resources. Up to the early 1960s, the Shi’a community as a whole was 
ignored by the central government. Their regions were deprived of substantial 
development projects. Norton remarked that "Lebanon's Shi'a had long been 
considered the most disadvantaged confessional group in the country".24 They had 
been dismissed as politically irrelevant; part of their prescribed share of power in the 
1943 confessional arrangement was allowed to slip into the hands of the Moslem 
Sunni.
However, the Shi'a were able, over a period of two decades, to transform 
themselves from a non-participant community to a highly politicized sect. Their 
emancipation was associated with two factors: societal disruption which was caused 
by Israeli incursions into their hinterland, and the process of modernization, which 
Lebanon experienced since the mid-1950s.
Both factors contributed to the social mobilization of the Shi'a and their 
eventual politicization. Karl Deutsch wrote th a t"... as people are uprooted from their 
physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities, from their old habits and 
traditions and often from their old patterns of occupation and places of residence, they 
experience drastic change in their needs"25, and become available for mobilization.
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The poverty belt around Beirut was inhabited mainly by the Shi'a from South 
Lebanon, and their co-religionists from the Beq'a Valley, in eastern Lebanon, who 
migrated voluntarily in search of better opportunities. Those urban quarters 
constituted a spawning ground for the political mobilization of the Shi'a. The impact of 
urbanization on the new comers served what Lerner termed a stimulant of needs and 
a take-off towards widespread participation.26 Huntington argues convincingly that 
urbanization is instrumental in lifting the ceiling of the new comers' aspirations and 
their spectrum of expectations, and offering an accoutrement of enhanced status. 
Failure to achieve this would induct individuals and groups into politics.27
Before the establishment of the Movement of the Deprived in 1974 and the 
Amal Movement in 1975, a large number of the Shi’a joined the Lebanese communist 
party, the Socialist Ba'ath Party and other anti-establishment organizations which 
were instrumental in the Shi'a awakening. Many Shi'a also joined the different 
Palestinian splinter groups. When the Amal movement rose to power and started to 
dominate the Shi'a politics in Lebanon, most of the secular parties' Shi'a recruits 
shifted towards it. The politicized Shi’a, in and around Beirut and in the South, were 
capable of translating their incipient politicization into political action for greater shares 
in the power structure. They used the Amal political agenda to achieve their goals. 
Norton observed that "...the Shi’a were beginning a political awakening that would 
play an important role in shaping the destiny of Lebanon."28
4 Inter-Arab Discord
Following the 1948 Arab armies’ defeat at the hands of Israel, a series of 
coups d'etat swept Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. The armies’ disappointment 
with their political leadership for failure to combat Jewish militarism and designs, and 
the loss of Palestine to non-Arab settlers, prompted these coups and set the process 
of political change in the Arab world with a snow-balling effect. In a quick retortion, 
the other Arab countries resorted, in self-defence, to a policy of appeasement by 
lending credence to Palestinian grievances and by embracing their demands.
The rift between the nascent military regimes and the rest of the Arab regimes 
grew wider as the former introduced sweeping reforms to their political institutions and 
economic organizations. These changes have set the military regimes on a collision 
course with the conservative Arab countries. Lebanon was left out of the game of tug- 
of-war between these two camps, but not for long.
Lebanon's relations with the Arab world had been clearly defined and 
institutionalized by the charter of the League of Arab States of which Lebanon was a 
founding member. A special resolution was introduced into the protocol at the
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Founding Conference of the League in Alexandria in 1944, pledging unanimous 
respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers.
The formal recognition granted to the Lebanese system and the acceptance of 
its side role in inter-Arab affairs did not immunize its polarized population from reacting 
to the pervasive political changes in the region. The Lebanese Moslem masses' 
dreams of glorious pan-Arabism and their yearning for a unified Arab world were 
inflamed by the incendiary slogans of Arab Unity of the new revolutionary military 
regimes and specifically that of Nassirism. This constituted a source of tension 
between the Moslem and Christian communities in Lebanon. The Christians accused 
the Moslems of going back on their pledge to relinquish their advocacy of uniting 
Lebanon with Syria or any other Arab state, but the Moslem community was not 
deterred by the Christians' claims. They were galvanized by the upsurge of pan-Arab 
nationalism, a concept utilized by the military elite themselves to manipulate events in 
the region. Soon the Arab world was revolving around two axes: the new radical 
progressive and socialist oriented regimes, represented by Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen 
and the newly independent Algeria, which was joined in the late 1960s by Libya, and 
the conservative regimes, headed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco.
On the other hand, the rise in the mid-1960s of the PLO to prominence gave 
credence to the Palestinian cause, and further attenuated the links between the two 
main communities in Lebanon. The Lebanese Moslems discovered in the revived 
pan-Arabism and the throes of change in the region a lacuna through which they 
could assert their endemic demands for political reform. By leaning on the surging 
Palestinian power in Lebanon, they were able to upgrade their conflictual tendencies 
and challenge the existing confessional arrangement and the National Pact itself. 
This upsurge in Moslem radicalism was met by a calculated quintessential response 
from the Maronites. They fortified themselves inside their armour and expressed their 
tenacious and trenchant attachment to the National Pact, the confessional system and 
their perception of the inviolability of the Lebanese State. Simultaneously, they also 
preserved a close link with the Arab conservative regimes as much as with non-Arab 
foreign powers including Israel, with whom functional relations were quickly cultivated.
The progressive states of the region could not hold for long as a unified front. 
Differences between them soon started to erode their cohesive posture. Their 
cooperation began to wither away as soon as the euphoria dissipated, and their 
traditional rivalries re-emerged.
During the decade preceding the war in Lebanon, the Arab world was 
chequered with conflicts and rivalries: between Egypt and Libya, between Algeria and
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Morocco, between Iraq and Kuwait, between Egypt and Syria, between Syria and 
Iraq, and between Iraq and Iran. Some of these rivalries had marginal effects on 
Lebanon’s communal and state politics but others were of long duration and intense 
impact. Syria seemed to be the centre of a network of rivalries. Most of its quarrels 
with other Arab countries had their effects on Lebanon. Its ideological rift with the co- 
ideological Ba'ath regime of Iraq split the Lebanese Ba'ath Party and its sympathizers.
The aftermath of the 1973 October war and the Sinai accord caused a deep 
division between Syria and Egypt. Failing to convince Syria of concluding a 
comprehensive settlement with Israel, Egypt moved alone towards separate peace. 
This infuriated Syria but above all caused much consternation in both communities in 
Lebanon. By this time, numerous ideological movements in the country - the 
Ba'athists, Syrian nationalists, the Nasserites, Arab nationalists, socialists, and 
Moslem brethren - had rallied behind the Palestinian movement in Lebanon.
The Palestinians and their allies in Lebanon felt that a separate agreement 
between Egypt and Israel did not augur well for their cause. They began fortifying 
their front in Lebanon by helping their allies establish their own militias. They also 
established a functional relationship with the Syrian regime to thwart Egypt's drive 
towards an Egyptian-lsraeli agreement. The Christian rightists were alarmed by the 
Palestinian close cooperation with the Lebanese National Movement and Palestinian- 
Syrian collaboration. Further tension between the two groups developed into further 
fights with the conclusion of the second Sinai Agreement.
The Palestinian-leftist-Syrian collaboration was further enhanced by the 
"...continuing Arab consensus that Lebanon must remain an active front-line state in 
the struggle against Israel."29 This deepened the anxieties of the Lebanese Christian 
rightists and spurred them to seek help from foreign sources.
The various Lebanese conflict groups failed to insulate themselves from 
regional influences; they rather developed an affinity with external patrons and a 
disposition to espouse and reflect the conflictual policies of these patrons. Ajami 
added that:
Lebanon has always been a theatre for the ambitions of more powerful 
Arab states and interests; all of them have been, in one way or another, 
involved in recent crises either as backers of certain movements or as 
anxious intermediaries trying to patch up the system and keep it 
together.30
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Syria has a long history of involvement in the internal affairs of the Republic of 
Lebanon by virtue of its geographical proximity and the historical and economic ties 
between the two countries. After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon and 
Syria were both placed under the mandatory power of France. They both achieved 
their independence around the mid-1940s. As independence took on firmer contours, 
both countries developed different goals in their foreign policy orientation. In 1949, 
Syria opted out of the French currency zone, while Lebanon remained attached to it. 
Until then, both countries had one central bank, a custom union, one railway 
administration, complete coordination in their farm policies, and a common labour 
market. In 1951, a complete severance of these institutional ties followed, and each 
country developed its own infrastructure, domestic and external policies. Lebanon 
kept a Western style multi-party system. Syria experienced a succession of coups 
which transformed it into virtually a one party state.
To delve into a lengthy investigation of Syria’s historical involvement in 
Lebanese affairs, and to explore the full complexity of its intervention in the conflict is 
beyond the limit of this study. We shall confine our enquiry to the implications of its 
intervention for the inter-communal relations and limit it to the war years, that is from
1975 to the present time.
Syria's intervention in the Lebanese conflict, and in its resolution, progressed 
incrementally in stages: from mediation to interference by proxy to direct military and 
political intervention.31 This pattern was in keeping with the progress of the conflict 
and its effect on the inter-communal balance.
With each new stage Syria found itself plunging deeper and deeper, whether 
by design or inadvertently, into the Lebanese "quagmire”. As the conflict proceeded 
on the ascending rungs of the violence ladder, Syria's role gained centrality and 
predominance. Similarly, in the regional conflict resolution efforts, Syria played an 
effective role.
Syria's objectives in the Lebanese crisis have attracted a wide range of 
opinions: President Assad himself revealed in his speech in Damascus on 20 July 
1976, to members of the newly elected Syrian provincial councils, that he interfered in 
the crisis to prevent the partitioning of Lebanon along sectarian lines, and to thwart 
the establishment of a radicalized regime in Lebanon that could destabilise the 
political system in Syria and draw it into a war with Israel for which it was not 
prepared.32
C The Syrian Factor
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The various domestic conflict parties assessed the Syrian intervention each 
from its own world view and interests. While it was welcomed initially by the Status 
Quo Coalition, it was opposed by the Reformist Camp and the Palestinian Resistance. 
At a later stage this situation was reversed. Syria backed, for most of the conflict 
years, the Reformist Camp but restrained it (by holding back military assistance) from 
administering a crushing defeat to the Status Quo Camp. The leadership of the 
Coalition, already suspicious of Syria's designs on the territorial integrity of Lebanon, 
accused the Reformist Camp, particularly the Moslem component of it, of yielding its 
influence to the Syrians. Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phalanges Party and a 
pillar of the Coalition leadership, accused Syria of harbouring ulterior motives on the 
independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. He requested the withdrawal of their 
troops from the country.33
This posture reflected the attitudes of the entire Status Quo Coalition and was 
not only maintained throughout the conflict years but intensified and was allowed to 
snowball into military confrontation with the Syrian troops in Beirut and its environs.
Syrian intervention in Lebanon, as well as that of Israel and to some extent 
other regional actors, such as Iraq and Iran, polarized the conflict environment. By 
the time the civil war officially ended in October 1976, the Status Quo Coalition was 
still backed by the Syrian forces in Lebanon. Shortly after that, and throughout the 
subsequent conflict period, Syria shifted its support towards the Reformist Camp 
whereas the Status Quo Coalition intensified its relations with Israel and established 
during the last years of the conflict strong relations with Iraq, which replaced Syria as 
its principal Arab backer. Hudson believes that the civil war of 1975-76, passed 
through four stages.34 Raster detailed those stages in the following table.
Table 4-2: Dominant Conflict Groups and Axes in the Four Phases 
of the Lebanese Civil War.
Phase Date Conflict Axes
1 February 1975 - 
May 1975
Palestinians vs. Phalangists
II June 1975 - 
December 1975
Lebanese Front vs. National Movement/radical Palestinians
III January 1976 - 
May 1976
Lebanese Front/Lebanese Army vs. National 
Movement/Palestinian Resistance Movement/ Lebanese Arab 
Army
IV June 1976 - 
October 1976
Syrian Army/Lebanese Front vs. National Movement/Lebanese 
Arab Army
Post-Civil
War
November 1976 - 
December 1976
Rightist militias vs. Palestinian Resistance Movement/National 
Movement
Source: Karen Rasier, Internationalized Civil War: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian 
Intervention in Lebanon, Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (September 
1983), p. 430.
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During the first three phases of the conflict, and prior to that, Syria's role was 
basically intermediatory. It was only in the third phase of the civil war that Syria 
clandestinely introduced into Lebanon contingents of its militia, al-Sai’qa (the lightning 
rod) and that of the Syria-stationed Palestine Liberation Army "...in order to prevent 
the rightists attempt to partition Lebanon."35 At the same time, it continued its 
mediation and was able to persuade the Status Quo Coalition to accept some 
amendments to the power-sharing agreement in which the Moslems' stake in the 
government rewards would be slightly raised. The Lebanese National Movement and 
its allies rejected this settlement on the grounds that it did not address the socio­
political grievances and fell short of their basic demand for a total secularization of the 
state.36
The fourth stage witnessed direct and massive Syrian military intervention in 
Lebanon. On 1 June 1976, up to 15,000 Syrian troops entered Lebanon and 
penetrated, amid occasional fierce resistance, into the Lebanese National Movement 
main areas. Their presence tilted, for the time being, the balance of forces in favour 
of the Coalition, which went on the offensive achieving considerable gains mainly 
against the Palestinians. Heller discerned a major contradiction in Syria’s intervention. 
He stated that:
It should be noted that by siding with the Maronite Christians at this 
time against the Palestinian-Lebanese leftists, the stated goals of the 
Syrians-to prevent the partition of Lebanon (sought by the Maronites), 
to preclude the installation of a Palestinian-backed leftist regime...and 
to achieve peace - tended to nullify each other.37
Nevertheless, this intervention brought the clashes between the two groups to 
an end. The Syrian military involvement was declared legal by the newly elected 
President of Lebanon, Elias Sarkis.38 Regional legality was also bestowed upon it by 
the Mini-summit meeting of six heads of Arab States in Riyadh39 in mid-October 1976, 
and was endorsed by a full Arab Summit Conference in Cairo40 on 25 and 26 October 
of the same year. One of the main resolutions of the conference was to create an 
Arab Deterrent Force to supervise the ceasefire and oversee the disbanding of the 
militias. It was agreed that this force was to be composed of 30,000 troops drawn 
from several Arab countries. Syria contributed half this number, its total contingent 
that was already in Lebanon. However, all Arab forces later pulled out of the ADF, 
leaving it purely Syrian.
Although the civil war officially ended in October 1976, the conflict persisted for 
fourteen additional years, during which new issues and conflict groups emerged, and
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old ones disappeared. The conflict itself changed its form and direction. Between 
October 1976 and October 1989 (the resolution of the conflict), significant 
developments, in which the Syrian factor played a salient role, emerged in the conflict 
environment.
The first of these developments was the Syrian reassessment of its support of 
the Status Quo Coalition. In 1978, Syria broke its relations with the Coalition and 
shifted its support back to the Palestinians and the Reformist Camp. Hinnebusch 
attributed this shift to the fact that the Coalition "...threw in its lot with Israel at the 
expense of its already badly frayed Syrian connection."41 From then onwards the 
forces of the Status Quo Coalition embarked on a confrontation policy with the Syrian 
troops in Lebanon. The Coalition demanded the eviction of the Palestinians from 
Lebanon and challenged the Syrian Army in their areas. Syria retaliated with force 
and vengeance. It attacked the predominantly Maronite militia's position in East Beirut 
and the rural town of Zahle, inflicting heavy damage on it, but, due to Saudi pressure 
and Israeli threats, the Syrian army retreated from East Beirut and the Kisrewan area, 
the main Maronite heart-land.42
At this stage Syria reconstituted its relations with the Reformist Camp and 
transformed it into an elaborate alliance, which brought together all anti-status quo 
forces. This shift brought about a change in Syria's role from that of a mediator and 
arbiter to a participant in the Lebanese conflict.
The second development was the 1978 massive Israeli invasion of South 
Lebanon in retaliation for an earlier Palestinian commando attack on a bus in Tel Aviv 
in March of that year. The immediate effect of this invasion on communal relations 
was to sharpen the polarization of both camps over the Palestinian and Syrian 
presence in the country. Khalidi concluded that the invasion "...strained to the limits 
the relations between the Maronite hawks and Syria."43 The "Hawks" hoped to 
liberate Lebanon from both the Syrians and the Palestinians. The rising tension 
developed into armed clashes in the suburbs of Beirut between the Lebanese 
National Movement and Coalition forces. Under such circumstances the Reformist 
Camp dropped its opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon and moved closer to 
them. Former President Frangie disengaged himself from the Lebanese Front and 
joined the Reformist group. A new alignment of forces based on political rather than 
sectarian issues emerged. This added vigour to the newly formed Syrian-PLO 
strategic alliance that was directed also against President Sadat's peace plan with 
Israel.
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The third development was the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 
1982. It took place at a time when polarization of the domestic conflict was at its 
apogee. On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon from the south and south 
east, and advanced northwards towards the capital. Within a week they laid siege to 
West Beirut, the Chouf mountain and part of the Beq'a Valley. Israel's basic aims 
were to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon, to establish a 
Phalanges dominated central government that would sign a peace agreement with 
Israel and to oust the Syrian forces from the country.44
There were claims and counter claims that the Lebanese Forces militias 
collaborated with the Israeli invaders. Schiff reported that several Christian leaders 
met in 1981 "with the then Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, and asked Israel to 
send its army to Lebanon as far as Beirut in order to get rid of the PLO and force the 
Syrian Army to leave."45 Petran states that "...the Lebanese Forces and other rightist 
militias acted during and after the invasion as auxiliaries of the IDF [Israeli Defence 
Forces]."46 Meanwhile Abu Khalil reports that the Lebanese Forces were not privy to 
the Israeli invasion plan. As a matter of fact they asked not to be implicated in the 
forthcoming battle.47 Haddad confirms that "...the Lebanese Forces refused to be 
directly involved or even associated with the Israeli."48 The militias of the Reformist 
Camp and the PLO resisted the invasion but were encircled and trapped together with 
the 600,000 inhabitants of West Beirut by the invading army.
Israel achieved one of its three declared objectives of the invasion: the 
destruction of the military and political infrastructure of the PLO. It pushed the Syrian 
Army from Beirut and part of the Chouf mountains and placed itself in a position to 
conclude a peace agreement with the Lebanese Government as a price for its total 
withdrawal from Lebanon.
Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon for the withdrawal of Israeli forces 
began towards the end of December 1982 under the auspices of the United States. 
An agreement was drawn up and signed by the heads of the three participating 
parties (with the USA as a witness) on 17 May 1983, but was never ratified,49 and 
later was abrogated by the Lebanese Government. The Reformist Camp was 
traumatized by the invasion and took an uncompromising stance against the proposed 
agreement. Syria strongly opposed the agreement and worked diligently, with 
considerable success, for its abrogation.
Thus, the conflict re-polarized around the Agreement. The Reformist Camp, 
supported strongly by Syria and the wider Arab audience, opposed the agreement 
and demanded its annulment as a precondition for reconciliation, and the Status Quo
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Coalition hawks held on to it as a negotiation chip in return for a Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon. Finally the treaty was blocked by Syrian and domestic pressure. 
President Gemayel was forced to renounce it. Ball surmises that this development 
gave Syria and the Moslem groups in Lebanon a win, and it reduced Maronite power. 
As for the invasion itself, he concludes that it failed in all its three objectives. He 
specifically refers to Israel's attempt to impose an Israeli influenced Maronite regime 
on the country as a delusion.50
Initially, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon eclipsed the Syrian role in the 
Lebanese crisis, but as soon as Israel withdrew from Beirut and the Agreement of 
17 May 1983 was annulled, Syria regained its prominence as a central player in the 
domestic conflict environment. The invasion reinforced the communal disputes and 
sharpened their bipolar resolve.
In 1984, the Lebanese Army was split along sectarian lines, almost all of the 
Shi’a and Druze elements and some Sunnis broke away and refused orders from the 
central command, leaving it predominantly Maronite. The conflict process continued 
unabated with intermittent violence until the last quarter of 1988. Political 
confrontation between the two camps escalated, causing total immobilization of 
government functions. The cleavage in the communal structure crept into the 
Cabinet. The Sunni Prime Minister, supported by the Reformist Camp ministers, 
boycotted the Maronite President. No cabinet meetings were held from mid-1985 to 
September 1988.
On 22 September 1988, the Presidency was rendered vacant. A rival military 
government, headed by the Maronite Commander of the Armed Forces, General 
Michel Aoun, was appointed by the outgoing President to fill the vacuum, without 
dismissing the existing government headed by the Moslem Sunni Prime Minister, 
Dr Salim al-Hoss. This step was denounced by the Reformist groups and declared 
illegal. They refused to recognize the government of Aoun or submit to its authority.
From September 1988 to October 1990, Lebanon had two rival governments 
but no President. The Moslem-led government representing the Reformist Camp, was 
fully supported by Syria, the Arab countries, except Iraq and the PLO, and the world 
community. The rival-appointed Maronite-led government could not extend its 
authority beyond the Maronite enclave in East Beirut and the Kisrewan region. With 
the presence of two rival governments, each claiming legitimacy to itself, the conflict 
escalated into unprecedented intensity and violence. It further changed direction and 
involved new participants.
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General Aoun, who commanded the loyalty of five out of eleven well equipped 
and highly trained predominantly Maronite brigades, attempted to impose his 
authority over the Christian militias in his enclave and extend it to the rest of Lebanon. 
He had to fight a two-pronged battle: at first with the Lebanese Forces militias, which 
shared his turf, and subsequently with the Reformist Camp militias supported by the 
break-away sixth Brigade and the Syrian troops in West Beirut. The clashes had a 
devastating effect on the Maronite community and on East Beirut in particular. Aoun’s 
war with the Lebanese Forces lasted four months, from February to May 1990. The 
confrontation ended without a victory for either side, but with enormous destruction to 
East Beirut, and a loss of over one thousand persons in the Christian enclave.
Fighting between Aoun and the Lebanese Forces left both parties weakened. 
Its impact on the Maronite community was devastating. However Aoun's popularity 
rocketed while his political predicament became more acute. During this period Aoun 
shifted the conflict focus from his co-religionist Lebanese Forces to the Syrians. He 
entered into fierce battles with the Syrian troops in Lebanon and demanded their total 
and complete withdrawal from the country. In his battles, he was able to mobilize 
popular support, but this was not enough to give him political gains.
Meanwhile, Arab mediation efforts intensified and an Accord was concluded in 
the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia, between the Lebanese parliamentarians, who 
represented the various conflict groups. The Accord was expected to usher in a new 
dawn of peace in Lebanon. Aoun rejected this Accord and precluded its 
implementation. Finally, in October 1990, he was forced out of his enclave, paving 
the way for the restoration of political legitimacy for the new government and eventual 
peace for the country.
Ill Conclusion
In conclusion it must be stressed that the failure of the social system to provide 
equal opportunities to Lebanon's component communities was due mainly to the 
nature of the social structure and to the impact of some external factors on it. The 
social structure itself became less creative, lost some of its social energy and became 
immobilized under the pressure of the evolving domestic and regional environment. 
Its adjustive mechanism could not cope with the demands of the fast developing 
situation. It collapsed under the stress and released all the latent communal tensions 
into an already explosive situation. We now should turn to conflict regulation and 
conflict resolution.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONFLICT REGULATORY PRACTICES BEFORE 
THE WAR: THE NATIONAL PACT 
I Introduction
The emphasis in the first part of the thesis was on the aetiology, sequence and 
manifestation of communal conflict in Lebanon. Our main concern was to find an 
answer to Gurr*s question "Why men rebel?" Answers to this question were sought in 
a matrix of relationships between the social structure, conflict process and conflict 
groups. The nature of the social structure was analysed in the light of the two generic 
concepts of authority and asabiya. The main argument was that both concepts can 
explain the differential distribution of power and the rise and fall of conflict groups. 
However it was not claimed that these concepts could dictate the nature, form and 
direction of conflict, but they were variables that produced the requirement for the 
generation of conflict.
In this chapter the emphasis will be shifted to an equally important aspect of 
conflict: the institutions and political processes through which communal conflict can 
be brought under control and resolved. Our aim is to find an explanation to the vital 
question: How men can contain rebellion?
We will first present a summary and evaluation of the consociational 
democracy theory. The major emphasis will be on its regulatory aspect as proposed 
by Eric Nordlinger in his model on conflict regulation. Second, the various attempts at 
managing the Lebanese conflict will be outlined in the context of consociationalism. 
Third, the chapter will conclude with some remarks on more theoretical questions 
which are prompted by the regulatory schemes attempted, but which failed to resolve 
the Lebanese conflict during the years of civil war.
II The Intractability of Conflict
The Lebanese conflict, like most other communal conflicts, is an amoeba-like 
shape. It is an amorphous blot with little apparent structure. Over the years it 
changed shape, direction and goals, making it more difficult to be resolved. However, 
no conflict is ever completely resolved.1
Some aspects of certain intractable communal conflicts may be managed by 
one of several methods: sweep them under the carpet and pretend they are not there, 
physical elimination of one of the conflict parties, partitioning of the country along
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communal lines, or adopting a long term conflict management mechanism that would 
blunt communal boundaries and reduce communal friction. Lebanon tried a 
combination of the first and last method. The disputant parties, by mutual agreement, 
sidestepped the sensitive issues, thus allowing them enough time to fester and 
surface again. Amine Gemayel, President of the Republic of Lebanon from 1982- 
1988, confessed that this method was Lebanon's choice for many years. "The 
government in Lebanon tended to steer away from the large controversial issues, 
allowing major political problems to develop largely on their own and to ultimately 
threaten the state and the citizens."2
Conflict itself is never solved. Sandole and Sandole-Stanoste remarked: "We 
talk of conflict resolution, not conflict solutions...conflict incidents or episodes may be 
solved, but conflict per se is never solved. Each solution creates, in a Hegelian 
sense, a new plateau or a new synthesis against which the next conflict scenario is 
played. Society never 'solves' conflict totally. Conflict incidents or episodes are 
solved and then resolved and resolved."3 To use a Hobbesian terminology, conflict 
ceaseth only in death. Coser agrees with this contention, but qualifies it by intimating 
that if "...no mutual agreements are made at some time during the struggle."4 
Rapoport maintains that resolving a conflict depends on its nature as well as on the 
core issue involved. Conflicts void of issues cannot be resolved. "Only conflicts in 
which substantive issues of some sort are an integral part, can be resolved."5 He also 
maintains that resolution of a conflict depends also on the expected outcome and the 
cooperation of the conflict groups. It is only when the outcome is jointly determined,6 
that is, both parties achieve some degree of satisfaction, that a resolution can be 
applied to a conflict. In other words, if a conflictual situation involved a zero-sum 
possibility then conflict resolution cannot be applied to it.7
Ill Diverse approaches to Conflict Regulation
Resolution is not the only approach with which conflict is tackled. There is a 
wide range of orientations oscillating between repression and amicable 
understanding. Those who occupy a position of authority and have better access to 
facets of power view conflict as a threat to their interests vis-a-vis conflict's potential 
disruption of the status quo. They would like to keep the system the way it is. It is in 
their best interests to suppress the conflict. On the other hand, those who are 
deprived of power find it in their best interest to change the status quo. They resort to 
various means ranging from agitation and instigation to revolution. Between these 
two positions there is a wide range of other alternatives with which one could 
approach conflict; we may tend to ignore, forget, avoid, regulate, manage or resolve 
it.8
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Conflict theorists of every orientation are in agreement that conflict cannot be 
eliminated from society. At best it can be regulated, at worst it cannot. ”... Particular 
disputes may be settled or brought under control, the underlying conflicts are not likely 
to be resolved, but will reappear in other forms and in other issues...”9. Boulding is of 
the same opinion. He envisages any situation void of conflict as a dull and featureless 
situation. He believes that the significance of conflict is its resolution. "We must look 
at the ways in which conflicts are resolved...what we must look for here is ways in 
which a particular conflict process moves towards an end. This is not to say, of 
course, that conflict itself comes to an end, for conflicts are continually being 
recreated."10
This apparent unanimity over the impossibility of eliminating conflicts from 
society is not applicable to conflict regulation, management and resolution. There 
exists a bewildering number of conflict models and a large volume of literature on 
conflict management and resolution which deal, in the majority, with individuals, 
dyads, small groups, or international situations. Conflict within nation-states has 
attracted less attention.11 Only recently, work on communal conflict has shifted the 
limelight from the problems of nationalism, minorities and self determination to 
alternative models in which communal pluralism is a legitimate structural option.12
Theories and models of conflict resolution and conflict management are 
numerous, but those which are relevant to communal politics are few. Furthermore 
those which are concerned with problems of cultural diversity, cleavages, 
segmentation and sharp division, are relatively recent. Literature on communal 
pluralism as a legitimate and feasible structural option of healthy political systems 
began to appear since the 1960s with the rise to prominence of consociational 
thinking.
In its early development, consociational thought was mainly preoccupied with 
carving a place for itself in the face of political integration and nation-building theories 
which were a natural propensity in Western political thought. The emergence of 
Lijphart's consociational democracy theory and Nordlinger's conflict regulation 
practices have given rise to an alternative approach to the explanation of stability in 
deeply divided societies (other than being treated as deviant cases). Their theories 
led to an extensive debate on, among other things, the methods for conflict regulation.
Another set of conflict resolution models that have gained some acclaim from 
conflict regulation theorists are the Game Theories. These theories have their 
drawbacks. They are mathematical constructs that can explain neither the contents of 
conflicts nor the genesis of conflict. They assume that decisions are made in a
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situation of perfect rationality. Their main concern is the "...logical structure of conflict 
situations."13 They are synthetic statements and difficult to test empirically. A 
fundamental assumption of these theories is that parties to the conflict are completely 
rational and that "negotiations are assumed, a priori, to end in agreement."14
The analysis of communal conflict and violence cannot be captured by the 
game theories’ conflict resolution models. Nor can conflict be explained by models 
designed to apply to individuals and to international conflict. Lijphart's consociational 
democracy theory and Nordlinger's conflict regulation practices provide a valuable 
insight into communal conflict resolution approaches which are made use of in this 
study.
The fundamental principle upon which theories of consociation rest is that any 
society characterized by deep divisions and cleavages can achieve a sufficient degree 
of stability if it can harness and learn to live with these divisions and schisms.
A Consociational Democracy Theory
Lebanon’s socio-political system has manifested certain characteristics of 
apparent stability, which could lend itself to consociational explication, within two 
perspectives: the first is "half the glass is full," focussing on coherence and stability of 
the system (Weber and Parsons); and the second is "half the glass is empty," pointing 
to a conflictual and immobilized deeply divided society, yet with an apparently stable 
system. What needs to be explained is not the disorder in the society but the stability 
and the persistence of such a system over time. The question that comes to mind 
and puzzles students of Lebanese affairs (that is, students of deeply divided societies) 
is how to explain the stability of Lebanese society up to 1975, even though it 
continued to be characterized by deep division and cleavages, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3.
Although Coser's conflict approach might be an adequate explanation insofar 
as it stresses the impact of criss-crossing conflicts and multiple loyalties on the 
amelioration of the conflictual tendencies, it does not constitute an adequate model for 
the explanation of stability in the system. Integration models are also incapable of 
offering the adequate framework since they stress socialization and assimilation and 
assume the eradication of inter-group differentiation as a prerequisite for social and 
political stability, a situation not tenable to Lebanese society.
Consociationalism is an alternative explanation to the above, for it takes as its 
starting point the problem of the deep divisions and segmentation in society, as well 
as the existence of competition between these segments, that is, a state of affairs in
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need of regulation and resolution. A whole school of consociationalism emerged 
since Lijphart's innovative approach to the study of stability in deeply divided societies 
and Lehmbruch's research on the concept of accommodation of deep political 
cleavages.15 The emerging concept of consociationalism16 contributed vigorously to 
the debate on the maintenance of political stability in deeply divided societies and the 
search for a possible alternative to the concept of majoritarian democracy as a model 
suitable for pluralist societies. "The theory is a very useful instrument in suggesting 
alternative ways of accommodating conflicting interests in deeply divided societies."17 
Daadler suggests that consociational democracy theory was "...developed as a 
deliberate counter model to the Anglo-American [majoritarian] type of democracy."18 
Lijphart uses it as a classificatory concept to analyse the decision-making process in 
societies characterized by "deep divisions" and "segmented pluralism".19
Lijphart uses consociational theory not only to explain stability in deeply 
divided societies, but also to "...challenge the pessimistic view that democracy 
[stability] must fail in ethnically divided Third World countries."20 The prevalent view in 
political science was, until then, dominated by the contention that social homogeneity, 
and its corollaries of political consensus, are conducive to political stability, whereas 
deep divisions and cleavages within a pluralist society inevitably lead to instability and 
breakdown of the system.
Lijphart's new and original consociational theme successfully, though not 
without criticism, challenges the majoritarian proposition in political science by 
establishing that it is possible to forge and maintain political stability in pluralist, 
sharply divided, and communalist societies, through consociationalism. He endorses 
the conclusions of Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe that stability in a pluralist society 
is threatened not by the existence of a structure characterized by communalism, that 
is pluralism, but by the failure of the existing institutions to recognize, accommodate 
and, regulate the cleavages and the ensuing divergent interests21 which this particular 
structure spawns.
Lijphart defines Consociational Democracy as "government by 'elite cartel' 
designed to turn a democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable 
democracy."22 The role of the elite is vital in achieving and maintaining the required 
stability. In fact, Lijphart imputes the success of consociational arrangements to the 
elites' "...deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilising and unstabilizing effects of 
cultural fragmentation."23 He identifies four basic characteristics that are key factors in 
a consociation:24 grand coalition of all component communities (elite cartel), mutual 
veto in decision making, proportionality in representation and allocation of resources 
and civil service, and segmental autonomy as manifested in federalism.
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The presence of these four factors in a pluralist society indicates the possibility 
of a successful management of conflict and the stability of the system. However 
certain conditions in the social structure must prevail before the above devices can 
carry through any consociational arrangement to its completion. Even though he 
recognizes the effectiveness of historical (Lehmbruch and Daalder), structural 
(Lorwin), and cultural (Daalder) conditions in establishing and maintaining 
consociational democracy, it is the "creative and constructive act of free will by the 
elites" that can bring about democratic stability.25 Even in the presence of sharp 
societal divisions, close cooperation between the elite can diffuse societal conflict. 
They cooperate to counteract the perils of cleavages, assuming that such cleavages 
translate themselves into conflicts.
Lijphart's definition of consociational democracy points to a crucial theme in his 
theory which indicates that it is a basically elitist model designed for a type of society 
characterized by centrifugal tendencies turned into centripetal outcomes by means of 
consociational arrangements. He stated that for any consociational arrangement to 
succeed the following conditions must be present: a distinct line of cleavage between 
subcultures, a multiple balance of power among the subcultures, popular attitudes 
favourable to government by grand coalition, external threat, moderate nationalism; 
and a relatively low total load on the system26.
Lijphart elevates the role of elite in a consociation above that of the institutions. 
"The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any 
particular institution arrangement as overarching cooperation at the elite level with the 
deliberate aims of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system. Joining in a 
grand coalition or national unity cabinet represents such cooperation."27 In order to 
create a situation conducive to elite cooperation, Lijphart suggests that the following 
four prerequisites must be present: ability to recognize the cleavages inherent in a 
fragmented system, commitment to system maintenance, ability to transcend sub­
culture cleavages at the elite level, and ability to forge appropriate solutions for 
demands of subcultures.28
B Other Conflict Regulation Devices
Consociation as a system of compromise and accommodation serves two 
functions. First, It enables all communal groups to play a meaningful role in the 
national life of their society. Second it keeps communal conflict in deeply divided 
societies within manageable limits.
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There are other similar methods to maintain stability in deeply divided 
societies, such as Dahl's six possible ways for dealing with sub-culture conflict29, 
Esman's four regime objectives30, Dekmajian’s nine categories of prescriptive 
constitutional engineering31, Salem’s consociational imagery for maintaining peace in 
Lebanon and the suppression of sectarian loyalties and identities32- and Nordlinger's 
conflict regulation practices.33 Several of the conflict management devices proposed 
by these models are similar to and identical with the consociational model. Following 
is a brief discussion of the main principles of these methods.
In managing sub-culture conflict, Dahl suggests six possible ways to bring 
"sub-cultural conflict" under control: violence and repression, secession and 
separation, mutual veto, autonomy, proportional representation and, assimilation. Out 
of these six only mutual veto and proportional representation are applicable to the 
Lebanese case.
Milton Esman limits the number of conflict regulation devices to four, which he 
calls "regime objectives": institutionalised dominance in which one community subjects 
other communities to a permanent status of inferiority, induced assimilation squeezing 
subordinate groups into the dominant group through induction, acculturation and 
reward procedure, syncretic integration eliminating ethnic pluralism by shaping a new 
national identity, and balanced pluralism, which involves proportionality, territorial 
autonomy including federalism, and legal cultural autonomy. Proportionality, out of 
the whole scheme, was applied in Lebanon. Implementation of the rest of the devices 
would have created more divisions and deepened the cleavages.
Drawing on Lijphart and Nordlinger, Dekmajian lists nine factors as conducive 
to the establishment and maintenance of stability and peace in a Middle Eastern 
society such as Lebanon. The factors are: the elite cartel, controlled competition, 
cohesion in subculture, multiple balance of power, circumscribed state power, system 
legitimacy and elite effectiveness, passive electorate - private bargaining, high 
encapsulation - low mobilisation and minimal environmental turbulence. All of these 
factors contributed, in different degrees, to the success of the consociational 
experience in Lebanon. The reference to environmental turbulence is an allusion to 
the regional climate and its impact on the Lebanese communal balance of power. 
This factor is absent from other consociational models.
Salem's assessment of Consociational Democracy Theory and its application 
to Lebanon, produced seven categories: government by Grand Coalition, mutual veto, 
proportionality, segmental autonomy, neutrality or restricted foreign policy, 
predominance of elites, and cooperation of elites. On a most-effective minimum-
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effective continuum, the government by grand coalition ranks highest and segmental 
autonomy lowest in the Lebanese consociational experience. Cooperation of the 
elites played a limited role as it was circumscribed by the rise of encapsulated 
communal loyalties and the emergence of new leaders who, due to the exigencies of 
the war, have had virtually no contact with their opposite numbers.
Nordlinger’s six successful conflict regulating practices are applicable to 
"intense conflict and open regimes."34. His bottom line in consociationalism or conflict 
regulation is his basic conviction that deeply divided societies have to live with their 
cleavages. "In Ar-rchey Road whin a married couple get to th' pint where ’tis 
impossible f'r thim to go on livin together they go on livin together."35 Every deeply 
divided society happens to have its Ar-rchey Road. Northern Ireland, Lebanon, 
Cyprus, Malaysia and Sri Lanka are plagued by intense divisions, fragmentation and 
diversity. Yet their component communities go on living together. Under what 
circumstances do they have to live with their communal differences in peace or be at 
each other's throat?
Consociation writers are in agreement that efforts to regulate conflict or 
exacerbate it, to establish stability or destabilize a system, must begin at the top, 
through the "free will of the elite" whose cooperation is an important step towards 
accommodation. Nordlinger, while giving considerable weight to the actions of 
political leaders in any consociational solution, maintains that the nature of political 
institutions and practices are equally salient in regulating conflicts in deeply divided 
societies.
The prominence given to the role of the institutions in conflict management is 
based on the assumption that communal differences and the ensuing divisive issues 
penetrates the every-day problems of communities' life.
Nordlinger's conflict regulation model has been constructed on the basis of 
data drawn from six deeply divided "open" societies which succeeded in bringing their 
intense conflict under control. Lebanon was one of these societies. His 
generalizations consist of six conflict regulation practices: stable governing coalition, 
principle of proportionality in representation and allocation of resources, the mutual 
veto open to all major conflict parties, purposive depoliticization, compromises, and 
granting of concessions by the stronger to the weaker. The two areas in which 
purposive depoliticization was applied in Lebanon are religion and citizenship law. 
Due to their sensitivity, these two areas were treated as terrae incognitae and 
mutually blanketed by both conflict blocs by a kind of an "avoidance scheme".
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Nordlinger ignored deliberately one more conflict regulation practice, 
federalism, though he believes it may facilitate conflict regulation by providing certain 
insecure groups a greater measure of geographical security. He excluded it from his 
scheme on the grounds that it constitutes a desideratum for certain conflict groups 
rather than a conflict management process.36 Moreover federalism could indeed 
become an outcome of the application of the above mentioned six practices. Above 
and beyond that, he believed that federalism may contribute to the failure of conflict 
regulation.37
On the other hand, Nordlinger rejects as ineffectual the conflict regulation 
practices which aim at creating an integrated national identity, cross-cutting divisions 
at the mass level, and the separation of conflict groups.38 Included in his list are only 
successful devices in conflict management.
Esman's first, second and third categories are, as far as policy analysis is 
concerned, of dubious utility. A consistent criterion for evaluation of a conflict 
regulation device is whether it proved successful in resolving the conflict or whether 
the arrangement broke down. Lijphart's criterion is whether "a given device may make 
a situation better or worse or the same".39
Nordlinger, on the other hand, considers that a conflict is successfully 
regulated if its outcome is "the absence of widespread violence and governmental 
repression..."40 Esman's assessment of the ultimate aim of conflict management is 
"...the authoritative allocation of scarce resources and opportunities among competing 
communal actors and the prevention or control of overt hostility and violence. A 
secondary purpose may be to reduce the long-range political salience of communal 
solidarities."41
The Lebanese political system has attracted the attention of several 
consociational scholars. Lijphart, Nordlinger and Lehmbruch included Lebanon 
among some European and a few third world countries in their studies of the 
conditions under which such communally divided societies managed their conflicts. 
They viewed consociationalism in Lebanon as a successful experience. Dekmajian 
and Salem produced a relatively optimistic view of the consociational experience that 
the country has had. Whereas Hudson was critical of the consociational arrangement 
developed by the system. He even went as far as to claim that it was instrumental in 
"exacerbating the divisions and hastened the collapse of the state."42
Did consociationalism, as a conflict regulating mechanism, fail in Lebanon as 
Hudson suggests? If it did, what is the alternative mechanism to resolve Lebanon's
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perennial conflict? If it did not, would it still be a remedy to bring the present conflict 
under control and restore stability to Lebanon, or would it act only as a political 
placebo until a different conflict regulation model emerges?
IV Conflict Regulation in Lebanon
In order to find meaningful answers to the question concerning the utility of 
consociational devices as a conflict regulating mechanism, we have to direct our 
search towards specific historical circumstances under which consociationalism was 
applied to the settlement of disputes in Lebanon. Lehmbruch informs us that "...under 
certain historical circumstances fragmented political cultures generate methods of 
conflict management which permit the survival and continued existence of the political 
system..."43
Some conflict management devices in the modern Lebanese political system 
had their roots in the Ottoman tradition of the millet system whereby religious 
communities were granted autonomous powers to administer their internal affairs, and 
in the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon of 1864, which provided for a multi­
confessional system of representation. This Council represented a long tradition of 
elite accommodation. The recent consociational model of Lebanon recognized the 
pluralist tradition as a significant foundation to build upon, rather than as an 
obstruction to overcome.
Consociationalism in Lebanon successfully bridged the polarizing effect of 
asabiya and prevented the bifurcation of Lebanese society. It provided the power 
groups with an accommodating mechanism in their competition for positions of 
authority.
A The 1943 National Pact
As a conflict management mechanism, the 1943 National Pact exhibited a two 
dimensional conceptual bearing: a consociational device for achieving a just 
communality, and a nation-building mechanism. Let us look at these dimensions 
separately.
1 The Pact as a Consociational Device for Achieving a 
Just Communality
The confessional distribution of government positions and Lebanon's foreign 
policy were the two main areas of contention between the two Lebanese communal 
blocs. The Pact's main theme was to bring down the conflict in these two volatile
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areas to a manageable level. It was designed to be both a consociational mechanism 
for achieving social justice and a fine tuning of a compromise between the two 
ideologies: Lebanism and Arabism.
The Pact laid down the foundations for sharing the power not only between the 
two communal blocs - Moslems and Christians - but among the various component 
sects within each bloc. It also defined the parameter of Lebanon's external relations 
and specified its foreign and Arab policies. Interestingly enough, this agreement was 
never committed to writing, but, nevertheless, became a "given", a "fact of life", which 
conditioned political behaviour and dictated government policies until the outbreak of 
the civil war in 1975.44
The distribution of government and civil service posts as well as the overall 
power sharing arrangement were, before the concluding of the Pact, a source of 
discord among the various confessional communities in Lebanon. The 1926 
constitution provided for equal opportunities of employment and representation in the 
government as well as its institutions.45 However, in practice the equal opportunities 
provided for in the constitution and established as a norm by the Pact, were not 
without flaws. The aim of balancing the interests of the various confessional groups 
became a source of constant friction among the confessional groups and strained the 
relations between their elites. It frequently spurred the less privileged communities to 
seek, by means bordering sometimes on violence, a remedy for the nuances in the 
law, which were used as a conduit for an unbalanced distribution of government 
rewards and resources. The Pact was meant to address, among other things, this 
aspect of communal relations.
The Pact as an instrument for distributing social justice was perceived to mean 
that government posts, parliament seats, bureaucratic, military and judicial positions 
were to be divided proportionally between the various Lebanese confessional 
communities on the basis of the 1932 census, which gave the Christians a slight 
majority. As such the presidency of the Republic was allocated to the Maronite Sect, 
the speakership of the House of Representatives to the Shi'a Moslems, the prime 
ministership to the Sunni Moslems, and the rest of the sects would share the 
ministerial portfolios according to their numerical strength. The parliament's 
composition as well as the civil service, army, and judiciary enrolment were 
established on the basis of a 6:5 ratio (against every six positions allocated to the 
Christians five positions were allocated to the Moslems).
Foreign policy constituted an area of great discord between the two communal 
blocs. The Christians, specifically the Maronites, passionately sought to keep an
independent Lebanon under French protection, while the Moslems, mainly the Sunnis, 
did not conceal their fervent desire for a union with the Arab world, particularly with 
Syria. The Christians' rationale was based on their minority status and their co­
religionist relation with the West and in particular with France. Being a trickle in the 
sea of Islam, the Maronites argued that a union with Syria or with any other Arab 
country would, unquestionably, destroy their identity and actually their very existence 
as a nation. The Moslems advanced the view that they were stripped of their majority 
status by being detached from their natural habitat, the wider umma (community) of 
Islam, and being grafted onto a small country under Christian domination.46
The Pact offered both communal blocs a settlement through which they were 
able to preserve their interests within an independent and sovereign Lebanon. This 
was envisaged to be realized through a trade-off of concessions in which the Moslems 
were made to give up their demand for making Lebanon a part of a larger Arab 
Islamic State, and to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. The 
Christians reciprocated by accepting the Arab character of Lebanon, and by agreeing 
to share power with the Moslems.47
These trade-off concessions produced a national settlement that explicitly 
rested on the assumption that both blocs had abandoned whatever loyalties they had 
to external powers in conformity with the concept of independence and sovereignty. 
In arriving at this settlement, the Pact succeeded in overcoming the disintegrative 
effects of the asabiya power. This power was apparently cloaked in communal 
cleavages and manifested in religious and ideological divisions.
2 The Pact as a Nation-Building Mechanism
The State of Lebanon created by the French was seen by the majority of its 
Moslem inhabitants as an artificial state.48 It took more than fifteen years to convince 
them of the viability of the new state. Until then, the Moslems were insisting on their 
demand for Lebanon's union with Syria.49 France retaliated by drawing up an 
agreement with the Lebanese Government in November 1936 granting Lebanon 
independence within its existing borders and tying it up by a friendship and alliance 
agreement to the French Republic.
In order to ameliorate the effect of this measure and to constrain the Moslems' 
opposition to it and to reduce their fear of a French backed Christian hegemony in the 
new republic, the then President, Emile Edde, exchanged letters50 with the French 
High Commissioner, expressing explicitly the readiness of his government to 
guarantee equality of civil and political rights to all confessional groups in Lebanon
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without discrimination, and to ensure a just proportional representation in public 
affairs.51 It was only then that the Moslems became inclined to acknowledge the 
majoritorian status of the Christians in exchange for recognition of Lebanon's Arab 
affiliation and the equitable distribution of government rewards and resources 
between the two major sectarian blocs.52
The 1936 agreement was not ratified by the French parliament and the 
provisions of the exchanged letters were not implemented. However, their spirit was 
retained, particularly in relation to civil and political rights and equal distribution of 
government rewards. It was a trenchant motivation for the Moslems to move closer 
towards the 1943 National Pact settlement.
The year 1936 was a turning point in the relations between the Christians and 
Moslems in Lebanon. For the first time both communities moved closer to a mutual 
understanding on the new Lebanese entity. This rapprochement was evident in the 
Maronite Patriarchate relations with Syria, and in the emergence of a new trend 
among the Sunni Moslem community calling for the total independence of Lebanon. 
These events were crowned with the appointment, for the first time, of a Sunni Prime 
Minister.53
The Pact's fundamental preoccupation was with the question of how to bring 
the conflict in the two most volatile areas, social justice and national identity, under 
control. Some students of Lebanese politics attached more weight to the question of 
Lebanon's identity than to the question of social justice. They imputed to the Pact a 
leading role in settling this issue. Hudson54 and Maksoud55 acknowledged the 
importance of the constitutional arrangement and the 1936 exchanged letters that 
promised Moslems an equal share with the Christians in the government rewards. Yet 
they believed that this issue was secondary to that of national identity. For them, the 
1943 National Pact was meant to settle the more profound issue of the national 
identity of Lebanon.
The Pact's resolution of the question of Lebanon’s identity was supposed also 
to resolve the question of loyalty to the nation. The specific provision on this issue 
stipulated unequivocally that members of the two main confessional blocs ought to 
dissociate themselves from any external loyalty in favour of an independent Lebanon. 
It was furthermore implicit in this settlement that loyalties to the various confessions 
ought to be subordinate to the loyalty to the nation.
The National Pact was a clear attempt to construct such a loyalty by inducing 
overarching loyalties to the nation as a whole, over and above communal loyalties.56
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3 The Pact as a Mechanism for Integration
The Pact's embodiment of overarching loyalties intimates an integrative value 
to it. President al-Khoury's inaugural speech to the parliament on 21 September 1943 
gave credence to the notion of integration in the Pact. He declared that:
The National Pact was not merely a settlement between two 
confessional communities but the fusion of two ideologies: one that 
called for melting Lebanon into another state, and the other called for 
its retention under foreign protection. It was assumed that, by mutual 
understanding and agreement, the Pact would transform the two 
conflicting trends into one national Lebanese Faith.57
Prime Minister al-Solh, on the other hand, did not consider that his faith in an 
independent Lebanon was "...incompatible with his own adherence to Arabism."58 For 
him, "Lebanon is a country with an Arab face that enjoys the good emanating from the 
West."59 He shared President al-Khoury's confidence in the integrative value of the 
Pact by giving credence to the existing sectarian institutions. Al-Solh believed that the 
institutions of a just communal representation would facilitate integration in due time. 
In his ministerial statement to the parliament on 7 October 1943, in which he launched 
the National Pact, he stated that the eradication of sectarianism was a decisive stage 
towards the attainment of integration. In his subsequent address to the parliament he 
described sectarianism as the first evil and considered it a hindrance to national 
progress and a poison to inter-confessional relations. He pledged to seek its 
abolition. He believed that once the national feeling enveloped the nation, 
sectarianism would disappear. "...The hour in which sectarianism vanishes is a 
blessed national awakening in the history of Lebanon."60
Loyalty to the system, national unity, harmony and cohesion, the basic themes 
of the National Pact, were continually emphasized by almost every ardent politician of 
an independent and sovereign Lebanon.
In his policy statement of 4 August 1958, President elect Fouad Chehab 
(1958-64) called on the Lebanese citizens to do their "...level best to restore to the 
country its national unity....It is from this unity that the National Covenant emanated. 
This Covenant which has outlined for us a purely national policy, a brilliant policy, and 
an independent foreign policy, will always remain the constitution which guarantees 
Lebanon's glory and the prosperity of its people."61 Lebanon's permanent 
representative to the United Nations, Charles Malik, advised the world community in 
his address to the UN on 19 August 1958 that "the National Covenant...was a free
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agreement among all of the elements of the population. They would all, from the point 
of view of independence, cease to look outside and, firmly clasping hands together, 
they would all hence-forth trust one another and work harmoniously together as equal 
citizens whose only political loyalty would be to one independent and sovereign state 
called Lebanon..."62
Upon his election to the presidency of the Republic, President Chehab 
pledged, in his swearing-in speech on 23 September 1958, loyalty "to the unwritten 
constitution, our National Charter, because this is what has bound us and still binds 
us..."63
Following the 1958 political crisis in Lebanon, Prime Minister Karame stated in 
his address to the nation on 25 September 1958, that the "...ordeal has proved that 
there is no way of rebuilding Lebanon as a free, sovereign and independent homeland 
except by once again uniting our hearts, joining our hands, and embracing the aims of 
the National Covenant [Pact] which was, is and will continue to be the pillar of 
Lebanon's structure and its cornerstone."64
The integrative tendencies existed in Lebanese society side by side with 
disintegrative forces long before the birth of the National Pact. Al-jisr observed that 
the negative tendencies were usually harnessed in the direction of integration but 
were never institutionalized in a formal text. The 1958 conflict and 1975 war revealed 
how the successive settlements, including the 1943 National Pact, were not as benign 
or innocuous as often assumed. It is indeed an advantage that their informality gave 
them the advantage of flexibility, but their intended ambivalent characteristics exposed 
their weakness65 at times of extreme political tension, and turned them into a source 
of conflict.66
4 Disintegrative elements in the Pact
A re-examination of the National Pact in the light of the 1975 war has revealed 
to some young students of Lebanese consociationalism that the Pact, in retrospect, 
contained palpable federalist tendencies. In their view, the protagonists of the 
National Pact were too ambitious in their vision of creating an integral society out of 
two distinctive cultures. The Pact was no more than a consociational attempt at 
resolving the conflict in Lebanese society and a mechanism for transferring the 
various conflictual tendencies, particularly those related to the question of loyalty and 
national identity, towards the direction of integration.
As a consequence, the National Pact laid the foundation for an integrated 
society, and it was up to the political process to translate this goal into reality . It was
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not an easy endeavour, for asabiya consciousness was a distinctive characteristic that 
defined and separated the component communities. Moreover, Lebanese society 
rested on a tripodal of power structure: the Christian bloc, the Moslem bloc and the 
State. The State was supposed to maintain a balance between these two blocs. 
However, the Christian bloc was, by tradition, closer to the position of authority than 
the Moslem bloc. This made the Christians a habitual ally and ardent supporter of the 
State. The Moslem bloc came face-to-face with the alliance of the State and the 
Christian bloc. The State lost its claim of neutrality and became a party siding with 
one confessional group against the other. The State, by losing its credibility as a 
meeting point for all sects, became the subject of conflict and a divisive factor in a 
volatile situation.67
In the area of government rewards, the Moslems' main inveterate fear about 
Christian hegemony, and the latter's embrace of the authority structure were 
ameliorated by the Pact's distribution of government and civil service posts in which 
the Christians were allocated a ratio of 1:6 over the Moslems. Although the Pact 
"...did not challenge the clear primacy within the system which the Maronites had 
enjoyed since 1861, it now for the first time allotted the 'second place' in the system to 
the Sunni Moslems."68
The State in its function as a focal point for all communal groups and as a 
balancing mechanism for their interests was supposed to invite all sects to join the 
nation-building process. The step would have reduced the confrontation tendencies 
between the different sects and strengthened the power of the State and its 
legitimacy. The State would have been able to act as a buffer zone between the two 
contending communal blocs, but the State's involvement caused the conflict to shift 
from the area of inter-communal relations to the area of legitimate authority. The 
conflict became a fight over the political system with the Christians striving to maintain 
it, and the Moslems struggling to change it.
The State was expected to carry on with the integration process for the 
following reasons:69 firstly, as a counter balance to the duality in the Lebanese society. 
It was therefore assumed that a centralized administration could bring together under 
its umbrella all confessional groups; secondly, as a mechanism to incorporate the 
diverse communal components in the state structure and harmonize their output. This 
may have led gradually to the integration of the Lebanese society. The State failed to 
achieve this goal. It was left to the National Pact to assume this responsibility.
Two possible outcomes were envisaged by this process: the erosion of the role 
of the confessional groups as independent and dynamic forces, and the fading away
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of the role of the confessional groups as a means by which their members could 
obtain their rewards from the state. However, thirty-two years later the Lebanese 
society was still a pluralist society. Neither the State nor the National Pact could effect 
the desired integration for reasons discussed below.
5 Failure of the Integrative Mechanism in the Pact
An interesting trend in the political thought of some post-1975-war students of 
Lebanese politics alludes that the integrative process was blocked before it started. In 
a re-evaluation of the National Pact, Charaf discovered that by inviting the Moslem 
bloc to become a full fledged partner in the power structure of Lebanese society, the 
Pact created a bond of vague federalism of confessional groups which replaced a 
central government concept envisaged by the 1926 constitution.70 Segmental 
autonomy, for him, is a kind of federalism, in the sense that it is not limited to territory 
but extends to religion, culture and ideology.71 This federative interpretation of the 
Pact reflects to a large extent the new direction of Maronite thought after the war. 
Suleiman finds in the unity created by the Pact no more than an alliance between the 
various confessional groups and political parties.72
Perceived federalism was not the only weakness in the Pact's integrative 
features. Other deficiencies appeared and were attributed by Charaf to the basic 
assumptions upon which the concept of integration was based. He contends that two 
aspects of communal reaction should have been explored before an integrative role 
was assigned to the pact: the communal coefficient of resistance to change, and the 
communal ability for adaptation to exogenous stimuli.73 Neither of these was 
investigated. If they were, Charaf contends, then Lebanese society would have 
revealed three characteristics that are not conducive to integration.74
The first is that confessions have existed prior to the State. They are self 
sufficient and can survive on their own. The second is that the confessional grouping 
is not a political grouping where continuity is derived from its individual’s interest. 
Confessionalism is a national society in its own right whose sum total is different from 
that of its individuals. The third is that various confessional structures in Lebanon 
originated from different sources and developed different ideologies.
6 Success of the Consociational Mechanism in the Pact
The National Pact may have failed as an integrative mechanism, but it 
succeeded as a conflict regulation device. The consociational arrangement embodied 
in the National Pact brought inter- communal conflict in the areas of national identity 
and power sharing to a manageable level. In foreign policy, which is a concomitant of
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the identity issue, the two Noes formula ('No' to Arab irredentism for Moslems in 
exchange for 'No' to western protection for Christians) made the two communal blocs 
attenuate their ideological excesses and acquiesce in a negative consensus which 
required unflinching loyalty to the newly independent and sovereign State of Lebanon.
In the area of power sharing the aim of consociationalism was to establish a 
balanced system of rewards. It offered the restive communities the best possible 
opportunity to make a contribution to the political culture from within the system. In his 
analysis of the public administration in Lebanon, Crow observed that:
since independence, the Lebanese public service has been reasonably 
open to all segments of society both in terms of the various 
communities and social classes....It serves as an adjustment 
mechanism which brings particularistic elements of society together into 
a working relationship without overriding interests or submerging their 
identities.75
The power-sharing concept was also applied to the legislative body. Individual 
communal entitlements were well observed but could only be realized in 
cooperation with other communities. An electoral law was established to 
supervise this process.
B The Electoral Law
The Lebanese electoral system embodied an electoral strategy which was 
oriented towards cross-cutting differences. The system, which was amended three 
times, encouraged moderation, competition and cooperation76, and prevented the 
polarization of parliamentary sectarian loyalties. Horowitz found in this system a 
cogent vehicle for inter-ethnic competition and cooperation, "...rarely in a severely 
divided society has there been a system that placed as high a premium on inter-ethnic 
competition and inter-ethnic cooperation"77. The electoral arrangement took into 
consideration the numerical strength and geographical distribution of each sect. 
Suleiman described it as a "...preset proportional representation system on a 
communal or religious basis."78
The confessional composition of the parliament was prescribed also by the 
fixed ratio of 6:5 Christians to Moslems, regardless of the number of deputies. The 
sectarian-regional distribution of members of parliament was also assigned. Table 5-1 
shows the number of deputies in each region and by sect. The total number of 
members, as well as the constituencies, were changed four times since
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independence. The ratio of 6:5 remained constant for the first three times but was 
amended in 1989 to 6:6. The voting process was changed too. In the 1943 election, 
the whole of Lebanon was one constituency sending forty-four deputies to the House 
of Parliament, and candidates were packed in one "Grand List". This system 
underwent gradual changes. The constituencies are now twenty four within the five 
provinces and the number of deputies has been increased from forty-four to 108, and 
lately to 128.
Table 5-1: Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect and Region
Region Sunnite Shiite Druze Alawite
s
Maron­
ite
Catho­
lic
Ortho­
dox
Angli­
can
Armen­
ian
Catho­
lic
Armen­
ian
Ortho­
dox
Minor­
ities
Total
Beirut 6 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 19
Mount
Lebanon 2 3 5 19 2 3 1 35
South
Lebanon 3 14 1 2 2 1 23
North
Lebanon 11 2 9 6 28
Beq'a 5 8 1 3 3 2 1 23
Total 27 27 8 2 34 8 14 1 1 5 1 128
Source: Article 2 of the Electoral Law of 26 April 1960 as amended by law 
No. 154 dated 22 July 1992 (official gazette No. 30 dated 23 July 1992)
The ticket composition reflected the sectarian structure of each constituency. 
At the same time it cultivated sectarian cooperation. For example, the voters in Mount 
Lebanon selected slates of thirty-five representatives that included two Sunnis, three 
Shi'as, five Druzes, nineteen Maronites, two Catholic, three Orthodox, and one 
Armenian Orthodox. This structure promotes compromise and harmony because for a 
candidate to be elected he needs the votes of his communal group as well as the 
votes of the other sects.
One of the major consequences of the list system is that it encouraged 
sectarian moderation.79 Lijphart finds in this aspect a drawback for consociationalism 
because it does not "...bring together the real segmental spokesmen at a site suitable 
for political accommodation."80
Competition takes place within each reserved office. A Sunni cannot compete 
with a Maronite for the presidency, but another Maronite can. A Sunni aspirant for the 
prime ministership would cooperate with a Maronite aspirant for the Presidency by 
trading off support. The Maronite candidate to the Presidency has a chance of 
winning only if the Moslem deputies vote for him.81 This is the case in parliamentary
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elections where mixed tickets in a multi-communal constituency require cooperation 
among the various candidates who belong to different sects.
However, the electoral law in itself was insufficient to placate the conflictual 
tendencies which came under increased pressure as a result of the process of change 
and development. Population mobility and change created new electoral realities and 
economic needs which could not be accommodated by the provisions of the electoral 
law and existing legislation. The Shi'a increased in number and multiplied around 
Beirut, leaving their original constituencies in South and East Lebanon and moving to 
new areas where they have no right to vote or to be represented by one of their sect. 
Moreover, they created in their new abode a socio-economic problem which added to 
an already volatile situation of unbalanced development in the country. The 
government had to introduce new measures to meet the challenges of the evolving 
situation which included, among other things, a threat to sectarian harmony. A 
developmental policy with an explicit aim of bridging the gap between the sects' 
entitlements and rewards was introduced in the early 1960s by President Fouad 
Chehab. Some aspects of this policy are discussed below.
C Developmental policies
The National Pact's main conflict regulation attributes were translated by 
subsequent governments into policies, which aimed, among other things, to achieve 
some measure of accommodation and harmony between the confessional groups. 
Immediately following his election in 1958, President Chehab introduced massive 
economic and social reform programs ostensibly to cope with modernization, but in 
reality they aimed at maintaining social justice and eventually communal harmony.82
A central Committee for Administrative Reform, consisting of twenty four 
members drawn from the bureaucracy and the private sector, was set up. The Central 
Committee spread itself over seven subcommittees and instituted a number of work 
committees in each ministry "...to study the needs and make recommendations to the 
Central Committee."83 Within a six month period the committees and subcommittees 
drafted 162 legislative decrees covering the bureaucratic structure. A number of laws 
were amended within this concept and a few "...autonomous councils having 
developmental objectives were also founded."84
In his approach, which came to be known as Chehabism, President Chehab 
was able to accommodate the demands of the less privileged communities for social 
justice within the context of the existing formula of political sectarianism.85 He did the 
next best thing, under the circumstances, to appease the Moslem bloc: top positions
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in the bureaucratic structure were redistributed between the two communal blocs on 
the basis of a 6:6 ratio instead of 6:5. This gave the Moslem bloc parity with the 
Christian bloc. Before that the Moslems were under the impression that "...the 
Christians hold the bulk of key government positions, with the power of the presidency 
and a Christian majority in the Chamber of Deputies."86
Chehab's reforms were not limited to the administration. In the areas of 
economic and social development he commissioned the French Institute 
Internationale de Recherches et de Formation en Vue de Developement (IRFED) to 
diagnose the social and economic problems of the country in order to determine the 
basis of sectarian suspicion and socio-economic tension.87
These policies succeeded in stabilizing the communal relations for a while. As 
modernization took its effect in Lebanon it exerted pressure on the social structure. 
Pressure was also coming from the regional environment in the form of political 
change and the challenges of the Palestinian problem. These policies could not 
withstand such pressure; nor could the social structure itself. The demographic 
change and the rise of communal consciousness in Lebanon which was associated 
with modernization as well as with the Palestinian influx into the country following the 
creation of Israel have revealed the weakness of the social structure and the conflict 
regulation mechanism in the form of consociationalism and the developmental 
policies. Inter-communal problems were exacerbated by these developments in spite 
of the above conflict regulation devices. Nevertheless they were responsible for the 
maintenance of communal peace for a period of thirty two years.
D An Overall Assessment of the National Pact as a 
Consociational Device and a Conflict Management 
Mechanism
The Pact has been the subject of criticism from almost every quarter. Its 
consociational aspect attracted most of the criticism. Some writers went as far as to 
claim that the Pact was the source of conflict. Enver Khoury believes that its 
power-sharing arrangement was the main cause for the 1975 civil war.88 The 
cleavages in Lebanese society along sectarian lines were at the core of the Pact's 
concern. Shemesh claimed that it failed to bridge the gap between the sects. He 
maintained that paradoxically enough it bolstered those processes which it was 
intended to abolish. Instead of achieving a just communality the Pact fostered and 
encouraged political communality that led to the civil war.89
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This view was shared by a number of students of Lebanese post­
independence politics. Yamak thought that the National Pact could not be regarded 
as a sound basis for national solidarity; instead of transcending what divided 
Lebanon, it consecrated that sectarian division by recognizing the sects as legitimate 
representatives of the population.90 Horowitz claimed that what appeared to be a fair 
and just distribution of opportunities between the two confessional blocs proved to be 
a rigid standard incapable of keeping up with changes in the underlying facts on which 
it was based.91 Mackey agreed about the rigidity of the Pact. She observed that the 
formula used in the dispensing of government rewards was based on the 1932 
disputed census and was assumed to remain static.92
At the time of its conclusion, the Pact was considered a victory for the 
Moslems93, but with the passage of time it was reinterpreted differently. In 1958 the 
Christians were defending it vehemently: by 1972 the Moslems were deeply 
dissatisfied with it,94 and in 1976 the Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Sheikh Hasan Khalid, 
declared:
we are with the Lebanese formula that unites the Lebanese not with the 
formula which distinguishes and discriminates between them. They 
understand the formula as such: the president is a Maronite and so is 
the foreign minister, the president of the higher judicial council and the 
commander of the Army. The Moslems ought not to exceed their 
limits...we request a Lebanese formula that entails a democratic 
environment, and equality between the citizens in rights and duties.95
Most of the politicians and the major political parties criticised the Pact on the 
grounds that it did not fulfil the dreams of its progenitors in building a unified and 
cohesive nation. The Moslem politicians who supported it in 1943 because its power 
sharing arrangement would give them some security, criticised it in 1975 because it 
ossified the social structure and became a covenant of Christian hegemony.
In general, three main factors contributed to the immobilisation of the Pact.96 
First, It could not transfer itself from an elite contract into a social contract involving 
the majority of the population. Second, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 as a 
homogeneous ethnic nation-state negated the concept of coexistence of a multi­
sectarian society. Furthermore, a massive Palestinian influx into Lebanon disturbed 
the sectarian and overall social, economic and later on political balance which the 
Pact fostered. Third, the emergence in the surrounding Arab world of ideological 
trends calling for Arab unity and socialism forced the Pact’s ideology of "Lebanon first" 
into retreat.
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On a more specific level the Pact attracted criticism for its failure to establish a 
dialectical relation between the two notions of Lebanism and Arabism97 and between 
the two notions combined and the socio-cultural diverse structure.98 Jean Suleiman 
agrees that the two ideologies of Lebanism and Arabism were originally void of any 
dialectic potential. The compromise arrived at in 1943 did not go further than 
establish an alliance99, a modus operand/10°, a grand settlement101 which succeeded 
in balancing group interests. However it failed to achieve consensus on communal 
goals.102
The contradiction inherent in the ideological aspect of the Pact constituted a 
negation of its integrative goals as envisaged by its founders. "In its attempt to 
combine between Arabism and Lebanism, between pure sovereignty and Arab 
solidarity...the pact preserved the contradictions which negated each other."103 
Instead of interacting with each other in a thesis-antithesis manner with an expected 
outcome of cohesive and independent entity, they negated each other, and the 
natural outcome was more cleavages and fragmentation.104
Unlike the settlement of national identity, the Christian-Moslem power sharing 
arrangement did not entail a reciprocal concession structure.105 As such, its 
repudiation by one side did not entail reciprocal action from the opposite side. For 
instance, the Moslems’ rejection of the 6:5 ratio in the distribution of the Government's 
rewards did not invite from the Christians a reciprocal reply as did the sectarian 
agreement on national identity.
Despite its deficiencies, the Pact was a vital means to assure communal 
harmony and amicability, and establish stability and peace that lasted for thirty-two 
years. Retrospective evaluation of its weakness and pitfalls should not obscure the 
importance of its conflict regulation achievements in a deeply divided society such as 
Lebanon.
As a consociational device and a conflict management mechanism, the 
National Pact formula, the Pact-based electoral law, as well as the developmental 
policies constituted a body of successful conflict management practices in Lebanon. 
To illustrate, between 1920 and 1979, seventy-seven governments were formed, all 
on a coalition basis.106 The political leaders of the major communities cooperated in a 
coalition cabinet. The composition of the cabinet reflected the segmental and regional 
division of the society and ranged in size from a very small cabinet made out of four 
members107 to a large cabinet composed of twenty-two members.108 The "grand 
coalition" or "stable governing coalition" is an effective conflict regulating practice.109 
Salem110, and Dekmajian111 argued that the characteristics of an effective coalition
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cabinet in Lebanon, during the above period, were present and were responsible for 
the success of Lebanon's experience with consociationalism. Hudson, on the other 
hand, was sceptical about the effectiveness of the grand coalition factor in the stability 
of the country. He, in fact, was of the opinion that the elite cartel encouraged 
sectarian hostilities in order to maintain its power base.112
Apart from "government by coalition", three other consociational characteristics 
were also present in the Pact's structure which contributed to the management of the 
conflict in Lebanon before 1975, such as "Mutual Veto," the principle of "Proportional 
Representation," and "Segmental Autonomy,". Among these factors, the principle of 
proportional representation was viewed by Nordlinger as of limited value in the sense 
that it served as an effective conflict regulation practice insofar as it reduced the 
degree and scope of competition for governmental power, administrative positions 
and scarce resources.113 Lijphart regarded it as a source of conflict. While expressing 
his satisfaction with the performance of consociational democracy in Lebanon for a 
period of thirty two years, he observed that, "...allocation of the highest offices and the 
preset electoral proportionality, both of which favoured the Christian sects, were 
incapable of allowing a smooth adjustment to the gradual loss of majority status by the 
Christians to the Moslems."114
Salem makes a similar argument. He maintains that "...the reluctance of the 
Christian elite to grant real parity of representation to the Moslem community greatly 
contributed to the breakdown of the political order in 1975."115 On the other hand, 
Horowitz suggests that the system of representation was too static to allow 
development and change. "What appeared to be a reasonable and objective means 
of distributing opportunities...proved to be a rigid standard incapable of keeping up 
with changes in the underlying facts on which it was based."116
Segmental autonomy is a salient feature of Lebanese society. The various 
sects have had autonomy in certain major areas since independence. The personal 
status laws as well as some aspects of the education policy have been left to the 
sects' exclusive concern.
V Consociationalism and Lebanese Social Structure
The Lebanese conflict, viewed as a single empirical case, offers the different 
theoretical perspectives a chance to be studied from conceptually different points of 
view. Four distinct cases can be selected from such studies, and are now discussed 
briefly.
167
A Lebanon as a Bi-polar or Multi-polar Society
From a distance, Lebanese society appears to be a bi-polar configuration: 
Christians versus Moslems117, Leftists versus Rightists118' Conservatives versus 
Liberals119, Lebanese nationalists versus Arab nationalists120’ the haves versus the 
have-nots, and mountain culture versus city culture.121 However, at a closer look the 
situation turns out to be more complex. In the first place, it is meaningless to talk 
about the existence of only two communities or two communal divisions in the country, 
that is Moslems and Christians, for these two configurations are the peak of a pyramid 
of a panoply of sects and denominations which differ markedly in the perceptions of 
their national identity and loyalties.122 The conflict has deepened the sectarian 
loyalties and identification and increased the alienation of the various communities 
from each other.
B Lebanon as a Sectarian Society
Is the conflict in Lebanon defined by religion? It is an obvious fact that religion 
is a salient factor in Lebanon's socio-political culture. Religious differences mark 
clearly the boundaries not only between Christians and Moslems, but also among the 
seventeen officially recognized sects of the country. Some of the more influential 
political parties are encapsulated within their own sectarian shells. The Phalanges 
Party is predominantly Maronite, the Progressive Socialist Party is mainly Druze, the 
Amal Movement is almost exclusively Shi'ite as is the Party of God. However, this 
phenomenon cannot be attributed to the tenets of the different religions. There is 
nothing in the basic nature of the above religions to link them with party conflict. The 
weight of religious cleavages has been misused by self-interested leaders. In the 
absence of other avenues for power, such leaders found no advantage in minimizing 
the religious asabiya.
Moreover the two conflicting groups do not fight each other over matters of 
faith. Bigots may exist on both sides but religious bigotry is not the root cause of the 
conflict.
C Lebanon as a Pluralist Society
Inspite of the above comments, we have to recognize that religious differences 
coincide with different political orientations, allegiances and national loyalties. A 
person's membership in a community is decisive in his assignment to a political 
affiliation. The conflict has demarcated the boundaries in such a way that a person 
who adheres to the position of other than his community is denounced. A Maronite 
who adopts a Moslem ideology or visa versa is for all practical purposes seen as a
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defector. Communal distinctions and political orientations pervade the whole social 
structure and render it plausible to pluralistic assessments. Such a kind of pluralism is 
best described by Dahl as conflictive, in the sense that the system is characterized by 
enduring cleavages123 whereas Barakat goes beyond this assessment to claim that 
Lebanese society is closer to a "mosaic" rather than a pluralist type. For him pluralism 
refers to harmonious relationships of several interest, religious, and/or ethnic groups 
within a clarified social order. A society is pluralist in as much as it allows for the 
participation of all groups so that no one group, or an alliance of a few of them, can 
possess a monopoly of rewards, nor dominate others and dictate to them what they 
should do.124 On the other hand, a mosaic society is characterized by a system of 
checks and balances among its various component groups. In a pluralist society 
there is consensus on fundamental principles whereas in a mosaic society this 
consensus is absent.125
Messera, quoting several Christian political party platforms, and Moslem 
political and social organizations, concludes that Lebanon is characterized by cultural 
pluralism. By this he means essentially the same as cultural or social diversity, and 
infers that the various Lebanese communities (sects) have come to acquire, during 
their historical development, distinctive features and different norms, values and 
patterns of behaviour.126
D Lebanon as a Classless Society
The Marxist writer Samih Farsoun agreed with Barakat's description of the 
pluralist system in Lebanon and remarked that consensus is absent from the social 
structure. He defined the problem in economic rather than political or religious terms. 
He envisaged it as a failure of the labour movement to unite the factions around a 
common value system and attributed this failure and the persistent diversity and 
absence of a central value system to western economic penetration and patronage of 
a favoured sect from among seventeen others. He claimed that this particular action 
stratified the sectarian system and transferred it into social classes antagonistic to 
each other.127
The economic interpretation of the Lebanese problem is not a novel one. 
Farsoun's perspective was preceded by another Marxist writer, B. I. Odeh, who 
postulated that what appeared a sectarian conflict was in reality a class conflict.128
There is no doubt that there is disparity in the economic status of the various 
component communities in Lebanon, and particularly among the four major ones. Yet 
the political attitudes among the communities reflect communal affiliation rather than
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class behaviour. In Lebanon, identification with social class is almost non-observable 
except among the few committed intellectuals whose class and status behaviour 
defies their affiliation. Any conflict regulation mechanism will be distorted by tying it to 
a class-struggle theory in Lebanon.
Consociational arrangements were instrumental in regulating, for a certain 
period of time, the above structurally-based disparities, but were ineffective in 
fortifying the social structure against domestic and regional pressure. Under the 
impact of the changing situation, both internally and externally, the communal 
conflictual tendencies erupted into a dramatic civil war in 1975. The first victim of this 
war was the National Pact and its consociational implications.
Attempts to resolve the conflict continued unabated throughout the war period. 
A countless number of proposals and schemes were negotiated through third party 
mediators. Schemes such as federalism, political and administrative decentralization, 
cantonizationr even secession, were contemplated but failed. Finally, the conflict 
parties realized that the only feasible and workable solution to this problem was to 
revive the National Pact, introduce some changes to its power-sharing formula to 
reflect the evolving communal changes, and amend the Constitution accordingly. This 
was what underlined the formulation of the Taif Accord - the subject matter of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE TAIF ACCORD
There had been numerous cease-fires in the Lebanese war since its eruption, 
followed by as many initiatives to resolve it. However, the quest for its termination and 
the establishment of permanent peace in Lebanon remained elusive until October, 
1989, when a breakthrough was achieved by the conclusion of the Taif Accord.
In retrospect, it is evident that the earlier attempts at resolving the conflict were 
no more than stopgap measures to halt the bloodshed and create cooling-off periods 
to allow further negotiation and reconciliation. These attempts started as early as the 
outbreak of hostilities in April 1975 and took two forms: direct negotiations between 
the elite of the conflict groups or their representatives, and indirect negotiations 
through third parties.
At the outbreak of hostilities, conflict groups, particularly their intelligentsia, 
initiated a flurry of stylized proposals for a termination of the conflict, but none of them 
produced a solid solution. The reason for this failure was mainly due to the fact that 
some of these initiatives focussed on lateral causes and ignored the basic issues, the 
underlying determining factors as well as the relevant venues for their resolution. 
Instead of identifying the appropriate elements of a resolution to the conflict, some of 
these attempts confused these elements with the conflict itself. The end result was a 
one-sided view counteracted, usually, by an opposite view from the contending party. 
This increased rather than eliminated the tension and sharpened the contradicting 
views among the conflict groups. On the other hand, the Taif attempt succeeded in 
terminating the war and brought the conflict down to a legal and manageable level. 
Why did the Taif endeavour succeed whereas the preceding attempts failed? What 
made the conflict parties agree to conditions for terminating the struggle?
This chapter deals with the major attempts to resolve the basic issues of the 
conflict and the proposals of the main conflict parties as well as those of the 
successive Heads of the State. It ends by a thorough analysis of the Taif Accord, the 
conflict environment that preceded it and its implications for the Lebanese socio­
political system.
It was assumed that a conflict resolution process could start if the contending 
parties meaningfully understood the views of each other through an understanding of 
how each of the conflict issues was viewed by them. It was further stipulated that a
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resolution of the conflict could be achieved if the conflict parties altered their positions 
with regard to the issues under dispute. The Taif Accord is a case in point.
I Basic Issues and Proposed Schemes
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the 1975 conflict in Lebanon revolved 
around three basic issues: reform of the political order which implied an amendment to 
the power-sharing agreement of the National Pact, the National Identity of Lebanon 
and its implications for inter-communal relations as well as for the country's relations 
with the Arab world, particularly with Syria, and sovereignty of the state and the 
presence of foreign troops on Lebanon's national soil. The conflict parties coalesced 
around two main groups, vis-a-vis these issues: the Reformists who were struggling 
to change the political system and make it more accommodative to social and political 
variations, and the Status Quo defenders, who fought back to presen/e and maintain 
the system.
Both groups, as well as third parties, submitted definite proposals and 
programs of action for resolving the basic issues of the conflict. The following is a 
descriptive analysis of these proposals and an assessment of their impact on the 
conflict process.
A The Issue of Political Reform
The Lebanese National Movement, which was the more influential partner in 
the Reformist Camp, announced on 18 August 1975 a comprehensive program of 
political reform,1 suggesting, among other things, an amendment to the existing 
political order in the areas of confessionalism, parliamentary representation and 
authority structure. It demanded the abolition of confessionalism as a first step to be 
followed by total secularisation of the political system, and proposed an amendment to 
the representative system, the electoral law, and regional and local representative 
bodies. The demand for a reformation of the authority structure was aimed at 
restoring the equilibrium to the various state organs and at shifting some of the 
powers invested in the president to the Prime Minister and cabinet. The program of 
the Lebanese National Movement included also some proposals covering other areas, 
such as, the public administration, the army, the judiciary, civil rights and liberties.
The Lebanese National Movement pressed this platform on the Status Quo 
Coalition in an attempt to extract from it an acquiescence in establishing a more 
balanced democratic political order which would allow the fullest participation of all 
component communities. To achieve this, it suggested an amendment to the
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Constitution and to the National Pact, which it thought would satisfy, if amended as 
such, the communities' entitlements to government positions, parliamentary 
representation, the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the army. Such an amendment 
would also address the overall question of disequilibrium between the three Estates 
as well as within them.2
As the conflict ebbed and flowed, the Lebanese National Movement remained 
firm in its demands and was determined to obtain concessions from the opposite 
camp. As this was not forthcoming some members of the Reformist Camp reacted by 
lifting the ceiling of their demands to include the overhauling of the whole political 
system.3 Other members kept their options open, but insisted on the 
deconfessionalization of the political system as a minimum acceptable requirement 
and on the amendment of the electoral law to insure wider popular representation.4 
The Lebanese National Movement was not alone in its demands for change in the 
political system as a way for settling the conflict. Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss 
requested an increase in the powers of the Prime Minister, a devolution of the 
Administration, an amendment of the electoral law to ensure parity in the 
parliamentary representation between the two confessional blocks and a mild form of 
administrative decentralization.5
The Moslem Establishment's proposals were similar to those of the Lebanese 
National Movement, except in one major area; they accepted deconfessionalization 
but denounced secularization, as they regarded it a contradiction of a basic religious 
tenet related to personal status domain. Nevertheless, the Establishment was very 
critical of the political order and the 1943 formula of power-sharing. Its proposals 
revolved mainly around the amendments to the Constitution, the National Pact, and 
several other facets of the socio-economic system to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of power and resources between the two main confessional blocks. Its 
acceptance of confessionalism was limited. It proposed partial confessionalization of 
the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the army requesting that the upper ranks of these 
three bodies ought to be confessionalized together with the three highest government 
positions.
In this respect, the Moslem Establishment worked hand-in-hand with the 
Lebanese National Movement to change the system. Bearing in mind the 
Establishment's rejection of the principle of total secularization, the Lebanese National 
Movement ameliorated its stance on this issue in order to appease the Moslem 
Establishment. As for the other issues, the spiritual leaders of the three main Moslem 
sects (Sunni, Shi'a and Druzes) reiterated, on 21 September 1983, their views on 
decentralization and confessionalism which were in full agreement with those of the
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Lebanese National Movement6. They strongly rejected all forms of political 
decentralization (federalism, confederalism, cantonism), but welcomed administrative 
decentralization. They argued that political decentralization is a form of partition and 
would lead the country to fragmentation. They also demanded the abolition of 
confessionalism in all its forms from the state organs.
However, the sects had individually articulated these demands to suit their 
specific community’s requirements. The Sunni spiritual and temporal leaders thought 
that deconfessionalism rather than secularization was a good enough solution to the 
present ills of the political order, and that there was an urgent need to conduct a 
population census in the country and amend the citizenship law7. The Shi'a demand 
went beyond deconfessionalism to request a total overhauling of the national pact8, for 
it had become an instrument for consecrating privileges of some communities at the 
expense of others.9 Their proposals aimed at abolishing the confessional arrangement 
from all walks of public life, amending the electoral law, defining clearly the relations 
between the branches of government and particularly between the president and 
prime minister, changing the authority structure to give more powers to the prime 
minister, and extending the term of office of the Speaker of the Parliament to four 
years. They also proposed an amendment to the laws governing the army, the 
administration, education, information and the economy.
Both spiritual and temporal leaders of the Druze community suggested a four­
fold reform package10. The first was the creation of a senate to share with parliament 
the legislative powers. It was proposed that within the senate the six largest sects of 
Lebanon will have an equal number of seats but the presidency should be allocated to 
a Druze. The second was the redistribution of highest posts in the administration, the 
judiciary and the army in such a way that equilibrium between the spiritual families 
would be maintained. The third was the institution of administrative decentralization in 
the state structure. The fourth was the demand to conduct a new population census 
within a maximum period of three years and abolish the laws on dual citizenship 
rights.
Other prominent politicians in this camp who chose to maintain an independent 
posture made their contributions towards a resolution of the conflict. Former prime 
minister, Saeb Salam, proposed a reform package which featured high in the final text 
of the Taif Accord. Most importantly, he proposed that the prime minister be elected 
by the parliament rather than appointed by the president, subject to the parliament's 
approval. The raison d'etre was that the prime minister ought to be liberated from the 
president’s hegemony and act in matters of state as a co-equal to the president. He 
also suggested that the prime minister, rather than the president, be granted the
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power to form governments subject to the president's endorsement and the 
parliament's vote of confidence. He also suggested a separation between the 
ministerial appointments and parliamentary status. As for the reform of the Legislative 
Body, his proposals included a suggestion to increase the number of parliamentary 
seats and have them equally divided between the Moslems and Christians.
In reforming the Administration, Salam requested the abolishing of the 
confessional system and the decentralization and devolution of the system. His 
proposals for economic reform revolved around the creation of a Social and Economic 
Council with wide powers to create situations in which the elimination of communal, 
regional and economic discrepancies in Lebanese society could become feasible. He 
also called for an extensive program of revising the education system and the 
unification of the curriculum throughout the country.11
Salam’s proposals were supported by the then Prime Minister, Salim al-Hoss, 
in his capacity as one of the prominent outspoken proponents of the Reformist Camp. 
He called for a broad base decentralization of the Administration12 but recommended 
that the deconfessionalization process be carried out gradually.13
The political parties of the Lebanese Front as well as the Christian 
Establishment opposed any change to the existing power structure embodied in the 
National Pact of 1943. This was clearly indicated by the Memorandum of the 
Phalanges Party on political reform published in December 1975, that is eight months 
after the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon. It stated unequivocally that the 
Phalanges leadership espoused the above formula and could find no substitute to it. 
Nevertheless, it admitted that the power structure needed improvement in order to 
cope with the requirements of modern times.14
The Phalanges Party's pious adherence to the formula of the National Pact at 
this stage was a function of the Maronites’ fear about losing their majority status to 
become a negligible minority. The existing power-sharing arrangement gave them an 
edge over the rest of the component communities, but the underlying assumption 
upon which the Maronites built their stance differed from other partners. To them 
these advantages were granted as a reward for their disengagement from their 
Western and particularly French connection. This disengagement was perceived by 
members of the opposite camp as a temporary measure, good for a limited time, when 
Lebanon could achieve a certain degree of integration and survive as an independent 
entity. The decision to share power in that formula was implicitly temporal and subject 
to demographic changes. As such the Pact was seen as a temporal necessity
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dictated by the exigencies of the process of transformation from tutelage to 
independence.15
Conversely, the Phalanges Party as well as its sponsors, the Christian 
Maronite and Catholic Establishments, felt, at this stage of the conflict, that the 1943 
power-sharing arrangement and the distribution of power between the three estates, 
is a permanent security for their very existence.16 It perceived in this arrangement the 
needed guarantees for their secure status as a minority rather than as transitory 
reward for their disengagement from the French patronage and their acceptance of 
the closer relations with the Arab world. For the Party, this arrangement should not be 
a function of the rising expectations of other component communities or of the 
demographic and political changes in Lebanon.17
The notion of "guarantees" and privileges of the Maronite community was 
implicitly accepted by all parties in the first few years following independence but 
came under pressure later on. In no more than two decades the very idea of 
privileges and its basic premises became repugnant and was totally rejected by all 
members of the Reformist Camp. The Reformists' basic platform was oriented 
towards the abolishing of such an idea.18
As the pressure to amend he National Pact grew, the Phalanges party as well 
as the Christian Establishment lost their zeal in supporting the Pact. They started 
shifting their emphasis from a rejuvenated National Pact that would retain a more 
balanced political structure to a decentralized federative form which, in their view, 
could provide them with greater security. As a part of their agenda for the resolution 
of the conflict, they announced in 1984 a program of action which revolved around the 
concept of decentralization. This program stated in its preamble that the guarantees, 
which were granted to the Christians under the existing power-sharing structure, had 
lost much of their expediency, therefore, no Christian-Islamic coexistence was 
possible if the Christian presence was not consciously strengthened and reinforced. It 
was also maintained that Lebanon as a collectivity of spiritual families ought not to be 
governed by the rule of numbers and by the logic of numerical majority. There was a 
need for a genuine balance of powers, and that decentralization must be adopted in 
order to reconcile the security requirements of the Lebanese sects with the need for 
mutual trust.19
Based on the above insight, a working group from the Phalanges and the 
National Liberal parties drafted a program of action whose main feature was a strong 
tendency towards federalism as an option in case they could not hold on to the 
guarantees they enjoyed under the National Pact -20
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The proposed federative solution to Lebanon's communal problem was the 
lesser of the two evils. To some of the Maronite leaders, partition was a more 
favoured option. They argued that the population was already divided into distinctive 
sects with a marked degree of geographical self-enclosure. Partition in this case 
would solve the problem of security, for it would provide a retreat into more secure 
sanctuary for them. This idea did not get beyond the flare up of communal passion. 
Nor, on the other hand, was it abandoned completely. Rather, it was transformed into 
a federative design, but rejected totally by the Reformist Camp.
The Lebanese Front posed the question "what Lebanon do we want?" In reply 
to this question they outlined a comprehensive program for the resolution of conflict 
and for the rebuilding of the country. The major features of this program21 stressed 
that Lebanon was an independent and sovereign democratic pluralist state 
unavailable for merger with any country in the region, and that the conflict and the 
political developments leading to it made the basic principles of the 1943 National 
Pact obsolete. Therefore a new structure would have to replace the Pact. This 
structure would have to take into consideration the widespread sentiments within the 
Christian community for a decentralized, or even a federal form of government. In this 
type of structure sectarianism would have to be maintained and preserved against all 
eventualities, particularly, against demographic changes. The program also 
maintained further that Christianity in Lebanon would remain for the foreseeable future 
"free, secure, and sovereign master of its values and fate".
The Christian Establishment's vision of a resolution of the conflict ran almost 
parallel to that of the Phalanges party and the Lebanese Front. The Order of Monks 
issued, on 9 October of that year, a statement demanding permanent guarantees for 
the Maronites' minority status, "...because Islam is a religion and a state".22 The 
Moslem intellectuals profess that acquisition of authority remains an essential goal of 
Islam." In their view recognition and acknowledgment of Lebanon's permanent 
independence would constitute the required guarantee.
The Order of Monks demanded also total secularisation instead of 
deconfessionalisation.23 This request was in line with the main platform of the 
Maronite Establishment24 This stance was projected as a defence line in the face of 
the Moslems' attack on the National Pact. The Order strongly rejected any 
amendment to the Constitution or to the existing power-sharing arrangement and 
insisted on devout adherence to the Pact and its provisions. It went as far as to 
request the institutionalisation of these guarantees and the neutrality of Lebanon.
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These proposals were rejected by the opposite side. However, another 
attempt was made by the Order of Monks in conjunction with the Maronite League.25 
A compromise reform program was submitted. Its main theme revolved around the 
need to preserve the status quo with slight amendments to appease the other side but 
with apparent rejection of a diminishing status of the Christians, particularly the 
Maronites.26 The Reformist Camp dismissed this and refused to discuss its contents.
In October 1976, new proposals were put forward by the Order of Monks. 
They embodied four different formulae for resolving the conflict and rebuilding 
Lebanon.27
The first formula was to retain the National Pact as amended by the 
Constitutional Document of February 1976. This construct had the advantage of 
preserving the basic characteristics of Lebanese society, that is, pluralism and its 
corollary notion of "unity in diversity". It also incorporated some of the basic demands 
of the Reformist Camp.
The second formula was to transform the present pluralist state into a unitary 
one and introduce secularism into its political system. Implementation of the formula 
required certain basic prerequisites which were non-existent in Lebanese society, the 
most significant of which was the acquiescence of the Moslem community for turning a 
highly confessional society into a secular one without passing through a transitory 
stage. The Order of Monks reply to these reservations was to suggest a cantonization 
or a federation of the country whereby each community could adopt the system it 
found more appropriate to its needs and requirements.
The third formula suggested an elaborate cantonized state in which 
autonomous administrative entities with a homogeneous population and veto powers 
apportioned the authority structure between them and enjoy a high degree of 
domestic self rule. This was perceived as a pragmatic solution that would provide the 
required security of the component communities.
The fourth formula called for the strict implementation of a pluralist policy in 
every aspect of Lebanese society. Such a formula could solve the problem of 
hegemony and would allow both communal blocs to contribute to the political process.
None the less, instead of resolving the conflict, these proposals increased the 
tension between the two conflict groups. Federalism and cantonization became 
issues in themselves rather than solutions to the conflict. As a matter of fact they took 
precedence over the three main issues of conflict. This was due probably to the fact 
that a substantial number of Christian inhabitants moved, at that stage of the conflict,
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out of the non-Christian areas to their co-religionist regions, and conversely most of 
the Moslems in the Christian areas were forced out into the mainly Moslem inhabited 
areas. Thus federalism or cantonization, as a likely solution to the conflict, became an 
attractive option to the Christians for, they argued, it would provide them with the 
conjectured security.
Federalist propositions became issues of widespread public debate. They 
embodied views ranging from mild decentralisation of the administration and 
economy28 to a full fledged federative system.29 Among the frequently discussed 
proposals were those suggested by the National Liberal Party30 and The Order of 
Monks31, which recommended a two tier system: federal32 and confederal.33 These 
were subsequently superseded by new proposals, most notably Saiyydah al-Bir (Lady 
of the Well) caucus proposal34, the Lebanese Forces comprehensive program35« and 
a European proposal36. All these proposals revolved around the theme of a federal 
solution to the present conflict. They based their premises on the assumption that 
Lebanon was a pluralist sectarian society, that its present socio-religious structure was 
a permanent fact of life; that each sect was a self-conscious cultural, and distinct 
entity, and that the sectarian characteristics of the component groups precluded any 
process of integration. Only a federal system could provide Lebanon with its best 
chance to keep its "unity in diversity" and avoid partition.37
The Reformist Camp reacted strongly to these propositions. It considered 
them partition in disguise and found in them an irrelevant prescription for Lebanon's 
ills. Al-Hoss responded to the proposition by indicating that a federal solution to 
Lebanon's conflictual issues was not feasible for the simple reason that federalism 
was workable in situations where the society consisted of independent, 
heterogeneous, separate, and self-sustaining groups. Federalism would bind them 
together and might lead to their unification. He maintained that a federative solution 
to the Lebanese conflict could lead to the division of the country into geographic and 
sectarian entities incapable of surviving on their own, that federalism was the first step 
down the road towards partition38, and that existing socio-political structure of the 
Lebanese society could not sustain a federal system.39
In rejecting the above propositions, the Reformist Camp propounded an 
alternative course for the resolution of the conflict. This course rested mainly on the 
assumption that Lebanon was a unitary state and ought to remain so, and the 
sectarian structure was a fact of life and needed to be maintained, but within limits. 
Therefore any solution to the conflict should aim at preserving the unity of the country 
and the basic characteristics of its sectarian composition, and at reforming the political 
system in the direction of a more equitable and just power-sharing formula. To
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achieve this, al-Hoss, echoing the thinking of the Moslem Establishment, suggested a 
decentralised administrative system and a gradually deconfessionalised political 
order.40 The political reform issue revolved around these two main themes for most of 
the duration of the conflict. The second main issue was that of the national identity of 
the country and its sovereignty.
B The Issue of National Identity
The question of Identity is linked to the problem of loyalty, and both are 
inextricably associated with the basic causes of the Lebanese conflict. As noted 
earlier, most of the Christians, and the Maronites in particular, "...reject Lebanon’s 
pan-Arabism which they tend to see as a mask for pan-lslamism."41 The Maronites 
have perceived of themselves as a "nation"42 in possession of all elements of 
distinctive cultural, religious, and communal values.43 They were convinced that such 
characteristics could be preserved by an independent Lebanon. This belief may shed 
some light on their emphatic and tenacious attachment to Lebanon, for by conducting 
themselves accordingly they presumed that they avoid "...the fate of being submerged 
as a tiny minority in a predominantly Sunni Moslem state..."44
It follows that Lebanon would become meaningless to them if it would not 
reflect their ethos. Eventually, "they have tended to equate Lebanism with 
Maronitism, and both with a paramount Maronite political and economic status in the 
country."45 Their notion of an independent Lebanon and their acceptance of it 
reflected their fear that they may lose their majority status if Lebanon joined the Arab 
world, and eventually lose their community's distinctive characteristics in a 
predominantly confessional Islamic society.46 Tewfik Khalaf remarked that, while the 
Moslems of Lebanon currently have forsaken their Moslem and Arab loyalties in 
favour of an independent Lebanon, the Maronites' loyalty to Lebanon is predicated on 
their traditional identity, aspirations and structure as a community. "Maronites’ 
Lebanonism of 1975 was the Lebanonism of 1920, i.e. Maronitism."47
Beneath this ideological assertion lies the claim that the Maronites are the 
descendants of the Phoenicians48 and that they are culturally akin to the other 
Christian Mediterranean countries.49 Hence, in their opposition to pan-Arabism, they 
argued vociferously that Lebanon is a sovereign state with a distinct identity. 
Conversely the Moslems of Lebanon perceived of themselves as part and parcel of 
the Arab nation, and maintained that Lebanon is culturally, religiously and historically, 
part of the Arab world,50 Radical Arab nationalists contend that such a conviction is a 
good enough justification for the "... erasure of [the] existing national boundaries and 
the creation of a pan-Arab state."51 For them Lebanonism is equated with Arabism.
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In between these two ideologies there was a cluster of some particularistic 
national trends which lie outside the above spectrum. The Kurds, the Assyrians, and 
the Armenians have their own national personalities, loyalties and aspirations, but 
because of their numerical inferiority they were overshadowed by the other two main 
trends. Moreover each of the two main identity orientations included nuances and 
tendencies which, over the years, were instrumental in narrowing the gap between the 
two main identity poles. The Greek Orthodox sect, for example, had no difficulty in 
associating itself with Lebanon's Arab Identity.52 The Shi'a sect had not shown much 
enthusiasm for pan-Arabism. The Druzes tended to be pragmatic in their ideological 
involvement, with a belated tilt to pan-Arabism.
The Lebanese Moslem communities of today, although not willing to forsake 
their religious and cultural bond with the world of Islam, are not inclined, either, to 
advocate Lebanon's merger with the Arab world. They espouse an independent and 
sovereign Lebanon built on the principles of justice and equality, as a final home for all 
of its citizens.53
The significance of the issue of identity was construed differently by each side. 
The sects refused to surrender their cultural and total political identities to the new 
norm created by the Pact. They found in the 1926 constitution, in which sectarian 
loyalties were recognised, a reinforcing mechanism for their contentions.54 The 
National Pact was supposed to thrust both camps and the trends between them into 
an integrative nation-building process, but both communal blocks remained in a state 
of ambivalence with regard to the question of identity. The Moslems could not rid 
themselves of greater Moslem sympathies for the Arab causes, such as the 
Palestinian issue, and the Arab-lsraeli conflict. The Christians, particularly the 
Maronites, could not venture out of their "ideology of the mountain" to lure back their 
Moslem partners from the sphere of pan-Arabism into the sphere of a Lebanese 
nationalism.
The Arab-lsraeli conflict generated enormous pressure on the Lebanese 
system. Pressure emerged from the radicalization of the Arab masses as a result of 
the outbreak of a number of successive coups d'etat in the neighbouring Arab 
countries, starting in the early 1950s, and from the rise of Nassirism throughout the 
whole Arab world. This polarized the political scene in the country and brought to the 
surface the Christian-Moslem cleavage over the identity of Lebanon. Thus, once 
again, Lebanon's national identity became a divisive issue in Lebanon's inter- 
communal relations and a prism through which the two communal blocks viewed the 
Palestinian cause and Lebanon's relations with the Arab and Western worlds.
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The Constitutional Document of 14 February 197655 addressed this problem. 
So did the Geneva National Dialogue Conference of October 1983, and the Tripartite 
Agreement of December 1985, and the Taif Accord of October 1989. In each and 
every one of these documents it was affirmed that Lebanon is an Arab state by 
identity and affiliation. This assertion featured high in every policy statement made by 
the government to the parliament.
The Maronite intelligentsia took issue with this concept when it first appeared 
in the Constitutional document.56 Their rejection of Lebanon's Arab identity did cast 
some doubts over the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory solution to the other 
issues of conflict, namely, political reform and the sovereignty of the country.
In the Geneva and Taif Conferences this issue was brought up again. The 
Geneva conference57 managed to draft the concept in an acceptable formulation in 
which all the parties acknowledged that "Lebanon is...[an] Arab country by identity and 
affiliation and a founding and active member of the Arab League fully committed to the 
League's Charter."58
At the Taif meeting, the Lebanese parliamentarians endorsed the concept and 
enshrined it in the final document which was later adopted by the parliament as the 
national constitution of the "second" Republic of Lebanon.59
C The Issue of The Sovereignty of Lebanon
The breakdown of the overall political and social system into a plethora of 
factions, militias, and political movements created an environment of spiral and 
endemic fragmentation of the underlying value system. As the conflict surged, the 
proliferating conflict groups found themselves polarized into two hostile camps. Their 
polarization around one issue catapulted them, in a domino-like manner, into 
disagreement on almost every other issue. The discord over political reform and the 
national identity of Lebanon descended to a similar dispute over the issue of the 
sovereignty of Lebanon and the presence of foreign forces on its territories. It must 
be admitted that both camps held identical views as to the inviolability of Lebanon's 
sovereignty, integrity and independence, but they differed in their perception of what 
constituted a breach of sovereignty of the country.
For the Status quo Coalition, the Establishment in particular, Lebanon was an 
eternal entity,60 a homeland for the Christians,61 a meeting place of civilizations and 
religions,62 and a crucible for confessional coexistence but with a strong Christian 
presence.63
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The Reformist Camp, particularly the Sunni Moslem component of it, perceived 
the post-1920 independent Lebanon as a politico-religious extension of the Moslem 
Arab world. It asserted that its links with the world of Arabdom ought to be judged as 
benign and innocuous.
Both Camps held different appraisals of each other's view on the question of 
sovereignty. These views were governed, to a great extent, by a stereotyped 
perception of a pre-independent Lebanon. In post-independent Lebanon the concept 
of sovereignty gained international legality which was instrumental in convincing both 
Camps, in particular the irredentists in the Moslem Camp, of the authenticity of the 
new entity. Nevertheless, the threshold of sovereignty was interpreted differently by 
each Camp. To the Status Quo Coalition "...the concept of sovereignty derives not 
from international status but from the degree of internal control exercised (by the 
government). Thus sovereignty originally described states where control over their 
territory was paramount."64 It follows that, from the point of view of the Status Quo 
Coalition, Lebanon lost its sovereignty from the 1960s, to such armed groups as the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, the Lebanese Forces, the Amal Movement, the 
Progressive Socialist Party militia, the Marada militia, the South Lebanese Army, as 
well as to Syria, Libya, Iran and Israel.
The Status Quo Coalition formulated its policies with regard to this question on 
the assumption that any one of the above groups, particularly the Palestinian armed 
presence in Lebanon, was a breach and a threat to the sovereignty of the country. 
The Palestinians turned themselves into a state within the state and precluded the 
national government from exercising its authority over all of its territories. Moreover, 
the Palestinians' raids into Israel from southern Lebanon invited Israel's 
disproportionate retaliation and its frequent incursions into the country in pursuit of the 
raiders.
Furthermore, the Coalition held the view that for Lebanon to regain its 
sovereignty the Palestinians should be disarmed and relegated to their refugee status, 
and brought under the control of the Lebanese authorities or dispersed in the Arab 
countries.65
The Coalition also believed that the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis, 
and particularly the Syrian Army's entry in 1976 into Lebanon, was a flagrant breach 
of its sovereignty.66 It persistently kept pressing world public opinion for the Syrian 
troops' withdrawal67, arguing that this intervention served Syria’s long-term interests 
rather than Lebanon's. It contended that the conflict failed to dissipate after the 
Syrian intervention, and the role of the Syrian Army in Lebanon changed from peace­
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keeping to occupation. Furthermore, the Coalition insisted that the help received by 
the rival militias from across the border was also a violation of the sovereignty of the 
country.
Conversely, the Reformist Camp, particularly the Lebanese National 
Movement, defended, in the early stages of the conflict, the Palestinian presence in 
Lebanon claiming that such a presence enjoyed Arab legality and "it is fighting not 
only for the liberation of its homeland....but also in defence of Lebanon."68 It also 
maintained that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was legal as it was invited by the 
then legal authority in the country69 and subsequently endorsed by the League of 
Arab States.70 Furthermore, it maintained that Syria's role was always that of a 
balancer, and that the arms supply to their militias and the financial assistance 
received from external sources were justified on the grounds that the forces of the 
opposite camp were receiving superior help, in arms .money and training from Israel 
and some western sources.
The polarization of the conflict issues polarized their resolution. Efforts to 
resolve the conflict continued throughout the war years, but were kept revolving in a 
vicious circle. The basic point became an issue in itself. The basic question was 
where to start, and which issue to tackle first: political reform, Identity or the 
sovereignty of the country? Both camps made some principled concessions to each 
other. The Coalition accepted in principle the indispensability of introducing political 
reform to the political system, and the Reformist Camp acknowledged the need for the 
withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. But the burning question was which 
comes first? The Coalition insisted on the withdrawal of Syrian troops before it 
committed itself to a constructive dialogue over the issue of political reform. It argued 
that the presence of these troops in Lebanon presaged an unbalanced outcome.
The Coalition maintained also that there could not be a meaningful dialogue 
between the parties as long as the fighting raged throughout the country. Its attitude 
was one of "let us stop fighting first and then we are willing to discuss reforms."71 The 
Reformist Camp charged that peace and security could be achieved through an 
agreement on political reform which must come first.
The same "chicken or egg" approach was applied to the issue of sovereignty. 
The Coalition's attitude was represented by the slogan "let us get all foreigners out 
and then the Lebanese can agree on domestic issues in no time."72 The Reformist 
Camp disputed this and reiterated its demand for a settlement of the issue of political 
reform first, and maintained that this would eventually lead to the liberation of the 
country.73
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This impasse was the subject of numerous attempts at outside mediation 
resolution. Prior to 1989, the Lebanese successive Heads of State and several 
Western and Arab mediators tried to resolve the conflict but their efforts went in vain. 
They even failed to restore the relationship between the conflict groups to a minimum 
level of legitimacy, that is a cessation of the use of force and consent to a trade-off. 
All mediatory efforts were aborted by the intransigence of the conflict parties. The 
process of conflict resolution could not be started because the conflict parties would 
not take the decision that they wanted their conflict resolved. Nevertheless these 
efforts and some objective elements of the relevant proposals created the necessary 
conditions for the conflict parties to enable them to enter the conflict resolution 
process at Taif. Let us turn now to the first four proposals and analyse their effect on 
the final process of conflict resolution.
II Conflict Resolution Programs
Mediation efforts never ceased. Proposals for the termination of the conflict 
were abundant but the outcome was negative. The Status Quo Coalition pressed for 
the internationalization of the conflict hoping that this would bring in a sympathetic 
backing of its demands from the West. The Reformist Camp strived to keep mediation 
efforts within the ambit of the League of Arab States for similar reasons. Amid this 
struggle, it fell to the Lebanese parties themselves to find a viable mechanism for the 
desired settlement. Several individual and collective initiatives were contemplated. 
The most significant were: 1) the proposals of President Suleiman Frangie on 
constitutional reform (the Constitutional Document of February 1976); 2) President 
Sarkis's 14 Points National Entente Program of 5 March 1980; 3) The National 
Dialogue Conference of Geneva and Lausanne of October 1983 and April 1984; 4) 
the Tripartite Agreement of December 1985; and, 5) The Taif Accord of October 1989.
The first four devices did not produce any substantial results for a resolution of 
the conflict, but the Taif Accord succeeded in establishing a workable and effective 
conflict resolution mechanism.
The reason for the failure of the first four attempts to terminate the hostilities 
and shift the conflict groups away from a strategy of incorrigible animosity towards an 
environment of conciliation and enhancement of mutual understanding was due to the 
inherent characteristics of these devices, as well as to the conflict environment of the 
warring factions.
The Constitutional Document, initiated by the then President Suleiman 
Frangie, with the help and endorsement of the Syrian side, contained some elements
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of a compromise settlement and aimed at a limited political reform package. Its 
seventeen points program accommodated some of the basic demands of the 
Reformist Camp, such as amending the sectarian representation ratio in parliamentary 
seats to give both confessional blocs equal numbers, the abolishing of 
confessionalism as a means for selecting candidates to the lower ranks of 
bureaucracy, army, and the judiciary, and a mild decentralisation of the Administration 
and lastly an acknowledgment of Lebanon’s Arab identity. The confessional 
characteristics of the three highest political positions, the presidency, the speakership 
and the prime ministership was, much to the consternation of the Lebanese National 
Movement, confirmed and formalised.74
The Document was received by the various warring factions with marked 
interest but little support. Although it offered the Reformist Camp some concessions, 
it retained many of the provisions of the vilified National Pact. The Lebanese National 
Movement saw in the Document nothing "...more than a travesty of their hopes."75 The 
Status Quo intelligentsia rejected it in toto, claiming that beneath its Lebanese facade 
were Syrian markings.76
The initial rejection of the Document, as well as the dramatic developments on 
the ground which lead to the break up of the Lebanese army, eclipsed the Document 
and dashed every hope of reconciliation. On 11 March 1976, the Commander of the 
Army’s Beirut garrison attempted a coup d'etat, demanded the resignation of the 
President and appointed himself the military governor of Lebanon. A new role was 
thrown at an already demoralised army. The coup failed but the army's atrophy 
continued. The sudden and long-dreaded disintegration of the army accelerated.77 
This obliged President Frangie to abandon his initiative, and to concentrate on the 
evolving situation.
Hopes and efforts to resolve the conflict were augmented by the election of a 
new president of the Republic to replace President Frangie whose term of office 
expired in September 1976. Yet no systematic conflict resolution device emerged 
until March 1980. Four years after he assumed office as successor to president 
Frangie, President Elias Sarkis announced his National Entente Program for the 
resolution of the conflict. During those four years the conflict evolved new forms and 
took a different direction due to the active involvement of the Palestinians and the 
Syrians in the crisis. Two issues came to the forefront of the conflict: Lebanon’s 
sovereignty, and the settlement of the Palestinian refugees in the host countries, 
including Lebanon. The Status Quo Coalition raised the alarm and brought these 
issues forward. Sarkis's 14-points program addressed these two issues as well as the 
issues of identity and political reform.
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To dissipate the fears of the Status Quo Coalition, the National Entente 
Program affirmed the sovereignty and unity of Lebanon, and strongly rejected the 
much debated intimations of the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon. The Program addressed also some of the basic demands of the Reformist 
Camp. It reaffirmed Lebanon's Arab identity and acknowledged the distinctiveness in 
the relations between Lebanon and Syria.78
The Sarkis 14-points Program was accepted, in principle, by both parties, but 
with some reservations by the Maronites79 Yet this Program could not bring the 
parties to the negotiation table nor could it terminate the fighting. It was abandoned 
sooner than expected.
With the help of some member countries of the League of Arab States, a 
National Dialogue Conference was organised to find a solution to the conflict. It 
included the main protagonists of both camps, and was held in two stages, the first 
stage was in Geneva in October, 1983, and the second, in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 
April 1984. In attendance were the then foreign Minister of Syria, Abdul Halim 
Khaddam, and the Saudi Arabian Minister of State, Ibrahim al-Mass'oud. Their 
apparent role was to reconcile the different views of the parties. Their role fell short of 
that of an official mediator. The conference was chaired by the then President of the 
Republic, Amine Gemayel, who succeeded President Sarkis in September, 1982, 
upon the expiry of the tatter's term of office.
In his opening address, President Gemayel underlined the basic issues which 
were then pertinent to that stage of conflict: "Rescue of Lebanon, unify its people, 
recover its sovereignty, strengthen the bonds of brotherhood between the Lebanese 
and with their Arab brothers."00
In Lausanne, the same themes were reiterated. However, both attempts were 
no more than a platform for releasing tension. Each one of the participating leaders 
aired the grievances of his faction and returned, at the conclusion of the conference, 
to his enclave. Nevertheless, the Geneva phase of the Conference was a step 
forward towards reconciliation and communal confidence-building. The two most 
important resolutions taken along this line were the confirmation of Lebanon's Arab 
identity, and the annulment of the 17 May security draft Agreement with Israel.81
The Lausanne phase of the conference continued the trend of confidence 
building between the warring factions. It resolved to establish a committee to draw up 
a new constitution82. These resolutions, which were supposed to demonstrate their
194
effectiveness as conflict resolution mechanisms, could not even influence the course 
of the conflict, or its escalation.83
Two years later, another attempt to resolve the conflict was made by the 
conflict group leaders themselves. In December 1985 the leaders of the three 
strongest militias, Elias Hobeika, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the 
Lebanese Forces, Nabih Berri, President of Amal Movement, and Walid Jumblatt, the 
Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party's militia, negotiated an 
agreement to settle the conflict. It was signed in Damascus under the auspices of the 
Syrians.84 The Tripartite Agreement aimed at the abolition of the confessional system, 
altering the power-sharing structure in the direction of a more equitable distribution of 
government awards between the two main communal blocs. It also provided for the 
increase of parliamentary representation, the establishment of a Senate and a 
constitutional court, decentralization of the administration and lastly, upholding and 
confirming Lebanon's Arab identity.
The Agreement contained also a section on Lebanon's relations with Syria 
which it described as distinctive and complementary. It also envisaged a program of 
action to translate these two features in the relations into government policies. The 
agreement was opposed vehemently by important sections of the Maronite 
community, like the elite of the Lebanese Forces, The Order of Monks, the Maronite 
President of the Republic and a few other Maronite political leaders, like Camille 
Chamoun, and Raymond Eddie. It was received relatively well by the Shi'a, and half­
heartedly by the Druze leadership85. However, the Agreement fell apart soon after it 
was signed.
Failure of this Agreement was due to two factors. First, the leader of the 
Lebanese Forces militia lost his capacity to commit his community to a new political 
order which relegated its status and authority to that of an ordinary component 
community. Second, the architects of the Agreement sought to secure the 
endorsement of the President of the republic without allowing him involvement in its 
formulation. This move was rejected by the President for its lack of procedural 
conformity.
However, the President and the state lost much of their means of coercion- 
control, during the conflict, over the force which commands respect for legitimacy. 
The crucial implication of this was that the political institutions were in no position to 
establish limits to the conflict nor provide for its resolution.
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As a result of the collapse of this Agreement, disruption and violence 
intensified. The people's increased frustration and their loss of direction became a 
basic source of demand for the termination and the resolution of the conflict. The 
State was unable to provide authoritatively stabilizing limits for the settlement 
processes to occur, for most of the implicit as well as explicit societal mechanisms for 
conflict management were debilitated or incapacitated. Nevertheless, the extensive 
experience gained from the unsuccessful previous attempts, and the upsurge in the 
intensity of the conflict, prompted third party mediators and conciliators to act. The 
League of Arab States managed, after a laborious, extensive, and time-consuming 
endeavour, to devise a strategy for the termination of the fighting. By then the conflict 
had escalated and became independent of its initiating causes. Expansion of the 
conflict incorporated new dimensions. The Presidency was rendered vacant by the 
expiration of the term of office of the President and the inability of the Parliament to 
choose a successor. Minutes before the expiry time on 22 September 1988, the 
President, invoking his prerogatives, appointed a bi-sectarian six-member interim 
military government composed of three Christian and three Moslem generals, (a 
Maronite, an Orthodox, and a Catholic, a Sunni, a Shi'a and a Druze) headed by 
General Michel Aoun, the Maronite Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to rule until a 
new president was elected. Gemayel's appointment of a Maronite to the post of prime 
minister, a post reserved by the National Pact and convention to the Sunni 
community, outraged the politicians of the Reformist Camp. The three Moslem 
ministers declined to serve in this cabinet. Aoun was left with two Christian members 
who assumed the vacated portfolios.
By his appointment of an interim military government, President Gemayel 
ignored the existence of an already established civilian government, headed by Dr. 
Salim al-Hoss. On 23 September 1988, Lebanon found itself with two governments 
but with no president. Soon it plunged into a constitutional crisis. Each government 
claimed legitimacy to itself and denied it to the other. The conflict took a new turn and 
a new face, though the conflict groups remained the same. The Status Quo Coalition 
supported Aoun, and the Reformist Camp supported the government of al-Hoss. The 
relationship between the Coalition and Aoun soon became problematic. The focus of 
the conflict shifted from the original issues in dispute to a conflict over power and 
authority. Fears sprouted that the existence of a dual authority could lead to formal 
partitioning of the country into Christian and Moslem cantons.
This crisis triggered a chain of events which hurled the country into more 
intense conflict episodes. This development was compounded by the failure of the 
parliament to elect a successor to its Speaker, or renew his mandate, upon the expiry
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of his term in October 1988. In the following month, the Minister of Defence in the al- 
Hoss government, dismissed General Aoun as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
appointed in his place a Moslem Sunni General, which was a retaliatory violation of 
the convention.
Ill The Conflict Environment Before the Taif Accord
Such was the conflict environment prior to the commencement of the Taif 
mediation efforts. The tension increased with every new step taken by the rival 
governments. The conflict became so pervasive that it engulfed not only the militias of 
both sides, but also their wider audience. The Lebanese Forces seized President 
Gemayel's party bases in his home town and region. The Amal militia clashed with 
their co-religionist Hezbollah in the southern suburb of Beirut. The rival groups were 
vying for the control of their respective communities.
In his drive to consolidate his authority over the Christian enclave and the rest 
of Lebanon, General Aoun turned on the Lebanese Forces, which shared with him the 
same territory. In an attempt to subdue them and bring them under his control, he 
fought them in street battles with some initial success but no decisive victory. The 
outcome of the battles helped in restoring, to a certain degree, the fast eroding 
authority of the army but fell short of achieving his original aim.
Aoun's second move was to expand his version of legality outside the Christian 
enclave, declaring that he intended to liberate the country from Syrian occupation. He 
imposed a naval blockade on the illegal ports in west and south Beirut. This act was 
countered by the al-Hoss government, which took similar measures against the ports 
of the Christian enclave. Fighting between the rival forces positioned on either side 
of the green line, dividing west from east Beirut, soon erupted. Aoun was helped by 
the Lebanese Forces, in spite of the animosity between them. The Reformist Camp 
militias were helped by the Syrian troops stationed in west Beirut. The gruesome 
clashes went on for six months with daily exchanges of artillery fire. Several cease­
fires were arranged by third party mediators, but the hostilities persisted.
Aoun's main strategy at this stage was to expel the Syrian troops from 
Lebanon. On 13 March 1989, he declared a "war of liberation" on the Syrians, but 
many "...doubted whether [he] had ever realistically expected to expel the Syrian 
troops from Lebanon. Rather he was believed to seek the internationalization of the 
Lebanese conflict to force their withdrawal."86
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The escalation in the conflict placed more pressure on the mediators to renew 
their attempts at terminating the war and resolving the conflict. In addition to the 
mediation of the League of Arab States, France, the Vatican, and the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations offered their offices to end the fighting.87 None the less 
the League's efforts met with some initial success. It was able to break the deadlock 
and achieve some positive results. A six member ministerial committee consisting of 
the foreign ministers of Algeria, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates, 
chaired by the foreign minister of Kuwait, was formed to hold exploratory discussions 
with leaders of the conflict groups and report back to the League on its findings. The 
Committee spent three months listening to the two prime ministers of the rival 
governments, leaders of the warring factions and heads of religious denominations. It 
held its meetings at the headquarters of the Arab League in Tunisia, in Kuwait and in 
Beirut.
As soon as the report of the Committee was submitted, King Hasan II of 
Morocco invited the Heads of Arab States to a summit conference in Casablanca, to 
discuss its contents and devise a conflict resolution strategy. The summit held its 
meeting in May 1989. A tripartite committee consisting of King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz of 
Saudi Arabia, King Hasan II of Morocco, and President Chazli Benjedid of Algeria, 
was appointed to mediate in the conflict. The committee members in turn mandated 
their foreign ministers to carry on the required mission.
The Tripartite Committee set itself the task of mediation and conciliation to 
achieve an immediate cease-fire followed by a meeting of all warring factions under 
the auspices of the Arab League, to deliberate over peace proposals. It appointed the 
League's Assistant Secretary-General, Lakhdar al-lbrahimi, as its emissary and 
mediator. Al-lbrahimi kept shuttling between the adversaries until he was able to 
obtain and enforce a cease-fire. This cease-fire, like the many that preceded and 
followed it, did not endure for long. In the meantime, the Foreign Ministers of the 
Tripartite Committee drew a "plan of action" for resolving the conflict. It was largely 
based on the findings of the six member ministerial committee. To give their plan 
credibility and support, they sought the comments and approval on its draft from 
several sources: The United States, the then Soviet Union, Syria, the rest of the Arab 
States, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, some Western European leaders, the 
permanent members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.88
Following these extensive consultations, the Committee drafted a peace plan 
for Lebanon, which called for: a) an immediate cease-fire; b) the formation of a 
Lebanese security committee, headed by Lakhdar al-lbrahimi, to supervise the cease­
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fire; c) the lifting of the Syrian-backed land and sea blockade of east Beirut; d) the 
reopening of Beirut International Airport; e) an embargo on arms shipment to the 
warring factions; and f) the summoning of the Lebanese parliament to meet outside 
Lebanon to discuss the "Document of National Reconciliation" drawn up by the 
Tripartite Committee in compliance with the Casablanca directives.
IV The Taif Accord
The draft "Document of National Reconciliation" addressed the basic issues in 
the dispute and prescribed the appropriate solution to them. On political reform, the 
Document provided for the balancing of communal interest and a redistribution of 
power and authority in Lebanon between the two main confessional blocs. For this 
purpose, it endorsed the transfer of some of the executive powers from the President 
to the cabinet, while the ministerial portfolios were equally divided between the two 
communal blocs. The term of office of the Shi’a Speaker of the House of 
Representatives was increased from two to four years. The parliamentary seats were 
increased from 99 to 108 and, in a subsequent amendment to 128 and were to be 
shared equally by the two confessional groups. Earlier distribution was in the ratio of 
six Christians to five Moslems. The Sunni Prime Minister's powers were expanded as 
well. For instance he acquired the right to call the cabinet to its meetings; the 
president would attend and chair these meetings, but would not have the right of vote.
The Document also called for the phasing out, in principle, of the confessional 
system, and the abolition of the requirements of sectarian qualifications for 
appointments in the lower ranks of government positions, the army, judiciary and 
public enterprises, but retained it for the higher ranks.
Other aspects of political reforms were also included, such as broadening the 
powers of the governors of the seven regions of Lebanon, and an increase in the local 
participation of the people in the administration of their regions and localities. The 
Document envisioned also the creation of a Senate with limited powers, and a 
constitutional council for the explication of the Constitution and for watching over the 
constitutionality of the laws. On the national identity of Lebanon, the Document stated 
clearly that Lebanon was an Arab country by identity and affiliation, and that the state 
embodied this principle in every aspect without exception.
The question of sovereignty of the country was dealt with within the context of 
the Israeli occupation of parts of southern Lebanon and the usurpation of the powers 
and authority of the State by the militias. The Document requested the
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implementation of the Security Council Resolution number 425 of March 1978, and 
other resolutions related to the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
A further provision in the Document was the implementation of a security plan 
in Lebanon in which all militias were to be disbanded within six months following the 
election of a new president, and the formation of a new government and the 
endorsement of the political reforms by the parliament. The Syrian troops in Lebanon 
would continue assisting the government in keeping law and order for up to two years 
from the day of endorsement of the reforms by the constitutional bodies. At the end of 
this period, the Governments of Lebanon and Syria would decide to redeploy the 
Syrian troops to the Beq'a valley in eastern Lebanon and the adjacent areas if 
necessary. Both governments would also negotiate the size of forces and period of 
their stay in the above areas as well as their relations with the Lebanese authority.
The relations between Lebanon and Syria were portrayed in the Document as 
"distinctive”, acquiring their strength from kinship, history and common strategic 
interests. These relations should be nurtured in cooperation and coordination 
between the two countries within the context of mutual respect for the sovereignty, 
unity and security of each country.89
V The Conflict Resolution Process
At the invitation of the Tripartite Arab Committee the Lebanese 
parliamentarians met on 30 September 1989 in the Saudi Arabian resort town of al- 
Taif to deliberate over the draft Document of National Reconciliation. The meeting 
was attended by sixty-two deputies (thirty-one Christians and thirty-one Moslems) out 
of seventy-two remaining able-bodied members of a ninety-nine-seat parliament 
whose mandate resided in the 1972 elections. The meetings were chaired by Prince 
Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister. At the opening session, prince Saud read 
a message from King Fahd to the conferees, urging them to discuss the provisions of 
the Document in a spirit of cooperation and amicable understanding.90 It took the 
parliamentarians three weeks of intensive, heated, and often broken negotiations to 
agree on the draft Document. Finally, on 22 October 1989, they agreed on the 
Document with some minor amendments. The issue of Lebanon's sovereignty 
consumed most of the conference’s time and efforts as well as the skill of the 
mediators before a compromise formula was accepted. Fifty-eight out of sixty-two 
parliamentarians voted in favour of the new "national charter that would divide political 
power equally between Moslems and the long-dominant Christians and take other 
steps to eliminate many of the causes of fifteen years of civil war.’’91
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Before their departure to al-Taif, the Christian deputies, in particular those 
associated with the Status Quo Coalition, had promised General Aoun to apply 
themselves to the task of trading-off concessions on political reform for the Syrian 
troops' withdrawal from Lebanon, or at least secure a confirmed timetable for their 
withdrawal.92 This was not achieved as intended and "...the agreement was, to a great 
extent, facilitated by the cooperation of Lebanon’s Maronite leaders, most notably 
Georges Sa'ade, the leader of the Phalanges party".93 The conclusion of the 
agreement changed the environment among the negotiating parties, their supporters 
and the majority of the Lebanese population drastically. Tension subsided, hostilities 
ceased and cooperation replaced confrontation between the majority of the conflict 
groups. The participants in the resolution process started looking forward to 
implement the provisions of the Accord in a spirit of cooperation and understanding.
VI The Conflict Environment After the Taif Accord
Following the agreement on the Document, the Tripartite Committee called on 
the Lebanese Parliament to meet as early as November to ratify it and elect a new 
president of the Republic. The Parliament met on 5 November 1989 in the Northern 
town of Qlai'at, instead of Beirut, to avoid intimidation by General Aoun, who a few 
days earlier, dissolved the parliament as a punishment to the deputies for their 
approval of the Taif Accord, and as a means to subvert the election process. The 
legislators elected their colleague Rene Mouawad as President of the Republic, 
endorsed the Taif Accord and re-elected Mr Husein al-Huseini as Speaker of the 
House of Representatives for a period of four years. On 13 November, President 
Mouawad invited Dr. Salim al-Hoss to form a government of national reconciliation as 
stipulated in the Taif Accord.
President Mouawad was assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb on 
22 November. Two days later the Parliament met again, outside the capital, and 
elected deputy Elias al-Hrawi as his successor. Al-Hoss formed a new government of 
national reconciliation that included representatives of the two main confessional 
blocs.
General Aoun condemned and rejected vehemently the Taif accord for failing 
to include a provision on a scheduled withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. He 
declared: "This solution is a trap to all Lebanese regardless of their sects because it 
is nothing more than submission to Syria's will under cover of solving the Lebanese 
crisis."94 His objections were not limited to the Syrian presence in the country only, 
but included the issue of political reforms as well. He glibly declared: "this plan will 
lead us to hell."95
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The Christian deputies who approved the agreement rationalised that "...to 
reject the Accord would have meant the return to a state of war and we cannot take 
on ourselves that kind of responsibility."96 Dr. Salim al-Hoss, Prime Minister of the 
existing civilian government, observed that, "...there is no substitute for this agreement 
except suicide."97
General Aoun escalated his opposition to the Accord. He mounted a 
campaign of terror against the Christian deputies who lived in areas under his 
jurisdiction. They had chosen not to return to their homes for fear of persecution. 
Even the Maronite Patriarch was not spared. He was subjected to scathing 
harassment from Aoun's followers because he declined to declare his opposition to 
the Accord. Aoun demanded the same thing from Samir Geagea, Leader of the 
Lebanese Forces, who in turn refused to comply with the request because he had 
already given his tacit approval to the Accord. The environment in the Christian 
enclave became intolerably tense. Shortly after that, armed clashes broke out 
between the well equipped forces of Geagea and Aoun, and developed into a full 
fudged armed confrontation that left more than eight hundred persons killed and two 
thousand five hundred wounded98, and caused extensive damage to the infrastructure 
in the Christian enclave.
Aoun's intransigence and the pressure he exerted on the Christian partners in 
the Accord to abandon it, stalled the peace process. The Parliament could not muster 
a quorum to approve the amendments as stipulated by the Accord. In July, the 
government called on General Aoun to reconsider his position, relinquish his hold on 
the army, either to join the cabinet or to go into the opposition from within the system. 
He refused the offer as well as all other mediation attempts, especially those by the 
French and Vatican sources, to resolve the impasse. The Parliament finally managed 
to meet in August 1990, and passed the amendments to the Constitution in 
accordance with the Taif Accord. With the passing of these amendments, President 
al-Hrawi declared the birth of Lebanon's second republic.
Aoun remained adamantly opposed to all efforts of mediation and 
reconciliation, although he was, by now, completely isolated internally and 
internationally, with the exception of his open channels to Iraq.99 Finally, on 
13 October 1990, the Lebanese Army, now under its new Commander-in-Chief, 
General Emile Lahoud, with the help of the Syrian troops and air force, bombed Aoun 
out of his headquarters in the presidential palace at Ba'abda. He escaped to the 
nearby French Embassy where he sought, and was granted, political asylum. He 
called on his faction of the army to surrender and obey the orders of General Lahoud. 
His faction of the army immediately declared loyalty to the new Commander and was
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reunited with the main army corps. The capital city of Beirut and all government 
institutions on either side of the Green line were subsequently reunited.
VII The Taif Accord and the Issues of Conflict
The Taif Accord appears to have succeeded as an instrument for resolving the 
conflict. This brings up the obvious question of why did it succeed? Furthermore, it is 
appropriate to go beyond this question and ask what are the criteria by which success 
can be measured. Has it served ends other than individual communal interests, or 
the ends of peace, justice, equality and stability?
For the Accord to be judged as a success, it is not enough to establish that it 
brought the most violent aspects of inter and intra communal war to an end. There 
are more profound criteria to take into consideration. One needs to answer four 
questions. With the signing of this Accord, has the probability of war between the 
conflict groups been increased, diminished or eliminated? What has been the effect 
of the Accord on the authority status of the conflict groups? Have the underlying 
causes of the conflict been eliminated or at least rendered dormant over the short and 
long term? Finally, has the Accord contributed to the techniques and theory of conflict 
resolution?
An assessment of the success or failure of the Taif Accord vis-a-vis these four 
criteria is based on inferences and deductions obtained from its resolution of the three 
main issues of conflict, that is, political reform, national identity and sovereignty of the 
country as indicated in Table 6-1.
Table 6-1 : Conflict Issues and Their Degree of Contribution to the Criteria of 
Success of The Taif Accord as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism
Political Reform National Identity
Sovereignty of 
Lebanon
Probability of War Substantial Negligible Moderate
Authority Status of 
Communities
Substantial Negligible Negligible
Underlying Causes of 
Conflict
Substantial Moderate Substantial
In examining these three issues in the light of four criteria the following 
conclusions can be drawn.
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A Political Reform and the Probability of War
The Accord brought together a set of political reforms which appeased and 
propitiated the Reformist Camp. The new power-sharing arrangement which gives the 
Moslems equal share in the country's political and social structure seemed to be 
acceptable to the major parties in both camps, but not without remonstrances. The 
new arrangement reflected to a certain extent the new demographic realities of 
Lebanon, which had stirred the Maronites' anxiety. Any demographic changes in the 
country are no support to their inveterate status as a dominant community. The 
power-sharing formula of the National Pact was accepted by them on the tacit 
understanding that the domestic demographic elements were not built into it.
By the same token, the Shi'a spiritual and temporal leadership, which accepted 
the Accord as an "out of necessity settlement", felt that its power was not reflected 
sufficiently in the new political formula as envisaged by the Accord. Its claims on the 
system were still unsatisfied and the newly designed mechanism had not pacified 
them. Other communities which shared similar feelings expressed their concern over 
a number of issues, most prominent of which were those related to their security 
requirements and authority status. The Taif Accord re-arranged the political power 
distribution of the 1943 National Pact. It enabled the Moslem component of the 
Lebanese society to secure for itself an expanding role in the political decision-making 
process at the expense of a shrinking Christian role.
Some critics may find in the Accord a moderate adjustment to the 1943 
National Pact. This was shown in the slight increase of the Moslem share in the 
power structure, from a ratio of 5:6 to a ratio of 6:6. It is also claimed that the Accord 
resembled President Frangie's Constitutional Document of 1976. Assuming that this 
is the case, the National Pact and the Document's apportionment of the top 
administrative posts were changed under the Taif Accord. The allocation of certain 
posts to specific communities was abolished under the Accord.100 This ultimately will 
lead to a loosening of the grip of the Maronites and the Sunnis on some positions of 
authority.
B National Identity and the Probability of War
The Accord endorsed, in unequivocal terms, what the elite of both communities 
earlier had agreed upon: that Lebanon is an Arab state by identity and by affiliation. 
Yet the Maronite masses and intelligentsia disavowed themselves from this dictum, 
attributing their roots to a Phoenician rather than Arab origin. This issue may not in
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itself be a direct cause of open violent conflict; at the same time, it does not diminish 
or eliminate the probability of war. It may trigger some other issues which could start 
a chain reaction leading to tension- building and conflict- sustenance.
C Sovereignty of Lebanon and the Probability of War
The Taif Accord is strikingly explicit on the question of the sovereignty of 
Lebanon. This featured as article number one in the Accord: Lebanon is an 
independent and sovereign country. The Document referred to the Israeli occupation 
of parts of southern Lebanon as a flagrant breach of the country's sovereignty (section 
3 entitled the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation). It did not say much about 
the presence of the Syrian forces in Lebanon- an issue of major concern to the Status 
Quo Coalition, particularly the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal Party, General 
Aoun, and to a certain degree, the Phalanges party.
Consequently, the Reformist Camp impassionately rejected the Coalition's 
interpretation of Syria's role in Lebanon and refused to equate the Syrian presence in 
the country with the Israeli occupation of the self-proclaimed security zone in southern 
Lebanon. Furthermore, it argued that the Syrian troops were in the country at the 
invitation of the Lebanese legal authorities. Above and beyond that, it maintained that 
Syria is a sister country whereas Israel is an enemy, and Israeli forces occupied parts 
of Lebanon by the use of force.
The Accord failed to make a firm commitment on the withdrawal of the Syrian 
troops from Lebanese territory, except a phased withdrawal from Beirut and its 
environ, within two years following the endorsement of the political reforms by the 
parliament. Moreover, the Accord singled out Syria, from among the Arab countries, 
for its "distinctive" relations with Lebanon, and requested that this distinctiveness be 
embodied in bilateral agreements between the two countries (section 4 of the Accord). 
This particular clause strengthened the radical Maronites' suspicion of Syria's design 
on Lebanon. They insisted on a complete and total withdrawal of the Syrian troops 
from all of Lebanon. Since the elites of the Coalition parties have already accepted, 
most probably temporarily, the presence of Syrian troops in the country, it is likely that 
a condition may arise in the not-so-distant future when this issue might resurface and 
become a subject of acute conflict between the two Camps. Aoun supporters and the 
Lebanese Forces as well as the Maronites' grass roots have not given it up. When 
the time comes they will thrust this issue back into political debate.
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VIII Implications of the Resolution of the Basic Issues on the Authority 
Status of the Conflict Parties 
A Political Reform and Authority Status
Have the approved political reforms affected the authority status of the conflict 
groups and their respective communities within the authority structure of the state and 
in the society at large? The answer to this question resides in the domain of the 
structural relations within and between the conflict groups themselves, and between 
them and the state.
1 Relations Within the Conflict Groups
Within each community, antipathy towards the militias developed in 
conjunction with the Militias' growth in power and the expansion of their authority. 
However no effective alternative leadership structure emerged to countervail the 
assertive political and military role of the Militias. In the Status Quo Coalition there is 
virtually only one bona fide militia: the Lebanese Forces. In the Reformist Camp, 
there are numerous militias and armed groups, but the most effective ones are: the 
Shi'a militias of Amal and the Hezbollah, the mainly Druze Progressive Socialist Party, 
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Ba’ath, and the Communist parties. The Shi'a 
and Druze Militias are in the forefront as far as actual military and political presence is 
concerned. However, the militia solidarity and cohesion started to wane as far back 
as the 1980s. This phenomenon was due to loss of group feeling on which the 
military power was built. Around that time the Shi'a community was divided in its 
support and loyalty between the secular movement of Amal and the religiously 
oriented Hezbollah . Conflict between the two for the control of their community had 
been violent and costly. The Druze and Shi'a Amal Militias clashed over the control of 
west Beirut. Amal attacked the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and southern 
Lebanon. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party was split into two factions, as were the 
Communists.
The Militias of the Status Quo Coalition were not spared the infighting that 
plagued the Militias of the other side. The Lebanese Forces attacked and eliminated 
the Militia of the National Liberal Party. They were also accused of massacring the 
leader of the Marada Militia, Tony Frangie and his family, in his home town, Ehden. 
The predominantly Maronite Aoun faction of the Army fought a devastating battle with 
the Lebanese Forces.
A dialectical relation had developed between the Militias and the inter- 
communal conflict. In order to survive the Militias had to perpetuate the conflict which
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provided them with power and material rewards. They weakened state authority and 
presented themselves as a persuasive alternative state. Their rationale was that 
since the state functions had withered away, they had to take over those functions 
that are vital for the survival of the population.
The Lebanese Forces Militia had developed a semi-state structure as far as 
services to the community were concerned. They introduced a rudimentary type of 
welfare system for their adherents and turned their Militia into a regular army- like 
structure. The other two main Militias, Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party, were 
not able to match the Lebanese Forces with their services but, nevertheless, 
developed an organisational structure that perpetuated their existence for the whole 
conflict life cycle.
A basic component of the reforms envisaged by the Taif Accord was the 
disbanding of the militias within six months of the resumption of state authority 
(Section II of the Accord). This provision created a favourable atmosphere within the 
communities themselves and reflected positively on inter-communal relations, but was 
reluctantly accepted by the Militia leadership.
2 Relations Between the Conflict Groups
The combined Moslem Communities' authority status was enhanced by the 
increase in their share of power. Conversely the Christians', in particular the 
Maronites', authority status was diminished and diffused throughout the state 
hierarchy. The release of the top authority positions from the fetters of 
confessionalism would loosen the Christians' grip on the highest ranks in the authority 
hierarchy and allow other communities to rise in power and authority.
The Taif Accord proposed a clearly defined formula for power-sharing based 
on the existing realities of the evolving social structure of the component communities, 
but did not provide for any future changes to accommodate new variations in the 
demographic and socio-political balance of these communities. Failure to foresee and 
plan for those changes may create similar conflictual conditions in the future.
3 Relations of The Conflict Groups to The Centre of 
Authority
The Maronite, and to a certain degree, the Sunni communities were seen as 
encompassing the state much to the estrangement of other communities. The 
National Pact allowed them to occupy the most influential administrative and political
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positions, such as the Presidency of the Republic and the Prime ministership, the 
Governorship of the Central Bank, the Army command, and other important posts in 
the administration. On the other hand, communities like the Shi'a felt that they were 
an antipodal outpost belonging to another part of Lebanon. This situation was 
remedied, to a certain extent, by the Accord by granting them a bigger portion than 
what they had of the state rewards. At the same time, it allowed the Sunni Moslems 
to retain, more or less, the same status position they enjoyed under the National Pact. 
The Taif Accord has not granted the Druzes any substantial change of status. Their 
share in the power formula was increased slightly within the general increase 
allocated to the Moslem group.
B National Identity and Authority Status
The issue of Lebanon's national identity, which seemed to have been officially 
settled by the Accord, was, in fact accepted as a best available preference. The 
people's affiliation, which had been shaped over the centuries, could hardly be 
changed by an elite decision taken under the pressure of a package deal. Yet it was 
an issue of central significance to the mainstream conflict situation since the 1920s.
To the Moslems, and particularly the Sunnis, and to the Greek Orthodox, 
affiliation to Arabism is not a disorienting exercise, and as such should not be used 
against them in the loyalty criteria for Lebanon. This means that they could be 
entrusted with the highest political office in the land. To the Maronites such an 
affiliation poses a traumatic prospect for their status as well as for their independent 
existence.
Regardless of its centrality, the identity issue did not gain predominance in the 
deliberations that led to the conclusion of the Taif Accord. The fact that it had been 
resolved by the agenda of previous attempts, would make its impact on the authority 
status of the various communities negligible at best. Lebanon's Arab polices are 
usually formulated on the basis of a whole matrix of factors. The identity 
consideration is but one of them.
C The Sovereignty of Lebanon and Authority Status
Each one of the two Camps was at variance with the other over what 
constituted a breach of sovereignty of the country, but none of them claimed the 
authority to define it. Each one had its own perceptions and tried to explain the 
concept of sovereignty and its breach accordingly. However, it is well known that 
both Camps tried to augment their authority status by soliciting the support of foreign 
powers. The Reformist Camp turned to Syria and some other Arab countries for help,
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and the Status Quo Coalition turned to some European countries, Israel and Iraq for 
the same purpose.
The Accord pin-pointed Israel as the source of breach of Lebanon's 
sovereignty. Conversely, it called on the Syrian authorities to help maintain law and 
order in the country until Lebanon's own forces are rebuilt and become ready to take 
over this function. The effect of this on the conflict parties was considerable, since the 
whole issue of foreign interference could tip the domestic balance of power and 
enhance the authority status of either Camp, or community to the detriment of the 
other.
IX The Resolution of the Basic Issues and its implications for the 
Underlying Causes of the Conflict 
A Political Reform And The Underlying Causes of The Conflict
Political reform is a cornerstone in the conflict resolution process. As a matter 
of fact, the Taif Accord is mainly about reforming the political system, a demand vital 
to the Reformist Camp and perturbing to the Status Quo Coalition. The reform 
package as envisaged by the Accord had been assessed by "many Christians as a 
half-hidden attempt to return to the days of the Maronite-Sunni alliance"101, a situation 
rendered implausible by the increased demographic Shi'a power. The reforms did not 
satisfy every party but were acceptable to all. The Reformist Camp accepted it on the 
understanding that it constituted an interim useful settlement and a means to end the 
war, which might usher a new era of peace and stability in the country and bring 
tranquillity to its exhausted and war-weary communities. This could be a situation that 
may eventually lead to better conditions for lifting their stakes in the future.
B National Identity And The Underlying Causes of The Conflict
The issue of National Identity of Lebanon was resolved at the elite level. 
However, this issue lost much of its power as a determinant factor in the conflict 
situation due to a change in the regional environment and its implication for the 
domestic politics. The present regional variables, unlike those of the 1940s and 
earlier, created a situation in which the concept of Arabism regressed from a notion of 
common Arab will into a concept of expediency of the individual Arab states.
Since the demise of Gamal Abdul-Naser in the early 1970s, the Arab masses 
turned from a belief in the super legitimacy of the collective Arab will to a belief in the 
legitimacy of the state. Coser explains this phenomenon by pointing out that if a
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conflict group fights for an ideology or supernational cause, then the conflict is likely to 
be intense and violent.102-
The Moslems’ tendency to affiliate with the world of Arabdom has been 
overshadowed by their evolving allegiance to Lebanon, and thus has given the 
Christians some peace of mind as to the future of an independent and sovereign 
country. In spite of this, the intelligentsia of both camps, who tacitly disagree, might 
cause this issue to surface again and play a contributory role in any future communal 
conflict.
C The Sovereignty of Lebanon and the Underlying Causes of 
the Conflict
The threat to, and actual breach of, Lebanon’s sovereignty created an 
atmosphere of consternation and apprehension among the Lebanese. According to 
Haddad, the violation of the country's integrity came from the armed Palestinians in 
Lebanon, the Israelis, the Syrians, and other external powers which extended a 
helping hand to the warring factions. Haddad depicts Lebanese sovereignty as a 
victim of the Arab-lsraeli conflict, the clash between Lebanon's western orientation 
and its Arab ties, the growing Palestinian militancy, and the Syrian ambivalent 
designs. "What sets the Lebanese case apart is the regularity of foreign 
intrusion....the continuity of foreign physical control of the national territory, and the 
openness with which Lebanese nationals accept the intervention of various non- 
Lebanese in Lebanon."103
Lebanon's breached sovereignty is quite a significant problem in itself, but 
equally important is the perception of the various conflict groups of what constitutes a 
breach of sovereignty. Their definition of it differs and, therefore, their acceptance or 
rejection of it depends on their perception. As we have seen earlier, the Syrian 
presence in Lebanon is not a breach of its sovereignty to the Reformist Camp but it is 
very much so to the Status Quo Coalition. It could be stated that their position on this 
issue is derived mainly from their perceived interests rather than from the provisions of 
international law. As long as they have contradictory demands on the system, foreign 
intervention would be sought by the weaker party, an act which, as experience has 
demonstrated, would elicit a reaction in kind from the rival party.
Events of the last sixteen years have revealed that foreign intervention and the 
violation of Lebanon's sovereignty were crucial factors in the intensity and violence of 
the conflict and its resolution. At a certain stage, the Status Quo Coalition agreed to 
discuss the issue of political reform but only after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops
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from Lebanon. The Reformist Camp rejected the condition for fear of losing the 
leverage if Syria withdrew before the settlement of this issue. They put equal 
demands on the Lebanese Forces Militias to sever their relations with Israel before 
they will accede to any dialogue with them.
The Taif Accord's formula on Lebanon's sovereignty seems to have addressed 
the problem in the short term. It will remain a source of conflict as long as national 
unity and its corollary of a shared value system is not attained, and as long as the 
state authority remains weak. However, the problem is tied up to a constellation of 
regional and international circumstances. This does not relegate to irrelevance the 
structural factors inherent in Lebanese society which give rise to opportunities for 
foreign intrusion and domestic erosion of the state authority.
The "distinctive" relations between Lebanon and Syria is not a new topic. 
What is new is the association of this concept with the Syrian military presence in the 
country and its support of the Reformist Camp. The Accord laid down the conditions 
for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and defined clearly the points at which the 
interests of both countries meet.
An area of considerable bearing on the conflict was omitted from the Accord, 
that is, the Lebanese-Palestinian relations. As noted earlier, these relations were, 
before and at the early stages of the conflict, a core issue in inter-communal relations. 
The Palestinian armed resistance played a contributory factor in the conflict. 
However, towards the end of the conflict's life cycle, its input into the conflict process 
receded. Since the forced departure of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, it ceased to 
be a factor of any significance in the over all conflict situation. Nevertheless, the 
Accord, being a mechanism for the resolution of Lebanon’s internal problems, 
included the Resistance in its provision for the disarming and disbanding of Lebanese 
and non-Lebanese militias.
X Conclusion
The Taif Accord is a successful attempt at resolving the Lebanese conflict by 
restoring consociationalism to the management of its pluralistic structure. The 
creation of Lebanon within its existing borders may be seen as an accident of history, 
yet it cannot be reversed. Its people have to decide under which system they have to 
live.
The divided people of Lebanon were faced in their struggle for national survival 
with the question of how to coexist peacefully with each other. Esman suggests two 
strategies for this problem. The first is "... to eliminate or reduce pluralism. The
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second is to legitimize and manage it."104 Both approaches were attempts to resolve 
Lebanon's predicament. The first strategy was utilized by the conflict groups 
themselves during the war, but failed. The second was a government designed 
strategy used before and after the war with initial success. Methods suggested under 
the first option included genocide, expulsion of minorities, partition and assimilation.
Instances of massacres and expulsion were evident throughout the conflict 
years, but more numerous and widespread during the early stages of the conflict. The 
Lebanese Front militiamen massacred, in August, 1976, Palestinian and Lebanese 
inhabitants of the Tel al-Za'atar refugee camp, and of the Nab'a and Karantina slum 
areas. About 2500 persons were reported to have died defending these areas.105 In 
retaliation, the Palestinians and their Moslem and Druze allies overran the Christian 
coastal town of Damour and the neighbouring village of Na'ame. Their inhabitants 
were either murdered or evacuated. The survivors of Tel al-Za'atar were installed in 
these two villages.106
Following the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in March, 1977, his Druze 
followers retaliated by murdering more than one hundred Christian inhabitants in the 
Chouf area.107 Perhaps one of the most violent days in the whole war epoch was a 
Saturday in December 1975, when Christian militiamen set up roadblocks in their 
areas in east Beirut and pulled Moslems out of their cars and murdered them on the 
spot. "At least 300 Muslims were butchered in this way; an equal number of 
Christians probably met the same fate."108 The massacres of Palestinians in the 
refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila, following the death of president elect Bashir 
Gemayel in September 1982, remains a most notorious incident of mass killing in the 
whole war period. 109
Instances of massacres were also evident in the power struggle for the control 
of the Maronite community. In a surprise onslaught, the Lebanese Forces under 
Bashir Gemayel, annihilated the militia of the National Liberal Party, the Tigers.110
Expulsion of unwanted minorities was also practiced by the conflict parties. 
Serious outbreaks against the Moslems in eastern Beirut, and against Christians in 
the Chouf district and eastern Sidon, resulted in the flight of minorities to safer areas. 
Expulsion on political and ideological grounds took place also in north Lebanon, 
whereby members of the Phalanges party and Lebanese Forces militia were expelled 
from the Zghorta district as a result of the murder of Tony Frangie by the Phalanges 
militias.
Partition as a strategy of eliminating pluralism was also contemplated by the 
leaders of the Lebanese Front, but abandoned in the face of mounting pressures from 
the opposite parties and the Arab countries as well as from lack of support from the 
international community. This attempt was, at a later stage of the conflict, replaced by 
a call for a federative system of government in Lebanon. This attempt also failed but 
remained a deferred option on the agenda of the Lebanese forces and their 
sympathizers.
Other methods suggested by Esman to eliminate or reduce pluralism, such as 
assimilation and acculturation, may have been pursued, with a certain degree of 
success, in other Middle Eastern countries111, but proved to be inapplicable to the 
Lebanese model of pluralism. Religious differences and sectarian loyalties and 
solidarities constituted a barrier to crossing the communal boundaries. Moreover, 
none of the component communities could claim to be a sufficient majority in the 
country to be entitled to set the appropriate norms. However, the Maronites perceived 
themselves as the most authoritative representatives of a Lebanese ethos and they 
encouraged acculturation and assimilation into their own perception of a "Lebanese 
political order".
These methods of eliminating or reducing pluralism failed in Lebanon. They 
intensified the conflict and increased the cleavages between the communities. The 
alternative strategy of dealing with pluralism is to manage and control it. This was the 
Government’s option. Esman suggested that such a strategy could be implemented 
through four different venues: allegiance to the state, consociational policies, regional 
autonomy of ethnic minorities, and religious and cultural autonomy of the component 
communities.112 There is enough evidence to suggest that Lebanon utilized, with a 
considerable degree of initial success, consociationalism and cultural diversity as a 
method of managing its pluralist structure.
Allegiance to the State and its institutions was a long term aim of the National 
Pact. However it was not achieved for two main reasons. The first is that the State 
had recognized sectarian pluralism and granted the various component sects control 
over their own affairs, mainly in the area of personal status matters. Individuals, in 
this case, could not transcend their sectarian allegiance to that of the State. The 
second is that the State itself, and some of its major institutions, such as the army, 
could not maintain neutrality among the various sects. For much of the conflict years, 
the army was seen by the Moslems as a defender of the Christian sects in the 
country.
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The architects of the Taif Accord were well aware of the saliency of sectarian 
loyalties. They tried to restore to the State the allegiance it lost to the sects, by 
restoring equilibrium to the state structure and neutrality to its institutions. In his 
attempt to persuade the Maronite Patriarch to support the Accord, Husein al-Huseini, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and godfather of the Accord, argued that 
the outcome of the meeting of the Lebanese parliamentarians in the city of Taif was 
not a zero-sum result, and that the Accord "... will not take away powers from one 
community and give it to the rival community. All communities will make concessions 
to the State and its institutions."113
Consociational policies were the corner stone of Lebanon's political order 
particularly since independence. They were adopted in the National Pact formula, 
upgraded by the Chehab regime in the early 1960s, but collapsed at the outbreak of 
the civil war in 1975. The Taif Accord resurrected the concept of consociationalism 
and reintroduced it into the states' ethnopolitics. Consociational policies succeeded in 
incorporating every sect into the state institutions according to a specified formula of 
communal representation.
In conclusion, the Taif Accord terminated the immediate hostilities, and 
restored to the social structure, for the time being, its tranquillity by restoring 
legitimacy to the concept of pluralism and efficiency to consociational management. 
However it fell short of providing an all inclusive conflict resolution mechanism to 
Lebanon's sectarian loyalties. Although it acknowledged the necessity of phasing it 
out in stages, the Accord retained confessionalism as a foundation of communal 
relations. This remains a core issue with significant implications for the political 
system. If unresolved Lebanon will remain in the danger zone of repeated episodes 
of conflict. A solution to this aspect of communal relations needs to be sought outside 
the Taif concept of conflict resolution. We may have to search for it in a welfare-state 
concept whereby the individual associates himself with the state rather than with his 
sect. In this case, the state rather than the sect, the family or the feudal lord would be 
able to provide for all his needs. In other words, the state needs to liberate the 
individual from his or her sectarian subservience and commitments as a first step 
towards the establishment of an appropriate social and political order.
The conflict process, as well as its Taif resolution, revealed that the underlying 
causes of the conflict in Lebanon were generated by the social structure, and the 
conflict itself was about positions of authority and access to government rewards. The 
determining factors were social and political in nature rather than economic. The civil 
war was not a class struggle prompted by economic determinants, but was a power 
struggle between communities and within them.
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It remained to be stressed that in the beginning we posed the question of what 
were the causes of the conflict, what was the relevant theoretical framework to 
analyse them, and what was the most appropriate method for resolving the conflict. 
We have demonstrated that the main causes of the conflict lie in the social structure. 
We accepted Marx's argument of the structural basis of the conflict but rejected his 
interpretation of class struggle and economic determinism in the conflict process. 
Instead we have made the argument that Dahrendorf's notion of political determinism 
and Ibn Khaldun’s concept of asabiya are determining factors in the rise and fall of 
states and that they give an adequate interpretation of the conflict in Lebanon.
The resolution of the conflict became possible when it addressed the problem 
of power and authority in the social structure, that is, when it restored balance to 
communal entitlement and recognized the deep cleavages resulting from asabiya 
consciousness. This was achieved through a revived consociational remedy to a 
pluralist social structure. However, the redistribution of power between the various 
component communities is governed by a multiplicity of factors that are subject to 
change.
We have argued that the Taif Accord, among the numerous attempts to 
resolve the Lebanese conflict, has been the most successful so far. It has taken into 
account those factors which have largely been responsible for the perpetuation of 
conflict in Lebanon.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The war in Lebanon came to an end officially with the conclusion of the Taif 
Accord. Two interrelated basic goals were achieved by this Accord: the termination of 
hostilities, and the resolution of the three main issues around which the conflict 
revolved and persisted, namely, political reform, national identity and sovereignty of 
the state. The resolution of these issues did not necessarily mean that the basic 
causes of the conflict had been solved, as in principle conflicts are never solved but 
resolved.1 It could be legitimately claimed that this episode of conflict was solved but 
the conflict itself was not. What has been resolved at the Taif Accord is the political 
aspect of the problem rather than its social origins. The balance of communal power 
within a consociational system was restored but the underlying causes which may 
have been dormant, have not been addressed directly. These causes are harboured 
by the social structure and they will erupt whenever the contradictory societal 
conditions become salient again.
This study demonstrated that although the conflict in Lebanon have appeared 
to be of a political nature, in the sense that it involved the State and the exercise of 
authority as an object of the conflict groups' perception, its underlying causes are 
social, in the sense that they originated in the social structure, and emanated from its 
existing contradictions.
I Social Structure or Social Processes
The focal point of this study was not the social structure per se but the social 
processes, in particular the conflictual tendencies inherent in this structure. Yet the 
approach is in agreement with conflict theorists such as Marx, Coser and Dahrendorf 
who postulate that any analytical study of social conflict must "...begin with a 
consideration of the social structure."2
Alluding a principal role to social structure in the generation of conflict does not 
mean that the influence of external factors is relegated to the lower rungs of 
importance. Nevertheless, the results of this study could not support the argument 
that the socio-political structure was just a passive recipient of an .external stimulant. 
External factors exacerbated but did not cause the conflict. The dynamism of the 
conflict process itself and its causal historical antecedents revealed that the social 
structure was the source of the conflictual tendencies.
The failure of the social structure to regulate these tendencies and to manage 
their spasmic nature led to their eruption into a violent and intense inter-communal 
conflict. The social structure failed also to absorb influences emanating from the 
changing regional environment. This rigidity in the social structure was challenged by 
the rising communal consciousness of the less privileged communities and their 
ascending awareness of their communal entitlements.
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Failure of the social structure to respond to the exigencies of change and the 
emergence of the conflictual tendencies is a two-way relationship. Each one fed on 
the other. The conflict weakened the social structure to such an extent that social 
structure could not preclude the eruption of the conflictual tendencies. To analyze the 
nature of this relationship and the ensuing conflict process, its dynamism and 
outcome, this study resorted to conflict theory and found in it a relevant conceptual 
scheme which served the purpose.
The findings of the research were arrived at by analyzing the historicity of the 
social determinants of the conflict. It was evident that an explanation of the recurrent 
historical events in the life of the component communities would help elucidate their 
present power structure. Their conflictual tendencies, being a part of this structure, 
were the focus of the investigation.
II Theoretical Framework
A conflict theory approach captured the empirical situation under investigation 
more effectively than a consensus and order approach. It directed the research 
towards a problem area of social interaction instead of a structure area within which a 
particular conflict on values, interests and power existed. A structural-functional 
approach would have missed or ignored the conflictual tendencies, or treated them as 
a pathological phenomenon in need of cure. Underlying the functionalist approach 
would be the assumption that Lebanese society is an orderly, stable and equilibrated 
social system. The conflictual episodes it experienced would be seen as deviations 
from this state of affairs.
The functionalist assumptions as well as the applicability of the major premises 
of a structural-functional theory were deficient in providing this research with a viable 
conceptual scheme to analyse the Lebanese conflict and its basic causes. A conflict 
theory approach was the alternative. For this reason the insights of Marx, Dahrendorf, 
Coser, Ibn Khaldun, as well as Parsons' structural functionalism were helpful in 
constructing a conflict model that would capture the empirical situation at hand. 
Parsons' insights in this area were useful in elucidating the inapplicability of a 
consensus, order and stability framework to the analysis of a conflict structure.
The proposed model was based upon the premise that conflict is endemic, 
ubiquitous, a basic law of life, constructive and destructive by nature, and is 
embedded in the social structure. Two basic generic concepts were utilized in this 
model: Dahrendorf's concept of authority and Ibn Khaldun’s notion of asabiya. Both 
concepts were utilized, complementarity, to analyze the causes of social conflict and 
describe the formation, rise to power and demise of power groups.
Marx’s conception of the role of the social structure in generating conflict was 
illuminating in promoting the basic hypothesis of this study. However, his theory of 
class struggle could not be applied to the Lebanese conflict simply because class 
consciousness does not constitute a power base in the Lebanese society, as Khuri 
observed. Family and sect interests, not class interests, dictate the course of political
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rivalry.3 Conflict groups fought over access to the power structure, about positions of 
authority, and communal entitlement to the overall reward system. Analysis of this 
phenomenon needs concepts other than the class concept to grasp the various 
dimensions of the problem.
Authority and asabiya, as political and organizational concepts, were useful 
tools in describing the dynamism of the conflict process. As a political notion, 
authority is manifested as a communal goal over which the conflict parties fought. 
The Reformist Camp struggled to introduce political reform to the existing political 
system in order to ensure a more equitable distribution of power and authority 
between the component communities. The Status Quo Coalition retaliated by holding 
on to the existing system for fear of losing its dominant authority status. Both groups 
had the same evaluation of the authority structure, but different perceptions of the 
social structure. For the Coalition the social structure was immutable. If changed it 
would have been destroyed. For the Reformists it was always changing, always in 
motion. These two different interpretations were prompted by the two groups' 
perceptions of the power and authority attributes of the social structure.
Authority as a classificatory concept delineated the conflict groups as those 
who had the power and authority as against those who were deprived of it. 
Dahrendorf maintained that the first group tried to shut off the rival group from the 
main source of power, and the second group tried to penetrate the closed circle. In 
the Lebanese context, the Maronites have the exclusive rights to occupy the position 
of the President of the Republic, as well as a few other power yielding bureaucratic 
posts; the Shi’a had the same exclusive rights to the Speakership of the House of 
Representatives; and the Sunnis had a similar right to the Prime-ministership. The 
desire to possess authority and power on the part of the communities which lacked 
them sets in motion a process of struggle and counter-struggle that developed into a 
full-fledged conflict.
Nevertheless, the notion of authority fell short of describing, comprehensively, 
the structure of the conflict groups. This deficiency was rectified by introducing the 
notion of asabiya into the analysis of this area of social conflict.
Asabiya is an organizational as well as a social and political concept. As a 
classificatory concept it differentiates between the groups which have asabiya and 
those which lack it. Those groups which have strong asabiya have also the power 
and usually the reign. The groups with weak asabiya are usually subservient to the 
strong asabiya groups.
The major militias in Lebanon are structured around at least one of the 
attributes of asabiya; they coalesce around blood relations, alliances or loyalty to the 
chieftain. The Lebanese conflict revealed that religion, sect, and geography are 
essential elements in the definition of asabiya. As indicated earlier, each one of the 
main militias has a sectarian and geographic dimension in its structure. The 
Lebanese Forces are predominantly Maronite. Their members are drawn mainly from
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the Christian villages in North Lebanon, el-Metn area and the dislocated inhabitants of 
the Christian villages in the Chouf. The Marada militia was a Maronite group whose 
members were mainly from the Zghorta town and its environ. The Amal militia was 
predominantly a Shi'a organization whose members come from south and east 
Lebanon, and southern Beirut. The Hezbollah was exclusively a Shi’a militia whose 
members were mainly from eastern Lebanon and the South. The Progressive 
Socialist Party militia was a Druze group whose members were recruited from the 
Druze inhabitants of the Chouf, el-Metn, and Hasbaiya regions.
Authority is based on coercion and asabiya on consent and obedience. 
Voluntary organizations, such as the militias which saw themselves as volunteers not 
mercenaries, were kept solidly coherent by appeal to the attributes of asabiya rather 
than by the use of authority. The combative will of these groups, as well as the will of 
the community for self assertion, was best explained by the concept of asabiya.
1 Significance of the Framework
The significance of this theoretical framework can be assessed in terms of its 
relevance to three types of settings: a) to sociological theory; b) to conflict theory; and, 
c) to society at large.
Sociological theory has provided the theoretical framework with the necessary 
means to analyse the social structure. Other disciplines, such as psychology, political 
science or history lack the relevant concepts which would enable the research to 
focus on the social structure. On a more specific level, conflict theory is best 
equipped to analyse an inherently conflictual social structure, which has until recently 
been treated as a pathological phenomenon, mainly because of the deficiency in 
theoretical concepts.
This framework contributes to the development of the conflict theory approach 
by testing the two concepts of authority and asabiya in a conflict situation. The 
analysis indicated that asabiya, though a fourteenth century North African concept 
associated with tribal structure, remains a relevant concept to analyse the rise and fall 
of power groups in a Middle-Eastern society such as Lebanon. This had a significant 
implication for the decision makers, particularly mediators of conflict, and for the 
society at large.
2 Applicability of the Framework
The question that poses itself in this context is whether this theoretical 
framework is unique to the analysis of conflict in Lebanon, or is it applicable to other 
societies. The answer to this query is to be sought at two levels of generalization: first 
at the assumption level and second at the empirical level. Generally speaking, this 
framework is valid for the analysis of a communal conflict irrespective of time or space 
limitations. But on a more practical level, the basic assumption underlying the main 
hypothesis will determine whether the framework is the appropriate one to be utilized
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or not. If our focus is the social structure and its inherent conflictual tendencies then 
this framework is a valid scheme for analysis of irreducible conflicts, such as the four 
centuries old Northern Ireland conflict, and the ethnic conflict in traditional societies, 
such as those existing in Yugoslavia, between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or in 
Pakistan between Baluch, Pashtuns and Sindhis, or in Sri Lanka between the Tamils 
and Sinhales, or in Malaysia, between the Malays and the Chinese, or in Sudan 
between the Arab Moslem north and the mainly African Christian south.
As for the principles of treatment and resolution of the conflict, the practices 
used by Lebanon are not unique. They have been tried in several European and 
Third World countries with a good measure of success. Whether the conflict is ethnic, 
racial, sectarian or linguistic, it can be reduced to a conflict over positions of authority 
and a commanding place in the power structure. A power-sharing system such as the 
one adopted by Lebanon could bring any conflict of such nature within a legitimate 
manageable level.
Ill Conflict Parties and Issues
Conflict groups are identified by their authority and asabiya structure. 
However, for the purpose of resolution of the conflict, other criteria may be utilized. In 
the conflict situation at hand, mediators were able to identify and work with two 
contending parties, the Status Quo Coalition and the Reformist Camp. Within these 
two broad based groupings there were a number of parties which coalesced at 
different levels of political organization. The parties of the National Movement 
became more independent and self-centred after the assassination of their leader in 
1976. They felt free to pursue their conflictual aims which sometimes diverted from 
the central aim of the defunct Lebanese National Movement.
Comparable conditions existed in the rival groups. The Lebanese Front, 
though more coherent than the National Movement, experienced similar conditions. 
Following the demise of two of its influential leaders, Camille Chamoun and Pierre 
Gemayel, the Front’s leadership passed into the hands of a less experienced 
generation which was unable to hold it together. Even inside the Lebanese Forces 
organization divergent views at the elite level caused a split in its leadership structure. 
In December 1985, the chairman of the executive committee of the Lebanese Forces 
was toppled by his lieutenants because they disagreed with him over a draft 
agreement to resolve the conflict with the rival Amal and Progressive Socialist Party 
militias.
This anarchism in conflict groups configuration dragged on for some time 
before a clearly defined bi-polar conflictual structure re-emerged in between these two 
contradictory camps, namely, the Status Quo Coalition and the Reformist Camp. 
During the course of the war several issues were countered; some were resolved, 
others withered away, new ones emerged, but what endured were mainly three: the 
political reform, the national identity, and the sovereignty of Lebanon with a special
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reference to the presence of foreign troops on its soil. Each one of the two conflict 
groups aligned itself against the other vis-a-vis these issues.
The Reformist Camp considered the issue of political reform as a major cause 
of the conflict, and made its resolution a main objective of its political agenda. 
However, not all members of the group held identical or even similar views on this 
issue. The most reformist minded group in this Camp was the Lebanese National 
Movement. It demanded radical changes to the sectarian system. It wanted it to be 
totally abolished and replaced by a laicist system. The Moslem establishment 
proposed, instead, a system based on a deconfessionalized order. Other aspects of 
the requested amendments, such as abolishing the sectarian basis of parliamentary 
representation and the redistribution of power between the communities to restore the 
equilibrium to the social structure, attracted consensus among members of the 
Reformist Camp members.
Conversely, the Status Quo Coalition rejected most of the demands of the 
Reformist Camp in this area, but they acquiesced in the demand for total 
secularisation. Their reluctance to yield to the reform proposals stemmed from three 
considerations: first any change to the existing system would be detrimental to their 
dominant position; second, the abolishing of the sectarian basis of the representative 
system would erode the power base of the Maronite political parties; third, the 
requested changes would produce a shift in the loci of power from the Christians to 
the Moslem bloc.
The second issue of contention was the determination of the national identity 
of Lebanon and its implications for Lebanon's relations with the Arab world. Having 
rejected earlier attempts by the Moslem pan-Arab irredentists to associate Lebanon 
with Arabism, for reasons discussed in this thesis, the Coalition, particularly the 
Maronites, had towards the end of the conflict's lift cycle, renounced their objections 
and accepted Lebanon's Arab identity. Their acquiescence in this resolution was 
tacitly encouraged by a declaration from the opposite side that Lebanon is an 
independent and sovereign state.
The third issue of Lebanon's sovereignty stemmed, partly, from the contending 
parties’ perceptions and, partly, from objective factors. Each group had its own vision 
of what constituted a breach of sovereignty. The Coalition took the view that the 
state's loss of control over its territory was tantamount to the loss of its sovereignty. 
As such, Lebanon’s sovereignty for the Coalition, was compromised by the presence 
of the armed Palestinian resistance movement as well as by the Syrian troops and 
Iranian and Libyan armed groups which were in virtual control of the areas they 
occupied. On the other hand, the Reformist Camp emphasised the objective factors 
as exhibited in the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the latter’s recurrent incursions 
into the country. For the Reformists, the presence of the Syrian troops in Lebanon 
was not a breach of its sovereignty, for they entered the country at the request of the 
legitimate government of the day. Their presence therefore did not constitute a 
violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon. The Coalition parties also incorporated the
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Israeli occupation in their definition of sovereignty, but they treated it as equal to the 
presence of other armed groups in Lebanon, especially the Syrian troops.
The core value of these issues to the conflict parties varied. At the outbreak of 
hostilities, the issue of political reform occupied a primary position in the conflict 
agenda of both groups. Towards the end of the conflict's life cycle, the issue of 
Lebanon's sovereignty became a front-line piercing issue, whereas the national 
identity question maintained a steady value throughout the conflict years.
IV Conflict Regulation: Theoretical Implications for Three Kinds of 
Theories
The above three basic issues were successfully resolved by the Taif Accord. 
A new set of conflict regulation practices in the areas of sectarian equilibrium and 
communal entitlement were also envisaged by the Accord. These practices were not 
dissimilar to those conceived by the National Pact, and employed by the successive 
governments since independence. Some of these regulatory practices, especially the 
ones subsumed under consociational democracy theory, worked well for a limited 
period of time, such as elite cooperation which ceased with the generation of militia 
leaders, and the jointly exercising government which practically came to an end with 
the Gemayel regime. Moreover, at least one of the basic characteristics of 
consociationalism was not fully applicable to the Lebanese situation; that was the 
required high degree of autonomy of the ethnic groups. It is a fact that the sects in 
Lebanon enjoyed a high degree of religious legal autonomy, mainly in the area of 
personal status, but the cleavage line was not as sharp and deep as to warrant total 
ethnic separation between them.
Segmentation and cleavages in Lebanon have emerged along sectarian lines. 
This has engendered strong ideological and political divisions in the country. 
Consociational politics succeeded in bridging these cleavages but failed in 
establishing a more enduring political system which would self-regulate, manage and 
resolve the underlying conflictual tendencies. Other compatible devices were also 
utilized to ensure harmony and concordance in the Lebanese society; the electoral 
law, for example, established a cross-communal distribution of electoral power 
whereby a representative of a certain sect may be chosen by another sect instead of 
his own. This violated the basic principle of representation in consociational politics.
Irrespective of whether consociationalism succeeded or failed in Lebanon, the 
experience itself is worth investigating from the point of view of its contribution to the 
main theoretical conceptions. The two conflicts Lebanon has had in its thirty-two 
years of independence, 1958 and 1975, as well as that of a century ago, provide an 
ample scope for testing three groups of conflict and conflict related theories: political 
stability, cross-cutting cleavages, and power-sharing theories.
A Political Stability Theories
Political stability, according to its proponents, is positively correlated with 
consensus. Consensus is a prerequisite for a politically stable government to govern.
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The absence of consensus will create an atmosphere which would allow strife and 
instability to grow. The two conflict experiences in the post-independence era of 
Lebanon could provide an augmentation to this theory. However, in between these 
two episodes the relations between the Lebanese communities were generally 
peaceful and the government was in control in spite of the fact that value consensus 
was virtually absent. The power-sharing system produced an environment of stability 
that allowed governments to govern.
B Cross-cutting Theories
Cross-cutting theories stipulate that overlapping opinions, characteristics, and 
communal belonging, create stability in a system by procuring moderation and 
conciliation among the various actors. Cross-pressures can, if properly communicated 
between the conflict groups, clear the misconceptions which would otherwise 
exacerbate communal conflict4.
The more influential pre-1975 political elites in Lebanon shared a greater 
degree of overlapping background, characteristics, and political experience than the 
post-1975 turbulent era elites. They had an historical experience represented by their 
struggle for the 1943 independence of Lebanon and their common effort to establish a 
viable and stable state. Compromises were made and concessions were traded in an 
atmosphere of cooperation and amicability, for the sake of the stability of the system,
However, cross-cutting theories proved to be of limited analytical value in the 
analysis of the inter-communal relations at the masses level and of diminished power 
at the elite level. In a prolonged conflict, where the emergence of new issues and 
new leaders is not uncommon, cross-cutting currents keep changing with every new 
phase of the conflict process. To be able to generalize, one has to study a single 
episode of the conflict.
C Consociational Democracy Theory
The consociational arrangements, adopted immediately after independence in 
1943, brought to Lebanon relative stability in the areas that matter most: communal 
relations. The elite settlement, the National Pact, between the leadership of the 
Maronite and Sunni communities, introduced a power-sharing formula which defined 
clearly, for the first time, the relations between all component communities of Lebanon 
vis-a-vis their numerical weight in the body politic of the country. The National Pact 
stipulated a course of action in which each community was given a chance to 
contribute to the political process of the country within a clear-cut framework which 
guaranteed each party an appropriate share in the parliament, government, 
bureaucracy, judiciary and the army.
Some writers believe that the introduction of these measures was conducive to 
the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy in Lebanon5. Others 
maintained that Lebanon indeed attempted a consociational solution to its perennial 
problems but failed to achieve the desired results that other similar societies 
achieved6.
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Lebanon’s pluralist characteristics and its deeply divided society can provide 
the consociational theory with a valuable testing ground for verifying the impact of 
pluralism on the basic tenets of stability. The Lebanese consociational experience 
manifested certain attributes which were conducive to consociational democracy as 
well as other attributes which indicated that the theory requires substantial 
modifications.
We discussed earlier the factors that contributed to the success of a 
consociational solution in Lebanon. Now we shall turn to the factors which appear to 
be present in Lebanese society that were conducive to the establishment and 
maintenance of consociationalism but require that the theory be modified. It is 
important to notice that the civil war in Lebanon highlighted some of these factors 
which otherwise would not have been so conspicuous and might have remained 
dormant. Among the factors are the impact of segmentation on elite control and the 
emergence of an external threat.
a Segmentation of Society and Elite Control
Consociationalism stipulates that a distinct line of cleavage presumes the 
success of consociational arrangement on the grounds that good fences make good 
neighbours. It is further assumed that cleavages promote cohesion within each 
group, and this subsequently strengthens the bargaining power of its leader. The 
leaders’ power to negotiate, cooperate, and make compromises is of vital significance 
for the success of any consociational solution under negotiation.
The war in Lebanon has indeed deepened the lines of cleavages between the 
communities by increasing their asabiya consciousness and the sense of 
distinctiveness in some of them. By the same token, it created the necessary 
conditions for the emergence of new leaders with roles that were compatible with the 
war aims of their communities. Thus, the role of the leader as a spokesman for his 
community was clearly established. So was his power base. This committed him to 
his community's wishes. In a sense, he became a hostage of his community's aims. 
His powers and latitude for consociational initiatives became contingent on his 
community's objectives rather than on his own visions and designs. Therefore a 
modification is required to take into account the power of the masses and their 
influence on the decision-making process of the elites.
b External Threat
Consociationalism proposes that an external threat produces an incentive 
towards cooperation among the elites and impresses upon them the need for unity. 
Lebanon had been under severe external threat from across its borders, including 
Israel's tacit claim to the Litani River in the South. Furthermore, Israel's continuous 
incursions into southern Lebanon and its occupation of a slice of the country has not 
created a situation in which the elite in the various communities would cooperate in 
their response to this threat. On the contrary, it exacerbated the divisions and
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deepened the cleavages among them. Some factions7 saw in the Israeli threat a 
support mechanism to press with their factional claims. The situation with the Syrian 
role in the Lebanese conflict is similar. One faction8 finds in it a friendly and brotherly 
helping hand while the opposite factions consider it a quintessential source of threat 
to their very existence.
A modification is required to take into consideration the group cohesion and its 
relation to an external threat. For such a threat to be a unifying factor, it has to be 
perceived by all parties as a common danger and a threat to the whole group.9
V Conflict Resolution
The resolution of the conflict in Lebanon defied the efforts of peace makers 
over a period of sixteen years. From the outset the conflict process was 
counterpoised with persistent attempts to terminate it. But these attempts failed for 
three reasons: the first is related to the conflict parties and their perception of their 
conflict aims; the second is linked to the issues of conflict; and the third is due to the 
conflict resolution approach.
The conflict groups, on both sides of the conflict, had their own interests which 
sometimes varied from that of their blocs. To resolve the conflict does not mean that 
every party's interests were met. The Taif Accord was satisfactory to the Phalanges 
party and the Lebanese Forces, but did not meet General Aoun's concern for 
Lebanon's sovereignty.
Moreover the conflict process delivered a new generation of leaders who had 
different perceptions, goals and approaches from their progenitors. Nevertheless, 
most of them saw in the conflict an opportunity to advance their own interests. They 
pursued their conflict aims to the very end reckoning that there is more to be gained 
from pursuing the conflict than from resolving it. The Coalition’s concern over the 
possible loss of their dominant status, and the Reformist Camp's desire to have a 
bigger share of the pie prompted both of them to pursue the conflict to the end of its 
life cycle.
The metamorphosis in the conflict issues jeopardized also the resolution efforts 
for ending the conflict. Each stage of the conflict brought with it either a new issue or 
a new version of the same issue. The fighting broke out first between the Phalanges 
party militias and the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Beirut. It ended with 
pitched battles between the predominantly Maronite break-away army of General 
Michel Aoun and the Syrian troops in Lebanon. In between these two stages the 
conflict parties changed as well, as did the conflict issues. Maronites fought Maronites 
and Shi'a fought Shi'a over the control of their respective communities.
Resolving the issues in dispute under such conditions was a close to 
impossible mission. Yet several attempts were made. The conflict parties themselves 
put forward their proposals but they proved to be no more than structural techniques 
to reduce the tension. The Coalition, for example, suggested an institutional format
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based on the principle of federalism, or regional autonomy, but was totally rejected by 
the Reformist Camp on the grounds that it ran contrary to Lebanon's social structure 
and would lead to partition and the exacerbation of communal tension.
With the escalation of the conflict both camps became convinced that a third 
party was needed to resolve the conflict. The Coalition tried to involve European and 
Western mediators but the Reformist Camp thwarted this attempt and, in turn, insisted 
on Arab mediation. Finally, an Arab brokered mediation succeeded in resolving the 
conflict. It was the Arab League Tripartite Committee consisting of three heads of 
states, that of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria, which succeeded in resolving the 
conflict issues at the Taif meeting of the Lebanese parliamentarians in October, 1989.
Their approach was a classical third-party panel mediation approach with 
certain innovative methods in crisis management. The mediators who delegated this 
mission to their respective foreign ministers enjoyed the respect and confidence of the 
conflict parties, and obtained their authority from the Arab League and their power 
support from the international community, particularly, the five permanent members of 
the Security Council.
After apprising themselves of the views held by all warring factions, a set of 
proposals was drawn up, based on the perceptions of the conflict groups themselves, 
as revealed to the Arab League committee of six. The Tripartite Committee decided 
to invite the Lebanese parliamentarians rather than the leaders of the warring factions 
to a meeting in the summer resort city of Taif in Saudi Arabia to discuss the proposals. 
The choice of parliamentarians was based on the assumption that they represent all 
the different factions and were nominated as their representatives to engage in direct 
discussions in the presence of mediators. The parties negotiated the proposed 
solution in a spirit of cooperation and with minimum interference but intensive 
caucusing from the mediators, allowing them to create jointly the new appropriate 
structure.
The new structure satisfied both groups. The previous perception held by 
either side that any solution to the problem would have a zero-sum effect were turned 
into a positive-sum outcome in which both sides can claim the attainment of their 
minimum objectives. The provisions of this agreement were enshrined in the 
constitution as amendments to the 1926 constitution of Lebanon.
VI Future Directions
Resolving the present conflict through the participation of the conflict groups 
and to everyone's satisfaction is not in itself a guarantee that at some future 
unspecified date conflict episodes will not recur. This is due to the fact that the social 
structure, which bred the conflictual tendencies, has not changed significantly as a 
result of the amendment to the political system. The nearest thing to a change in the 
social structure was the phenomenon of communal entitlements. Such entitlements 
have come to possess a normative quality in Lebanese society. Like any other norm,
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they have developed a certain degree of fixity. They have constituted barriers among 
the communities and taking them away would be possible only at a price. The 
Maronites struggled to keep their entitlements as endorsed by the National Pact. The 
rival communities have not been bereft of counter claims. A compromise was worked 
out through the Taif Accord whereby the problem of communal entitlement was 
readdressed and a balance was restored.
The old agencies of change and development in Lebanese society were re- 
acredited by the Taif Accord. The Accord retained the same political and social 
institutions which were operative under the National Pact. The state structure 
retained its sectarian basis, with participation in the political process requiring formal 
sectarian affiliation. Patron-client relationship retained its centrality as far as the 
distribution of government awards is concerned. Distribution of positions of authority 
and resources is still done on the basis of the same stratification system of the 
National Pact. Each community is entitled to a certain predetermined quota for 
government rewards and resources. The same political institutions of the pre-war era 
are entrusted, in the Second Republic, to regulate the use of and access to power. 
The question of national identity and ongoing political reform are handled by the same 
political parties who fought over it for sixteen years.
The same social institutions were also retained. Their saliency in the new 
Lebanon was reinforced by the Taif Accord rather than diminished. The family is still 
the main source of material and non-material security for its members. It kept its role 
as the primary socializing agency of the young. In other words, the sixteen years of 
war did very little to liberate the ordinary Lebanese from his or her dependency on the 
same structure which generated the conflict. Asabiya consciousness and sectarian 
identity continues to be emotively strong factors. The question that comes to the 
forefront of this study is what are the future directions that Lebanon should take to 
eradicate conflict.
First, it is too optimistic to assume that conflict can be eradicated. Conflict 
itself is neutral. It can either be regulated, suppressed or resolved. However, the 
conflict phenomenon needs a milieu, a habitat to metamorphosize. That habitat is the 
social structure. It follows that where the structural conditions are right then conflict 
will erupt. This means that unless the social structure is changed we will keep 
experiencing a recurrence of conflict episodes and probably a different kind of conflict 
which varies in nature, shape and form but not in intensity and violence.
Second, what would a restructured Lebanon look like? A new Lebanon ought 
to develop a new set of regulatory and integrative institutions which will ensure the 
separation between political conflict and social development. In more specific terms, 
certain basic features of the social structure ought to be changed. High among these 
features is the sectarian regime and communal relations vis-a-vis the authority 
structure. An important feature of sectarianism in Lebanon is its asabiya component. 
The decision makers have to look into the possibility of transforming Lebanese society 
from a tribal-like structure, exhibiting such attributes as feudal patronage, familism,
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sectarianism and regionalism to a more diffused type of society in which the citizen is 
liberated from all these attachments and feels free to connect directly with the state 
and state apparatuses, and to have direct access to their rewards and resources 
without the help of the intermediaries.
Secularization, in the sense of elimination of social and political sectarianism, 
may solve part of the problem. The problem with this solution is that it is not attractive 
to either of the two conflict groups. The Maronites, and the Christians in general, 
support social secularization. The traditional Moslems reject it. They in turn advocate 
deconfessionalization of the political system. The Christians reject it. In taking such a 
position on this issue, both groups are driven by a perceived regime of benefits and 
loses in the power and authority structure.
Secularization will not also solve the problem of the individual's ontological 
needs for economic, political, social and psychological security. These problems are 
part of the social fabric of the society. They are governed by social factors and need 
to be solved at that level.
A welfare system ought to provide a viable framework to address this problem. 
Under the existing system, the individual’s ontological needs, particularly those in the 
areas of security, identity and even basic human rights, are pursued through the 
individual's membership in an ethnic group, political organization, or kinship system. If 
the State can guarantee these needs, then the above institutions would become 
irrelevant as agencies for winning their entitlements. A welfare system would enable 
the individual to become a citizen, whereby communal loyalty becomes a matter of 
choice and sectarian identity a personal matter.
The findings of this thesis have demonstrated clearly the difficulty of resolving 
a conflict situation, which is embedded in authority and asabiya. No conflict resolution 
can occur without taking into account the basic roles of these two factors in generating 
conflict. Their power must be diluted in any conflict resolution process.
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DOCUMENT OF 
LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
FIRST - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND REFORMS 
I GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1 Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country. It is a final homeland 
for all its citizens. -It is unified in its territory, people, and institutions within the 
boundaries defined in the Lebanese Constitution and recognized internationally.
2 Lebanon is Arab in its identity and its association. It is a founding and active 
member of the League of Arab States and abides by its pacts and covenants. 
Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization 
and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception.
3 Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public 
liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice 
and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination.
4 The people are the source of authority and sovereignty: they shall exercise 
these powers through the Constitutional institutions.
5 The political system is established on the principle of separation, balance, and 
cooperation amongst the various branches of Government.
6 The economic system is free and ensures private initiative and the right of 
private property.
7 The even development among regions on the educational, social, and 
economic levels shall be a basic pillar of the unity of the state and the stability of the 
system.
8 Endeavouring to achieve comprehensive social justice through financial, 
economic and social reform.
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9 Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese shall have the 
right to live in any part of it and to enjoy the sovereignty of law wherever he resides. 
There shall be no segregation of people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no 
fragmentation, partition, or colonization.
10 There shall be no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts 
the 'pact of communal coexistence’.
11 POLITICAL REFORMS 
A The Parliament
The Parliament is the legislative power which exercises full supervision over 
government policy and acts.
1 The President of the Parliament is elected for a period equal to the life of the 
Parliament.
2 The Chamber may, once only, two years after the election of its President and 
his Deputy, and in the first session it holds, withdraw its confidence from the President 
of the Chamber or his Deputy by a Decision of two thirds of the Chamber, based on a 
petition signed by at least ten Deputies. The Chamber, at such point, must hold an 
immediate session to fill the vacant post.
3 Every bill sent by the Council of Ministers to the Parliament, in an urgent 
capacity, ought not be promulgated unless it is inscribed in the agenda and read in a 
general session, and the time limit specified in the constitution lapses without deciding 
on it and after the approval of the Council of Ministers.
4 The electoral constituency is the Mouhafaza.
5 Until such time as the Chamber enacts new electoral laws on a non­
confessional basis, the distribution of seats shall be according to the following 
principles:
a Equal representation between Christians and Moslems.
b Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each 
religious community.
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c Proportional representation among geographic regions.
6 The number of parliamentary seats is increased to 108 to be divided equally 
between Christians and Moslems. Exceptionally, and for one time only the seats that 
are currently vacant, as well as the new seats that have been established by this 
Document, shall be filled by appointment, all at once, by the prospective Government 
of National Unity.
7 With the election of the first Parliament on a national non-confessional basis, a 
Senate shall be established in which all the religious communities shall be 
represented. Its authority shall be limited to major national issues.
B President of the Republic
The President of the Republic is the head of the state and the symbol of the nation's 
unity. He shall safeguard the Constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. He is the 
Command-in-Chief of the Armed Forces which fall under the authority of the Council 
of Ministers. He exercises the following powers:
1 presides over the Council of Ministers when he wishes without participating in 
voting.
2 presides over the Supreme Defence Council.
3 issues decrees and requests their promulgation; he has the right to ask the 
Council of Ministers to review any Decision that the Chamber has taken within fifteen 
days of the decision's transmission to the Presidency. If the Council of Ministers 
insists on the Decision or if the time limit passes without the Decree being issued or 
returned, the Decision or Decree shall be considered legally operative and must be 
promulgated.
4 promulgates the laws after they have been approved by the Chamber. He also 
has the right, after notifying the Council of Ministers, to request a reconsideration of 
the laws in accordance with the time limits specified by the Constitution and its 
provisions. In case the time lapses without its promulgation or return the laws are 
considered executed and ought to be promulgated.
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5 forwards to the Chamber of Deputies Bills that are delivered to him by the 
Council of Ministers.
6 designates the Prime Minister in consultation with the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies based on Parliamentary consultations which shall be binding 
and the content of which the President shall formally disclose to the Prime Minister
7 issues alone the Decree which designates the Prime Minister
8 issues in agreement with the Prime Minister the decree appointing the Cabinet 
and the decrees accepting the resignation of Ministers.
9 issues, on his own authority, the decrees accepting the resignation of the 
Cabinet or considering it resigned.
10 accredits (Lebanese) Ambassadors (abroad) and accepts the credentials of 
(foreign) ambassadors, and grants official decorations by Decree.
11 negotiates and ratifies international treaties in coordination with the Prime 
Minister. These treaties are not considered ratified except after agreement of the 
Council of Ministers. They shall be made known to the Chamber whenever the 
national interest and security of the state permit. However, treaties involving the 
finances of the state, commercial treaties, and in general treaties that cannot be 
renounced every year shall not be considered ratified until they have been approved 
by the Chamber.
12 addresses, when necessary, letters to the Chamber of Deputies.
13 calls by Decree, in agreement with the Prime Minister, the parliament to 
extraordinary sessions.
14 may introduce, from outside the agenda, any urgent matter to the Council of 
Ministers.
15 may, in agreement with the Prime Minister, call the Council of Ministers to an 
extraordinary session, whenever he sees it necessary.
16 grants particular pardons by Decree, but a general amnesty cannot be granted 
except by a law.
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17 during the execution of his mission, the President is not responsible unless he 
violates the constitution or commits an act of treason.
C The Prime Minister
The Prime Minister is the head of the Government and its representative and 
spokesman. He is considered responsible for executing the general policy that is set 
by the Council of Ministers. He exercises the following powers:
1 heads the Council of Ministers.
2 conducts the Parliamentary consultations involved in forming a Cabinet. He 
signs, with the President, the Decree forming the Cabinet. The Cabinet must present 
its general statement of policy to the Chamber and gain its confidence within thirty 
days. The Cabinet shall not exercise its powers before it gains the Chamber’s 
confidence nor after it has resigned or is considered resigned, except in the narrow 
sense of managing affairs.
3 presents the Government's general policy statements before the Chamber of 
Deputies.
4 signs, along with the President, all decrees, except the Decree which 
designates him the head of the Government (ie. Prime Minister), and the Decree 
accepting the Cabinet's resignation or considering it resigned.
5 signs the Decree calling for an extraordinary parliamentary session, decrees 
issuing laws, and requests for reviewing laws.
6 calls the Council of Ministers into session and sets its agenda, and informs the 
President and the Ministers before hand of the subjects included on the agenda and 
of the urgent subjects that will be discussed, and signs the minutes of the sessions.
7 supervises the activities of the public administrations and institutions and 
coordinates among the Ministers and provides general directives to ensure the proper 
progress of affairs.
8 holds working meetings with the competent authorities in the Government in 
the presence of the concerned Minister.
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9 he is, ex officio, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Defence Council.
D The Council of Ministers
Executive authority shall be vested in the Council of Ministers. Among the powers 
that it exercises are the following:
1 sets the general policy of the Government in all fields, prepares Bills and 
Decrees and makes the decisions necessary for implementing them.
2 watches over the execution of laws and regulations and supervises the 
activities of all the Government’s branches including the civil, military, and security 
administrations and institutions without exception.
3 The Council of Ministers is the authority to which the armed forces are subject.
4 appoints Government employees and dismisses them and accepts their 
resignations according to the law.
5 has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies upon the request of the 
President of the Republic if the chamber of Deputies, for no compelling reasons, fails 
to meet during one of its regular periods and fails to meet throughout two successive 
extraordinary periods, each longer than one month, or if the Chamber returns an 
annual budget plan with the aim of paralyzing the Government. This right cannot be 
exercised a second time if it is for the same reasons which led to the dissolution of the 
Chamber the first time.
6 whenever the President of the Republic is in attendance he chairs the 
meetings of the Council of Ministers.
7 The Council of Ministers meets in a locale specifically set aside for it. The 
legal quorum for a Council meeting shall be a two-thirds majority of its members. It 
shall make its decisions by consensus. If that is not possible, it shall make its 
decisions by vote of the majority of attending members. Basic national issues shall 
require the approval of two thirds of the members of the Council named in the Decree 
forming the Cabinet. Basic national issues are considered the following:
The declaration of a state of emergency and its termination, war and peace, general 
mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the annual Government budget,
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comprehensive and long-term development projects, the appointment of Grade One 
government employees and their equivalents, the review of the administrative map, 
the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, electoral law, nationality law, personal 
status laws, and the dismissal of Ministers.
E The Minister
The powers of the Minister are strengthened in accordance with the general policy of 
the government and with the principle of collective responsibility. He is not to be 
dismissed except by a decision of the Council of Ministers or by a vote of no 
confidence in him personally by the Parliament.
F Resignation of the Government and Considering 
It Resigned and the Dismissal of Ministers
1 The Government is considered resigned in the following circumstances: 
a If the Prime Minister resigns;
b If it loses more than a third of the members specified in the Decree 
forming it;
c If the Prime Minister dies;
d At the beginning of the term of the President of the Republic;
e At the beginning of the term of the Chamber of Deputies;
f When it loses the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies based on the 
Chamber's initiative or based on the Council's initiative to gain the 
Chamber's confidence.
2 Ministers shall be dismissed by a Decree signed by the President and the 
Prime Minister, after the approval of the Council of Ministers.
3 When the Council resigns or is considered resigned, the Chamber of Deputies 
shall automatically be considered in extraordinary session until a new Council has 
been formed and has gained the Chamber's confidence.
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G Abolition of Political Confessionalism
Abolition of political confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be 
achieved according to a gradual plan. The Chamber of Deputies which is elected on 
the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate 
measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional 
plan. A National Committee shall be formed headed by the President of the Republic, 
including, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime 
Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures. The tasks of this Committee 
shall be to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, 
propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministers, and supervise the 
execution of the transitional plan.
During the transitional phase:
1 The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the 
judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies 
shall be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they 
shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One 
posts and their equivalents shall be excepted from this rule, and the posts shall be 
distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular 
job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and 
competence.
2 Removal of mention of religion and sect from the identity card.
Ill OTHER REFORMS
1 Administrative Decentralisation
a The Lebanese state is a unitary and unified state with a strong central 
authority.
b The authority of the heads of the Muhafazat and the heads of the 
Qada's shall be broadened, and all the branches of the government 
shall be represented in the administrative districts at the highest level 
possible in order better to sen/e the citizens and to respond to their 
needs locally.
c The administrative map shall be reconsidered in order to ensure 
national integration while preserving coexistence and the unity of land, 
people, and institutions.
d Broad administrative decentralization shall be adopted on the level of 
small administrative units (the Qada and smaller) by electing a council 
for each Qada headed by the Qayem Maqam (the appointed governor 
of the Qada) to ensure local participation.
e A unified and comprehensive development plan for the nation shall be 
adopted. The plan should lead to the development of the various 
Lebanese regions economically and socially. The resources of the 
Municipalities, of the joint Municipalities, and the Municipality Unions 
shall be enhanced through appropriate financial support.
The Courts
a In order to ensure that all officials and citizens are subject to the 
supremacy of the law and to secure the harmonious functioning of both 
the legislative and executive authorities with the requirements of 
coexistence and with the basic rights of the Lebanese as specified by 
the Constitution:
i A supreme council stipulated by the constitution shall be 
formed. Its function is to try presidents and ministers. A special 
law to this effect should be legislated.
ii A Constitutional Council, as prescribed in the Constitution, shall 
be established to supervise the constitutionality of Laws and to 
arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential 
elections. The President, the President of the Parliament, the 
Prime Minister, along with any ten Members of Parliament, have 
the right to consult this Council on matters that relate to the 
constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of 
religious communities have the right to consult this Council only 
on laws relating to personal status, the freedom of belief and 
religious practice, and the freedom of religious education. The 
rules governing the organization, operation, composition, and 
modes of appeal of the Council will be decided by a special law.
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iii The following bodies have the right to petition the Administrative 
Council in matters related to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and the supervision of the constitutionality of the 
laws:
President of the Republic 
President of the Parliament 
Prime Minister
A certain proportion of the members of Parliament
b To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the 
heads of religious communities have the right to consult this Council in 
matters related to:
i Personal status
ii Freedom of belief and religious practices
iii Freedom of religious education
c In strengthening the independence of judiciary a certain number of the 
Supreme Judicial Council are elected by the judicial body.
3 Electoral Law
Parliamentary elections shall be held according to a new electoral law on the basis of 
the Muhafazat. The new law shall respect the principles which ensure coexistence 
among the Lebanese communities, political representation for all classes and age- 
groups in the population, and the effectiveness of that representation, after redrawing 
the administrative map within the framework of the unity of the land, the people, and 
the institutions.
4 The Establishment of an Economic and Social Development Council
An Economic and Social Council shall be established to ensure the participation of 
representative of the various sectors in the formulation of the economic and social 
polity of the government by providing advice and suggestions.
5 Education and Teaching
276
a Education shall be provided for all and shall be made obligatory, at 
least for the elementary classes.
b Freedom of education shall be ensured according to the law and 
general rules and regulations.
c Private education shall be protected, and the supervision by the 
government of private schools and school textbooks shall be increased.
d Public, vocational, and technical education shall be reformed and shall 
be reinforced and developed in a way that meets the nation’s 
developmental needs. The Lebanese University shall be reformed and 
supported, especially in the faculties of applied fields.
e Educational programs shall be re-examined and redesigned to 
reinforce national identification and integration, to ensure spiritual and 
cultural openness, and to unify history and civic education textbooks.
6 The Media
All the media shall be re-organized in line with the law and within the framework of 
responsible freedom to serve the goals of national reconciliation and the termination 
of the state of war.
SECOND - EXTENDING THE LEBANESE STATE S AUTHORITY 
OVER ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY
As agreement was reached among the Lebanese protagonists on the establishment 
of a strong and able state based on the principle of national concord, the Government 
of National Reconciliation shall put together a detailed security plan to be 
implemented within one year, the aim of which shall be the gradual extension of the 
state's authority over all Lebanese territory by the state's own means. The broad 
outlines of this plan shall be as follows:
1 The dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the handing 
over of their weapons to the Lebanese state within six months beginning after the 
ratification of the Document of National Reconciliation, the election of the President of 
the Republic, the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation, and the 
amendment of the Constitution to include political reforms.
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2 The internal security forces shall be reinforced through:
a Opening of conscription to all Lebanese without exception, training 
them, and distributing them to units in the Muhafazat where they will 
continue to undergo regular and organized training programs.
b Reinforcing the security apparatus to tighten the control on the entry 
and exit of individuals by land, sea, and air across the nation's borders.
3 The reinforcement of the armed forces.
a The main task of the armed forces is the defence of the homeland and, 
when necessary, the preservation of general order when the threat to 
that order goes beyond the capabilities of the internal security forces.
b The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces 
in order to maintain security when the Council of Ministers so decides.
c The armed forces shall be unified, equipped, and trained to assume 
their national responsibilities in facing Israeli aggression.
d When the internal security forces are capable of assuming their security 
responsibilities, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.
e The intelligence branch of the armed forces shall be re-organized to 
serve only military purposes.
4 The problem of displaced persons shall be solved in depth, and the right of 
each Lebanese person displaced since 1975 to return to the place from whence he 
was displaced shall be recognized; laws that will ensure these rights shall be enacted 
and the means to help in their return shall be provided.
As the objective of the Lebanese state is to extend its authority over all of its territory 
by its own means, first and foremost by its internal security forces, and based on the 
reality of the filial relations that tie Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian armed forces shall 
(with Lebanese gratitude) help the legitimate Lebanese forces to extend the Lebanese 
state's authority during a specified time period not to exceed two years beginning after 
the ratification of the Document of National Reconciliation, the election of the 
President of the Republic, the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation,
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and the incorporation of the political reforms into the Constitution. At the end of this 
period, the Government of Syria and the Lebanese Government of National 
Reconciliation shall agree on the redeployment of Syrian forces in the Beqa’, at the 
entrance to the western Beqa’ in Dahr al-Baydar, and down to the Hammana-Mdayrij- 
Ayn Dara line, and, if necessary, to other locations to be agreed upon by a joint 
Lebanese-Syrian military committee. The two Governments shall also agree on the 
size and duration of the deployment of the Syrian forces in the locations mentioned 
above and the specification of the relationship between these forces and the 
Lebanese authorities in the areas of their deployment. The Higher Tripartite Arab 
Committee is ready to help the two states in reaching this agreement if they so wish.
THIRD - THE LIBERATION OF LEBANON FROM 
ISRAELI OCCUPATION
Reinstating Lebanon's authority all the way to its internationally recognized frontiers 
requires:
1 Working toward implementation of UN Resolution 425 and all other resolutions 
of the UN Security Council which demand the full withdrawal of Israeli forces.
2 Insisting on the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement signed by Israel and 
Lebanon on March 23,1949.
3 Taking all necessary measures to liberate all Lebanese territory from Israeli 
occupation; extending the state's authority over its entire territory; deploying the 
Lebanese Army to the internationally-recognised Lebanese border area; and 
endeavouring the reinforce the presence of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
in the Lebanese South to ensure Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for 
the return of security and stability to the border area.
FOURTH - LEBANESE-SYRIAN RELATIONS
Lebanon, which is Arab in its belonging and identity, has close filial ties to all the Arab 
states; there exist between it and Syria distinctive relations which derive their force 
from the roots of propinquity, history, and common filial interests. This is the 
foundation on which coordination and cooperation between the two countries shall be 
based. This shall be embodied in agreements between the two in various fields which 
shall realize the interests of the two filial countries within the framework of the 
sovereignty and independence of each. Based on this, and because the
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consolidation of security provides the atmosphere required to develop these special 
ties, Lebanon must not be a source of threat to Syria's security - or Syria, to 
Lebanon's security - in any way whatsoever. Lebanon shall not allow itself to be a 
passageway or haven for any force, state, or organization that aims to threaten its 
own security or the security of Syria. And Syria, which cares greatly for Lebanon's 
security, independence, unity, and the concord of its citizens, shall not allow any 
activity that will threaten Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.
